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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
1.

Idaho Is a Common Law Strict Liability State.
For unless the owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner
had such knowledge, he is liable. - McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing
Ass 'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909).
Such is the law in Idaho. Such has been the law in Idaho since at least 1909. Such is a clear

and concise statement of the common law of strict liability for dog bites.
The declaration of the common law was reiterated by this Court less than three years ago: "In
the absence of statute to the contrary, an owner is liable for injuries caused by a domesticated animal
where the owner knew or should have known of the animal's vicious or dangerous propensity." Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443,446,337 P.3d 602,605 (2014).
This simple declaration is the sum and substance of the common law of the United States and
England pertaining to dog bites as it has existed since at least 1846. By the end of the first week of
the first year of law school, every law student has been exposed to the preeminent hombook on the
law of torts: Prosser and Keeton on Torts. From its earliest editions, Professor Prosser and staff have
explained: "Strict liability for animals apart from any trespass on land is a very ancient origin but
finds its first modem statement in 1846 in the English case of May v. Burdett, it is ... an instance of
strict responsibility placed upon those who even with proper care expose the community to the risk
of a very dangerous thing. While two or three jurisdictions insist there is no liability without some
negligence in keeping the animal, by far the greater number impose strict liability." - Prosser and
Keeton on the Law ofTorts, Ch. 13, § 76, p. 541 (5th ed. 1984).
Professor Prosser then explains: "A possessor of a domestic animal is not subject to liability
for harm simply and solely because it resulted from a dangerous propensity of the domestic animal.
To be strictly liable the possessor must have known or have reason to know of a dangerous propensity
or trait that was not characteristic of a domestic animal of that kind." Id. at 542
Idaho is one of the earlier states to adopt the common law strict liability. In .McClain, the
Idaho Supreme Court cited to Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322 (1857). The Decker v. Gammon
opinion, in tum, relied upon May v. Burdett, 9A. & E., N.S., 101 (58 Eng. Com. Law R. 99), the very
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same case relied on by the Prosser Hombook for the common law of strict liability. The Decker case
quotes the May v. Burdett, opinion for the following:
This case decides that negligence is not the basis of the action. That the basis or gist
of the action is the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischievous habits.
Decker v. Gammon at 325 (Italics in the original).
Strict liability is not a negligence action. It is an action based on the knowledge of the
possessor or harboror of the animal of its abnormally dangerous propensities. Thus, the District
Court's ruling that "all of Plaintiffs [Boswell's] causes of action sound in negligence," and instructing
the jury accordingly is clear error.
The Respondents would have us believe that Idaho recognizes only an action for negligence.
Respondents tell us that when this Court said it recognized the common law in Braese v. Stinker
Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443,445,337 P.3d 602,604 (2014), what this Court meant to say is that it only
recognized the common law of negligence - this despite the fact that ths Court articulated the strict
liability rule. Thus, according to Respondents, it would make no difference whether Zoey was a
Scottish Tarrier that had previously only twice drawn blood with its teeth, or Zoey's first cousin, the
Staffordshire Terrier (Pit Bull) that had severed appendages from victims old and young on a dozen
prior occasions. According to Respondents, Idaho only recognizes negligence. So as long as the
harborer of the dog is only hanging up her coat, and the owner is off to school, they are both off the
hook.
2.

Respondents' Brief may be Wanting for Candor as to the Law.
Respondent's Brief, asserts a number of definitive statements that deserve closer scrutiny:
a.

"Idaho has only adopted the concept of strict liability in cases dealing with a seller of
a defective product to consumer." (Res. Br. p. 15);

b.

"Idaho has only adopted the Restatement of Torts in defective product cases."(Res.
Br. p. 12);

c.

"Actually, a majority of other states do not recognize strict liability in dog bite cases."
(Res. Br. p. 21);

Reply Brief
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d.

"Idaho has never adopted or applied the strict liability to dog bite or premises liability
cases. Rather, the common law in Idaho is negligence." (Res. Br. p. 15); and,

e.

"[T]he court [the Court of Appeals in Boswel!J specifically rejected adopting strict
liability as a claim in dog bite cases." (Res. Br. p. 11)

Let us reexamine each of these statements in tum:
a.

Respondents' assertion: "Idaho has only adopted the concept of strict liability in
cases dealing with a seller of a defective product to consumer. "(Res. Br. p. 15)

Respondents open part B of their response brief with this declaration: "Idaho has only
adopted the concept of strict liability in cases dealing with the seller of a defective product to a
consumer," (Res. Br. P. 15).
Actually, Idaho recognizes strict liability in a myriad of circumstances. For example,
Idaho recognizes strict liability for damage caused by trespassing animals. Maguire v. Yanke, 99
Idaho 829, 833, 590 P.2d 85, 89 (1978).
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law of a bailee for the misdelivery of goods.
Quinto v. Millwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162, 938 P.2d 189 (1997).

Idaho recognizes strict liability for damages caused by aircraft operators by the ascent, descent
or flight of aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom. LC. § 21-205.
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law of a corporation for the crimes of its agent.
State v. Adjustment Dep 't Credit Bureau, Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 158-59, 483 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1971).

Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for commercial carriers who fail to safely
transport goods. McIntosh v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 17 Idaho 100, 105 P.66 (1909).
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for livestock dealers who fail to pay for
purchased cattle. US. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889,452 P.2d
993 (1969).
Under Idaho Code§ 6-320 Idaho recognizes strict liability for a landlord who fails to keep the
premises safe for tenants. Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 233 P Jd 1 (2008).
Under Idaho Code§ 6-210 Idaho recognizes strict liability of a parent for harm done by a
minor child.

Reply Brief
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Under Idaho Code § 25-2806 Idaho recognizes strict liability of an owner of a dog that injures
poultry or livestock.
In the criminal realm, Idaho recognizes strict liability for injury caused by a defendant guilty
of aggravated DUI, LC. § 18-8006. State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436 (2005); for failure
to affix illegal drug stamps. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199,204, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App.
2003); for vehicular manslaughter, Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 786 P.2d 580 (1990); for
statutory rape, State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405,410, 788 P.2d 220 (1990); for sale of securities when
not licensed, State v. Montgomery, 135 Idaho 348, 17 P.3d 292 (2001); and for driving without a valid
driver's license. State v. Taylor, 139 Idaho 402, 80 P.3d 338 (2002).
An employer is also strictly liable for statutory penalties for failure to secure payment for
workers compensation. Heese v. A & T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598,635 P.2d 962 (1981).
Last, and most importantly, Idaho recognizes common law strict liability, and strict premises
liability, in dog bite cases when an owner or harborer of a dog knows or ought to know the dog has
a propensity to cause injury. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass 'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104
P. 1015 (1909); Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443,446,337 P.3d 602,605 (2014).
The Respondents have made an unequivocal averment to this Court that Idaho only recognizes
strict liability in one instance: products liability. Respondents are aware or should be aware 1 of at
least fifteen cases or statutes that are directly contradictory to their assertion.

b.

Respondents' assertion: "Idaho has only adopted the Restatement ofTorts in defective

product cases. "(Res. Br. p. 12).
This statement from Respondents seems extremely straightforward - not much room for
interpretation or spin. Yet it is profoundly untrue. Appellants's Brief Addendum 1 cites about 340
cases where Idaho has adopted the Restatement of Torts in a myriad of Tort matters. If we look no
further than those cases decided in this century, we find over thirty-five cases in which this Court has
adopted the Restatement of Torts as Idaho law. Notably, every one of those cases deal with an aspect
of torts other than products liability. Not one of those cases deal with products liability:

1

The Respondents made this exact same assertion to the Court of Appeals and these same cases were cited
in Appellants Reply Brief. Respondents should have known by then that their position was contrary to Idaho case
and statutory law.
Reply Brief
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Washington Federal Sav. v. Van Enge/en, 153 Idaho 648, 289 P.3d 50 (2012), (Rest. 3rd § 1
Intentional Torts); Printcrafl Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 283 P .3d

757 (2012) (Rest.2nd§ 551, Duty to disclose and§ 532 Justifiable reliance); Carrillo v.

Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256 (2012) (Rest. 2nd

§ 500 Reckless

misconduct); Beaudoin v. Davidson Trust Co., 151 Idaho 701,263 P.3d 755 (2011) (Rest. 2nd§
71 Fiduciary relationships); WescoAutobodySupply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,243 P.3d 1069

( 2010) (Rest. 2nd§ 766 Intentional Interference); Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d
642 (2010) (Rest. 2nd§ 586 Privileged statements based on public policy); Castorena v.

General Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 238 P.3d 209 (2010) (Rest. 2nd§ 899 Statute of Limitations);
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 235 P.3d 387 (2010) (Rest. 2nd § 46
Immunity in exercising a legal right); Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149

Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010), (Rest. 2nd§ 46 Emotional Distress); Schmechel v. Dille, 148
Idaho 176, 219 P.3d 1192 (2009) (Rest. 2nd§ 288B Violation of standard of care); Harrison v.

Binnion, 14 7 Idaho 645, 214 P .3d 631 (2009) (Rest. 2nd § 431 Substantial factor as legal cause
of harm); Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 210 P.3d 63 (2009) (Rest. 2nd§
544 Justifiable reliance);Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455,210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009) (Rest.
2nd§ 46 Emotional Harm); Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 204 P.3d 508 (2009) (Rest. 2nd§
457, Liability for Subsequent Harm from attempts to remedy); Jones v. Health South Treasure

Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 206 P.3d 473 (2009) (Rest. 2nd § 429 imputed liability); BECO
Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008) (Rest. 2nd§ 766 B
Intentional interference); Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) (Rest. 2nd §
774 B, Intentional Interference with an inheritance); Steed v. Grand Teton Council ofthe Boy

Scouts ofAmerica, Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007) (2nd§ 288 B Negligence per se);
Dopp v. Idaho Com'n ofPardons and Parole, 144 Idaho 402, 162 P.3d 781 (2007), (Rest. 2nd§ 874
A private right of action); McKinleyv. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 247, 159 P.3d 884 (2007)
(Rest. 2nd§ 46, Outrageous conduct); Nation v. State, Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 158

P.3d 953 (2007) (Rest 2nd § 288 B, Negligence per se); Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and

Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006) (Rest. 2nd § 315 Affirmative duty to aid); Alderson
v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 132 P.3d 1261 (Idaho App. 2006) (Rest. 2nd § 46, Infliction of
Reply Brief

5

emotional distress); O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005) (Rest. 2nd
§ 286 Reasonable man standard for violation of legislative enactment); Galloway v. Walker,

140 Idaho 672, 99 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2004) (Rest. 2nd§ 500 Intentional acts); Jenicek v. State

Farm Fire and Cas. Co., Not Reported in P.3d (2003) (Rest. 2nd § 46 Emotional Distress);
Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 75 P.3d 733 (2003) (Rest. 2nd § 46
Emotional distress); O'Guinv. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 72 P.3d 849 (2003) (Rest. 2nd§ 339
Attractive nuisance); Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc., 138 Idaho 550, 67 P.3d 29 (2003)
(Rest. 2nd§ 652B, Invasion of Privacy); Doe v. Haw, Not Reported in P.3d (2003) (Rest. 2nd §
652 Invasion of privacy); Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249, 61 P.3d 606 (2002) (Rest.
2nd§ 581 A, Truth as a defense to defamation); Wenstrom v. Platinum Recovery Solutions, Inc.,

Not Reported in P .3d (2002) (Rest. 2nd § 894 A, Tort liability for violation of legislative
provision); Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 P.3d 1076 (2001) (Rest. 2nd§ 288 B, negligence
per se); Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 32 P.3d 695 (Ct. App. 2001) (Rest. 2nd§ 46 Emotional
distress); Vincent v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 136 Idaho 107, 29 P.3d 943 (2001) (Rest. 2nd§
552, Foreseeable third party reliance); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Company, Inc., 135 Idaho

80, 14 P.3d 1074 (Ct. App. 2000) (Rest. 2nd§ 317, Master servant liability); Brock v. Board of

Directors, Independent School Dist. No. 1, 134 Idaho 520, 5 P.3d 981 (2000) (Rest. 2nd§ 874 A,
Protected class of Legislative Enactment); Defendant Av. Idaho State Bar, 134 Idaho 338, 2

P.3d 147 (2000) (Rest. 2nd§ 538 Materiality of a statement).
Yet Respondents frankly tell us that products liability is the only area of law where Idaho
adopts the Restatement ofthe Law ofTorts. None of these cases to the contrary are cited in their brief.
Appellants stand by their position that this Idaho Supreme Court has almost always adopted the
Restatement of Torts in every aspect of tort law.
Furthermore, the very language expressed by this court in Braese is identical in substance to
the Restatements concerning injury by animals:
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, an owner is liable for injuries caused by a
domesticated animal where the owner knew or should have known of the animal's
vicious or dangerous propensity.
157 Idaho at 446.

Reply Brief
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That quote from Braese is exactly the same law expressed in Restatement (Second) ofTorts,
§ 509 (1977):
(1) A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by
the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from
doing the harm.

It is also exactly the sentiment expressed in Restatement (Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot.
Harm, § 23 (2010):
An owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has reason
to know has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is subject to
strict liability for physical harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues from that
dangerous tendency.
And it is certainly the law and the sentiment embraced in Restatement (Second) a/Torts§ 513
(1977):
The possessor of an abnormally dangerous dog who keeps it upon land in his
possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming upon the land in the exercise
of a privilege whether derived from his consent to their entry or otherwise.
Appellants stand by their position that Idaho follows the Restatements of the law pertaining
to almost every aspect of tort law in general, and to dog bite in particular.

c.

Respondents' assertion: "Actually, a majority of other states do not recognize strict

liability in dog bite cases. " (Res. Br. p. 21 ).
The Prosser Hombook declares: While two or three jurisdictions insist there is no liability
without some negligence in keeping the animal, by far the greater number impose strict liability." -

Prosser and Keeton on the Law a/Torts, Ch. 13, § 76, p. 541 (5th ed. 1984). Boswells represent to this
Court that almost all states adopt the rule of strict liability, and we have outlined the authorities in our
opening brief. Respondents tell this Court just the opposite. Obviously, either Professor Prosser-and
the Boswells - are right, and the Respondents are wrong, or vice versa.
Respondents do correctly cite to the Court four jurisdictions that do not recognize strict
liability: Hawaii, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont. Nevada statutorily requires two previous
bites, instead of just one, before strict liability is imposed, which wouldn't make any difference here

Reply Brief
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because Zoey had bitten twice before.
Contrary to Respondents' assertions, Florida is very much a strict liability state. Its statute, the
one cited by Respondents, provides:
The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a public place,
or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is
liable for damages suffered by persons bitten. (Fla. Stat. Ann. §767.04).
Florida's Statutory rule is more like the Pocatello Municipal Code, in that it is even stricter than
strict liability. If your dog bites, you are liable. Period. Moreover, the Florida Statute concludes with:
The remedy provided by this section is in addition to and cumulative with any other
remedy provided by statute or common law.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 767.04
In other words, the common law of strict liability as an additional remedy is expressly
preserved in Florida.
Likewise, the Arizona Statute cited by Respondents says just the opposite of what Respondents
represent it as saying:
Injury to any person or damage to any property by a dog while at large shall be the full
responsibility of the dog owner or person or persons responsible for the dog when such
damages were inflicted.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1020. The Arizona Supreme Court interprets the Arizona statute as saying
just the opposite of what Respondents represent it to say pertaining to comparative negligence:
Under the statute, the "owner is virtually an insurer of the dog's conduct." Massey v.
Colorac, 151 Ariz, 65,66, 725 P.2d 1099, 1100 (1986). Provocation is a defense to any
action for damages under the dog bite statute. A.R. S. § 24-2-523 [renumbered 11-1027].
Contrary to the Damrons' assertions, it is the only defense available, "with the common
law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk superseded." "
Massey v. Colorac, 151 Ariz, at 66-67, 725 P .2d at 1100 -1101.

Mulcahy v. Damron, 169 Ariz. 11, 13, 816 P.2d 270,272 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).
Without reviewing every state, state by state, those states that have adopted statutory rules have
either statutorily adopted strict liability, or they have adopted stricter than strict liability, like Arizona,
or like the Pocatello Municipal Code.
Now, Respondents do point out one very important rule of law in reference to those statutes.
They point out that two states statutorily adopt assumption of the risk as a defense, and one state, New
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Hampshire, statutorily adopts comparative negligence, which proves one and only one very important
point: For comparative negligence to apply, it must be done by statute.
The Bowells stand by their representation to this Court that virtually every state, and the
District of Columbia, recognize strict liability as the rule in dog bite situations.
d.

Respondents' assertion: "Idaho has never adopted or applied the strict liability to dog
bite or premises liability cases. Rather, the common law in Idaho is negligence."(Res.

Br. p. 15).
Idaho Supreme Court has twice articulated the common law rule of strict liability pertaining
to injury by domestic animals:
For unless the owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had
such knowledge, he is liable. - McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass 'n,
17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909).

In the absence of statute to the contrary, an owner is liable for injuries caused by a
domesticated animal where the owner knew or should have known of the animal's
vicious or dangerous propensity. - Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443, 446,
337 P.3d 602,605 (2014).
Granted, neither of these two cases were dog bite cases. This Court has also, albeit in dicta,
referred to this rule as "strict liability." Henderson v. Cominco Am., Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 694, 518 P.2d
873, 877 (1973) ("This is entirely consistent with the rule applied to other strict liability involving
animals, or abnormally dangerous activities."). The only time a dog bite has been addressed in the
Idaho Appellate Courts is this case, the Boswells. The Court of Appeals said:
On the other hand, the Court adopted a rule of law lacking the ordinary care scienter
(sic) requirement of negligence when owners of domestic animals know of vicious
tendencies. In cases where a domestic animal is not trespassing, the owner of the
animal is liable for injuries caused if the owner knew or should have known of the
animal's vicious or dangerous tendencies. McClain, 17 Idaho at 79, 104 P. at 1020.
Absent from the rule is any requirement to show a failure to exercise ordinary care.
This rule was again recently affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Braese v. Stinker
Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443, 337 P.3d 602 (2014) ....Notably, the Court did not
mention the need to show a failure to exercise ordinary care under these circumstances.
Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554,560,348 P.3d 497, 503 (Ct. App. 2015).
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Regardless of what the Court of Appeals chose not to label it, the Court of Appeals very much
adopted the common law rule, articulated the rule, and that rule is strict liability for dog bite. What
the Idaho Courts of Appeal have never done is never declared that Idaho is a negligence only state; or
that unless a plaintiff can couch his dog bite injury cause of action in negligence, he has no cause. The,
Idaho Courts have never done that, except for the trial court in this case.

e.

Respondents' assertion: "[T}he court [the Court ofAppeals in Boswell} specifically rejected

adopting strict liability as a claim in dog bite cases. " (Res. Br. p. 11 ).
Regrettably, the Court of Appeals neither adopted or rejected the "label" of strict liability. If
it had, this second appeal might have been avoided. The Court of Appeals outlined the elements of
strict liability, i.e. "prior knowledge, or should have known of the animal's dangerous propensity."
The Court of Appeals noted that a showing of negligence was not one of those elements: "Notably,
the Court did not mention the need to show a failure to exercise ordinary care under these
circumstances." 158 Idaho 554 at 561 (referring to this Court's decision in Brease) The Court of
Appeals adopted every aspect of the law of strict liability. The Court only demurred to apply the label.

3.

Respondents' Rendition of the Facts Fall Short of the Facts.
The Respondents' brief contains several statements of "facts" and procedural events that are

incorrect. Few references to the "facts" are from the trial transcript. Respondents make the following
factual assertions:
x.

"The Boswells kept their negligence per se claim under the Pocatello Municipal Code."
(Res. Br. p. 14).

y.

"The evidence established that Mary Steele did not have any knowledge that Zoe was
dangerous or a vicious animal ... " (Res. Br. p. 19)

z.

"Zoey was also barking and growling, yet despite this, Mr. Boswell approached. Zoey,
with a closed fit (sic) reached over the gate and was bitten." (Res. Br. p.l ).

Let us reexamine each of these statements in tum:
x.

Respondents' assertion: The Boswells kept their negligence per se claim under the

Pocatello Municipal Code. " (Res. Br. p. 14).
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The correct fact is, the Boswells withdrew every cause of action that had anything to do with
negligence before the trial began. The following is straight from the transcript:
MR HEARN: Your Honor, to smooth things and make them a little bit - - we
will - - we'd like to formally dismiss or drop some of our claims on the record, where
we - - no one is confused.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HEARN: And things. Okay? And those claims which we are at this time

dismissing are the per se negligence claims having to do with the state law confinement
of dangerous animals, and any per se claim based upon the city ordinance. This will
leave us - - and I want to make it specific where we know what's still in - - is the
standalone claim - - sorry.
THE COURT: The per se negligence claim as to the city ordinance?
MR HEARN: Any per se negligence claims. Yes, sir.

(Supp. Trans. p. 16).
Respondents' assertion on what happened is simply not what happened. Before trial, the
Boswells had ridded this case of any cause of action having to do with negligence.
The Pocatello Municipal Code is a standalone cause of action. So affirmed the Court of
Appeals. (158 Idaho 554 at 566, fn. 7). The Boswell's cause of action under the Pocatello Municipal
Code was a cause of action premised on that Code's own elements-not on any negligence per se. All
causes of action for negligence, including negligence per se, were withdrawn specifically to avoid the
confusion that would be caused by any instructions or verdict forms having to do with negligence.
Accordingly, all jury instructions or special verdict forms that addressed negligence or comparative
negligence were in error.
y.

Respondents' assertion: "The evidence established that Mary Steele did not have any
knowledge that Zoe was dangerous or a vicious animal . .. " (Res. Br. p. 19).

The evidence established nothing of the sort. That selective summation on the evidence is the
same argument rejected by the Court of Appeals:
Turning to the Boswells' amended complaint, the Boswells alleged that the Steeles
knew Zoey was a vicious animal and that Mr. Boswell had been bitten by the dog. The
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Boswells presented testimony that Zoey had bitten two other individuals prior to Zoey
biting Stephen. The Steeles allege the prior incidents complained of by the Boswells
were not bites, but the dog was merely being protective by nipping at the individuals.
Whether these incidents constituted notice of vicious propensity is a question for the
jury. The incidents, though not severe, resulted in injury evidenced by bleeding and the
need to clean the wounds.

Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 561, 348 P.3d 497,504 (Ct. App. 2015). The Jury never got to the
question of knowledge of the animal's propensity, having been sent home after answering the first two
questions on the special verdict form that turned the outcome improperly on the issue of negligence.
z.

Respondents' assertion: "Zoey was also barking and growling, yet despite this, Mr.

Boswell approached Zoey, with a closed fit (sic) reached over the gate and was
bitten. " (Res. Br. p.l ).
The evidence supports neither a foregone conclusion that Zoey was barking or growling, nor
that Steve Boswell approached Zoey with a closed fist, nor that he reached over the gate. Steve
Boswell fell for a classic deposition trick: a question in the alternative; neither answer to which is a
good one. And he bit hook, line, and sinker. When asked whether he approached the dog with an open
hand or a closed fist he took the choice of a closed fist. Had he answered "open hand" the defense
could have produced expert evidence that approaching a dog with an open hand, fingers first, is the
wrong way to approach a dog. Steve chose "closed fist" even though "I approached the dog with the
back of my closed hand" would have been the more accurate answer. The very nature of the wound
shows unmistakably what part of his hand approached the dog.
The defense presented no expert evidence that a dog is any more threatened by a closed fist
than by the wink of an eye. The trial testimony of Steve Boswell is that the dogs were wagging their
tails (Tr. p. 31, I. 6), not growling, (Tr. p. 30, I. 24-25), he approached the dog so as to allow the dog
to smell the back of his hand (Tr. p. 29, I. 17-21), and the dog reached over the fence and bit him (Tr.
p. 45, lines 4-7, 13-14 and 22 and 25).

4.

Comparative Negligence Is an Improper and Incompatible Defense.
Comparative negligence emerged statutorily on the scene of English and American

jurisprudence at the behest of plaintiffs, to ameliorate the harsh unfairness of the contributory
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negligence defense. Strict liability emerged on the scene of English and American jurisprudence again at the behest of plaintiffs - to ameliorate the harsh unfairness of requiring plaintiffs to match
resources and meet insurmountable burdens of proof in certain circumstances where society has
decided that liability ought to lie regardless of fault. The Boswell case is a classic example of one of
those circumstances. Both of these principles of law were adopted to effectuate societally desirable
or fairer results. Both were adopted to benefit plaintiffs. The Respondents claim it is their right to mix
both of these adopted rules to create a perfect defense against the plaintiffs' right to recover.
Consider the Pocatello Municipal Code as an example. It requires an injured dog bite victim
to prove two things: injury and ownership of the dog that caused the injury. The burden then shifts
to the owner to prove that the dog was taunted, teased, or threatened. Those are the only defenses. The
Statute is clearly designed to remove proof of negligence as an element of the cause of action. Yet,
if comparative negligence is applied, it would still impose a requirement on the injured party to prove
negligence, and to prove greater negligence on the part of the owner, or recovery is barred. Every
cause of action, whether negligence is an element or not, becomes a negligence action.
As Black's Law Dictionary explains:.

STRICT LIABILITY -Liability without fault. Case is one of"strict liability" when
neither care nor negligence, neither good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor
ignorance will save the defendant.
Volumes have been written on the incompatibility of comparative fault and actions for strict
liability.

If the Court cares to immerse itself in the literature, the Appellants would recommend

reading Reconciling Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST.
LOUIS U.L.J., 19 (1988), a copy of which is attached as Addendum A.
Irrespective on one's predilections on the subject, it still remains an issue for the legislature,
not this Court. The bottom line is, comparative fault is a creature of statute, in contravention of the
common law, and as such it only applies as broad as the statute, which in Idaho only applies to actions
for negligence. Idaho Code § 6-801.
CONCLUSION
The Idaho Supreme Court has been down this road before. In Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329,
848 P.2d 387 (1992), the plaintiffs, in a blown tire incident, plead theories of negligence and strict
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liability. The trial judge refused to give the strict liability instruction, treating all of the Plaintiffs
claims as negligence. The Idaho Supreme Court did then as it should do now. It ruled that failure to
give the requested strict liability instruction is reversible error.
In this case, the Boswells anticipated the that same misunderstanding may arise. In order to
avoid confusion they dismissed all of their negligence claims just to head off the recurrence of that
same error, but to no avail. The trial court still determined that all of their causes of action sound in
negligence. The court instructed the jury in such a manner that the jury could never get past first base
unless it found at least one of the two Steeles negligent.
The elements of dog bite law in Idaho mandate instructions independent of the standard IDJI
negligence instructions and routine negligence special verdict forms. If nothing else, Pocatello
Municipal Code mandates instructions commensurate with its standalone cause of action; instructions
that do not require the jury to find, at the outset, that one or the other of the Steele's were negligent.
The policy reasons for the common law pertaining to dog bite and the policy reasons behind
the Pocatello Municipal Code are stripped away by treating them as nothing more than negligence
claims. Moreover, the same stripping occurs even if, on the front end, the claims are properly treated
as claims where a showing of a failure to exercise ordinary care is not required, but then, on the back
end, subjected to comparative negligence where such a showing is required. We still wind up with the
owners and harborers of vicious dogs walking away with no responsibility by application of doctrines
that have no place in the objectives of the law or public policy.
The actions for injury by Steve and Karena Boswell are not negligence actions. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in instructing the jury so as to require the Boswells to prove negligence in order
to move forward. The trial court also erred in refusing to give the Boswells's requested instructions,
in accordance with the common law, and commensurate with the Pocatello Municipal Code.
Accordingly, the result reached in the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted, this __gJ_ day of April, 2017.
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!Y.c CONCLUSIO~
*20 I. INTRODUCTIO~
The two doctrines that have most changed American tort litigation during the past twenty years are strict liablity in tort
for defective products and comparative negligence. l Each has produced its own *21 revolution, and perhaps the most
difficult tort question facing courts in recent years has been how to reconcile these doctrines when neither was developed
with the other in mind.
Although these doctrines have developed independently,~ most courts favor one doctrine over the other and tend to
mold the remaining doctrine to complement the one favored. Most courts favor comparative negligence, 1 and apply it
to strict liability cases despite its adverse impact on the policies underlying the doctrine. A minority of courts favor strict
liability, 1 adopting the Restatement (Second) o( Torts section 402A defenses,~ though this approach was formulated
before comparative negligence was generally adopted in most states.
Extensive legal commentary has focused on the strict liability-comparative negligence conflation. !i We hesitate to add
to the mountain *22 of discussion, but do so because in our minds no court or legislature has yet taken the proper
approach to reconciling the two doctrines. The primary difficulty lies in the accommodation of the policies underlying
these doctrines when they conflict. To what extent should the risk-spreading, safoty-producing policies underlying strict
liability be sacrificed to deter or punish the various types of plaintiff misconduct? How can the fundamental fairness
of comparative negligence, which forces each party to bear the responsibility of its own misconduct, best be applied to
situations in which one party has a more realistic opportunity to prevent accidents than the other?
This Article is premised on the belief that reckless infusion of comparative negligence into strict liability litigation
undern1ines the well-founded purpose of the strict liability doctrine. Furthermore, this Article asserts that even those
courts that have refused to apply comparative negligence to strict liability, but instead hewed to the section 402A line
regarding defenses, have by their inflexibility also blunted the proper evolution of the strict liability doctrine. Too often
courts combine these two 'pro-plaintiff doctrines to produce an 'antiplaintiff *23 result.
Only a careful case-by-case analysis of the policies underlying the comparative negligence and strict liability doctrines
can produce the proper accommodation of them. Blind application of comparative negligence to strict liability claims
by most courts has injured these policies and resulted in a confused state of the law. As Dean Twerski has stated:
The problem with comparative negligence is that it is the great compromiser. It permits a court the luxury of
evading fundamental policy questions, and once it is introduced it has a life of its own which blinds courts
to the policy questions which they might otherwise be required to face.1

This Article briefly chronicles the development of and policy bases for the doctrines of strict liability and comparative
negligence~ and describes the various approaches courts use to accommodate the two doctrines. 2 The Article concludes
by setting forth a position for the proper resolution of this problem . .!Jl

[I

A. Histol'y of Strict liability
1. Development of the Doctrine

'NESTLAW

ti

.~
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In 1962, the California Supreme Court adopted a theory of strict products liability in Greenman v. Yuba Poll'er Products.
Inc. ll The court held that ' a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knO\ving

that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.'
court emphasized that its new theory was not based on warranty when it said:

12

The

Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty
running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between
them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to
permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products make clear that
the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.11

*24 The Greema11 decision found its roots in Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Esco/av. Coca Cola Bottling Co. H
written eighteen years earlier. Justice Traynor recognized the need for a products liability theory not based on the concept
of fault. Emphasizing the sound public policy rationales of'enterprise liability' and 'risk distribution,' Traynor reasoned:

In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to human beings .... The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by
the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest
to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products
nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever
injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the
product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and
however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one.
Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated
to afford such protection. 15

Additional policy considerations were identified in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 16 a 1960 New Jersey case in
which the defendants, an auto manufacturer and a dealer, were held liable on an implied warranty of safety for the injuries
the plaintiff sustained as a result of an accident caused by a defective steering mechanism. U Although Henningsen was
an implied warranty case, it spelled out a number of policy considerations which helped pave the way for the new strict
liability theory, including: the rapid growth of commercial society, lli the desire to dampen the often harsh results of
cai•eat emptor, 12. the power of advertising, 20 public reliance upon manufacturers for fitness of use, ll the special duty of

I

manufacturers for dangerous products *25 that are a necessary a.djunct of daily life, 22 the unequal bargaining power of
manufacturers and consumers, 23 and the risk of loss resulting from injury to consumers as a hazard of doing business.~
The rationales of Greenman and Henningsen spread quickly as many jurisdictions adopted strict liability. Q. Then, in
1965, the American Law Institute, in an effort to develop a uniform doctrine of strict liability for defective products,
formulated section 402A of the Restatement ( Second) of Torts. 26 An overwhelming majority of states have now adopted
s~cLion 402A or its equivalent as embodying the doctrine of strict tort liability for defective products.~

·------··----·----··-------------------·--····----------··------·
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2. Policy Underpinnings of Strict Liability

One of the major policy considerations influencing the adoption of strict liability in products cases is the extreme practical
difficulty of proving the negligence of a manufacturer or supplier. :::x The United *26 States Department of Commerce
Interagency Task Force on Products Liability noted that:
[I]f traditional negligence is applied the plaintiff faces substantial proof problems since he must establish
that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care in the manufacturing process. Basically, he must impugn
the conduct of the manufacturer, and evidence of such a lack of due care is extremely difficult for the
· '9
· "ff to o b tam.=p Iaintt

Additionally, the fact that an injury-causing product is frequently not amenable to examination after the incident
exacerbates the difficulties presented by a requirement that plaintiff demonstrate negligence. 30 Thus, an approach which
conditions a plaintiffs recovery on the ability to prove negligence is inadequate.11 Warranty actions offer no better
alternative, because the arduous task of bringing a series of warranty actions has proved to be 'an expensive, timeconsuming, and wasteful process.' 32 The negligence and warranty actions were therefore supplanted *27 by 'risk
"f.
11
t111g. , =

Sh I

A second policy justification advanced for the adoption of strict liability is the so-called 'representational liability'
rationale, 34 which is based
upon the assumption that the manufacturer creates a representation that its product is reasonably safe for
its intended use by placing the product on the market. The ordinary consumer is not aware of, nor can he
appreciate, the importance of safety aspects of any particular design. Moreover, consumers generally have
no way of knowing how much more they would have to pay to obtain a comparable product as serviceable
and less hazardous. Even when aware of the risk associated with a product, the consumer cannot predict
the frequency, severity or probability of injury. The idea is to protect the normal safety expectations of the
typical consumer. 35
That the consumer may expect the manufacturer to produce safe and merchantable goods and stand behind them is
expressly included as a rationale for scction 402A, 36 though the absence of advertising to promote sales is not a factor. 37

Related to the 'representational' rationale is the relative helplessness of the consumer in determining the fitness of either
complex devices or simple products. ll\.

*28 The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a
product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by
the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as

rl

trade-marks. 39

i.

Thus, not only is it difficult for plaintiffs to prove negligence by manufacturers, it also remains generally impossible for
consumers to recognize the manifestations of any negligence prior to use of the product.

4
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In contrast. the manufacturer is peculiarly situated to minimize the risk of harm and loss arising from product-related
. . . 40
. .
. a manner w h'1c h th e pu bl'1c cannot. .fl
mJtmes
~ an d to ant1c1pate
some h azar d s an d prevent t h e recurrence of ot h ers m
This is true both because the manufacturer establishes and remains responsible for the product's design and because of

its exclusive ability to supervise the integrity of the actual production through inspection and quality control. 42
Other justify the application of strict liability to manufacturers and other merchants in the chain of distribution upon
the rationale that they should pay for all losses occasioned by their products as a cost of doing business. 43 Comment
c to section 402A of the Restatement ( Second) of Torts makes this explicit: ' Public policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated
as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained .... ' 44 The emphasis of this rationale rests
less on its apparent enterprise liability notions 45 than on the manufacturer's ability to spread the costs of *29 loss
prevention and compensation among all consumers.
The social desirability of shifting the burden of injury costs from the single injured individual to the general purchasing
public through the vehicle of manufacturers' liability insurance is a prominent rationale for the strict liability theory.1.!!.
This widely held view, pervasive in most areas of personal injury law, requires that the brunt of injury costs in productsrelated accidents be borne by the party best able to absorb those costs and pass them on. ±z Rather than require
consumers to insure themselves against uncompensated accidents resulting from use of defective products, the basic
moral-economic decision behind strict products liability anticipated that the manufacturer would pass on and thereby
spread the costs of accidents in the forn1 of higher prices to consumers. Higher prices cover product liability insurance
premiums and damages for which the manufacturer is self-insured. 48
*30 Finally, an extremely important justification for imposition of strict products liability lies in the incentive it creates
for potential defendants to design, manufacture, and market safer products. 'Modern strict products liability expresses
the legal system's choice to strengthen incentives for manufacturers, a choice based in part on the manufacturers' generally

superior ability to control the risks of products.' 49

B. History of Comparatfre Neglige11ce

The recent development of the doctrine of strict liability has been paralleled by the development of the doctrine of
comparative negligence. Strict liability pennits easier recovery for plaintiffs injured by defective goods, while comparative
negligence allows a plaintiff who is guilty of misconduct nevertheless to recover against a similarly negligent defendant.
It is appropriate that these two pro-plaintiff doctrines have developed simultaneously, because they are replacing 'antiplaintiff doctrines (for example, the privity requirement for product liability and the contributory negligence defense),
which also developed concurrently early in the nineteenth century. iQ
The contributory negligence defense often resulted in harsh and unfair decisions.~ The primary motivation for the
development of comparative negligence, therefore, was the desire to ameliorate the harsh results for plaintiffs caused
by application of the doctrine of contributory negligence.~ Indeed, the Maine Supreme Court recently noted that 'the
sole purpose of comparative negligence is to eliminate the *31 harsh, all-or-nothing consequence of the contributory
.
de1ense.
"
,=
,,
neg I1gence
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is readily apparent. It places
upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of
the defendant has played no less a part in causing the damage; the plaintiffs deviation from the community

----·--··-------------·---

·--••a•-•-•--------

C:
,J

RECONCILING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT..., 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 19

standard of conduct may even be relatively slight, and the defendant's more extreme; the injured man is in
all probability, for the very reason of his injury, the less able of the two to bear the financial burden of his
loss; and the answer of the law to all this is that the defendant goes scot free of all liability, and the plaintiff
bears it all. Nor is it any answer to say that the contributory negligence rule promotes caution by making
the plaintiff responsible for his own safety. It is quite as reasonable to say that it encourages negligence, by
giving the defendant reason to hope that he will escape the consequences. i1

Although many states had enacted some sort of general apportionment statute by 1975, the modern surge in development
of the products liability doctrine may be traced to that year's California Supreme Court decision to judicially adopt pure
comparative negligence in Li 11. Yellow Cah Co. 55 The pure comparative system allows a plaintiff at least some recovery
in all cases except those in which his or her own fault was the exclusive proximate cause of the injury. 56
Though the same factor-an 'increasing social awareness of [the] harsh 'all or nothing' consequences' 57 of contributory
negligence-led most states to adopt some form of comparative negligence, a number of different approaches have been
taken. Some states, like California, have judicially or legislatively adopted a 'pure' system. 58 Most states *32 have
adopted a 'modified' form of comparative negligence, of which there are two basic types: a 'less than' rule or 49'X, system
under which recovery is denied if the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's; 59 and a 'not greater
than' rule or 50% system under which the plaintiffs recovery is barred if his negligence is greater than the defendant's. 60

II. APPROACHES TO ACCOMMODATION OF STRICT LIABILITY AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

In his oft-quoted statement, Justice Richardson of the California Supreme Court noted that: 'We stand now at the point
of confluence of these two conceptual streams .... '21 An appropriate fusion of these doctrines does not come easily.
Several approaches have been taken.

*33 A. Restatement Approach

Absolute defenses in a strict liability action include absence of a defect, 62 absence of a causal connection between a
defect and the plaintiffs injury, 6-~ or absence of a direct connection between the allegedly defective product and the
defendant.§.:! These 'defenses' negate critical elements of plaintiffs cause of action.
Affirmative defenses, on the other hand, are addressed by the Restatement primarily in comment n to section 402A:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability,
the rule applied to strict liability cases (see§ 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists
in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the
name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make

[f
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use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.~
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Thus, the Restatement adheres to the view that mere contributory negligence is no defense when it consists of failure to
discover a defect *34 or guard against its existence. but knowing assumption of risk is a total defense. Formulated before
the widespread adoption of comparative negligence, the Restatement allows no middle ground. Plaintiffs misconduct is
either no defense at all, or it is a total bar to recovery.
A third defense, also apparently absolute, arises from comment h to section 402A:

A product is not in a defecti\'e condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury
results from abnormal handling, as v.·here a bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the
cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or from abnom1al
consumption, as where a chile eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not liable. Where, however,
he has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use, as where a drug is sold which is
safe only in limited doses, he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger (see Comment}), and
a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition. 66
Thus, a misuse or abnorn1al use defense joins contributory negligence and assumption of risk as the Restatement defenses
to strict liability.

1. Failure to Discover or Guard Against
The Restatement theorizes that simple contributory negligence, when it consists of failure to discover or guard against a
defect, should act as no defense to a strict liability claim. 67 Such a defense would prove inconsistent with the theory and
policies of strict liability. 68 Precomparative negligence courts had no difficulty accepting this notion, 22 and even some
courts applying comparative negligence in the strict liability context have refused comparisons of failure to discover or
guard against defects. 70

*35 The Restatement does not address the carelessness of a plaintiff that amounts to more than a mere failure to discover
or guard against the defect but less than a konwing assumption of the risk. Nevertheless, in a number of pre-comparative
negligence cases, courts have held or recognized that contributory negligence is no defense to an action based upon strict
liability in tort, without limiting the definition of contributory negligence to the type of conduct outlined in comment
n of the Restatement.11

2. Assumption of Risk
Assumption of risk exists when a person voluntarily uses a product with a known defect in disregard of his or her own
safety. Traditionally, the requisite elements of this defense are: (I) a subjective knowledge of the dangerous condition;
(2) subjective appreciation of the dangers likely to result from the defective condition; and (3) a free and voluntary choice
in encountering the danger. 72
The Restatement, however, alters this totally subjective common law approach by defining assumption of risk as
'voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger.' :U Use of the objective 'reasonable care'
standard inexplicably allows negligence concepts to filter into the strict liability equation. 7.:!. Although most courts
have generally embraced the Restatement's approach, 12 some have followed the traditional common law approach by
1112.i!1taining a thoroughly subjective approach to assumption of risk. ?.!J.
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*36 3. l\lisuse

A significant number of jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement view that misuse or abnormal use 7]_ acts as a defense,
either partial or total, to a strict products liability action. Tii The Restatement indicates that 'evidence of misuse merely
rebuts elements of causation and defective conditions, and thus is not a defense in the true sense.' 79 Many courts RO
*37 and commentators §l adhere to this view. Other courts, however, refer to misuse as an affirmative defense or part

of the defendant's burden of proof.~ Still other courts refer to the misuse 'defense' without indicating whether misuse
arises as part of the plaintiff's case or is an affirmative defense. 83
The various jurisdictions employ the concept of misuse in different ways. In what has perhaps become the seminal case
in the area, General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, fil the Texas Supreme Court declared that 'misuse may bear upon the issue
of whether the product was defective when it left the hands of the supplier or the misuse may bear on the issue of what
caused the harm.' 85 A finding of misuse tends to negate the plaintiff's prima facie case because it acts to disprove the
allegation that the product was defective. SC, Similarly, the plaintiff's misuse of a defective product may lead to an accident
and injury-but it does not necessarily follow that the defect, as opposed to the misuse itself, caused the accident. These
two forms of misuse are not inconsistent, and each may support a denial of recovery under proper circumstances.
The concept of 'foreseeable misuse' represents an extremely important component of the 'misuse' concept. Comment
h to *38 section 402A mandates an objective test-whether the manufacturer 'has reason to anticipate that danger
may result from a particular use;' 87 and as recently noted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland: 'We conclude, as have
most courts which have considered the issue, that 'reasonable foreseeability' is the appropriate test, and thus a seller
is required to provide a product that is not unreasonably dangerous when used for a purpose and in a manner that is
reasonably foreseeable.' fill.
The automobile collision represents the most common example of foreseeable misuse. A collision is a misuse of the
vehicle, but is unquestionably foreseeable. Automobile manufacturers should therefore be required to provide safety
features in order to minimize the harm attendant to such misuse. 89

B. Jurisdictio11s That Do Not Compare
1. Judicial Selection of the Restatement Approach

The Restatement does not contemplate comparative treatment of plaintiff misconduct defenses, primarily because section
402A was drafted before the advent of comparative negligence. Nevertheless, several courts have considered the concepts
of strict product liability and comparative negligence irreconcilable. Thus, they have refused to apply their jurisdiction's
comparative negligence statute to strict liability.
In Staymates v. ITT Holub Industries, 2.Q a Pennsylvania Superior Court stressed that 'the concept of strict liability, as
being devoid of notions of negligence, has remained intact in this jurisdiction.' 21 The court viewed the comparison of a
plaintiff's possibly 'slightly negligent' conduct with a manufacturer's strict liability as inconsistent with the Restatement
view of defenses. The court likewise considered the comparison incompatible with societal concerns that underlay the
adoption of strict liability and that were 'no less prevalent' than in 1966 when Pennsylvania adopted strict liability. 21 on
principles of statutory construction in concluding that comparative negligrnce statutes had no relevance to strict liability
causes of action. In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 2l the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted strict liability, but held
inapplicable the state's comparative negligence statute. As a simple *39 matter of legislative intent, the court concluded,
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the state's comparative negligence statute was limited to "negligence' actions and hence had nothing to do with strict
liability. 2.::! Kirkland involved an automobile accident in which the plaintiff claimed that the car seat collapsed, causing
her to fall backwards and lose control. However, strong evidence indicated that plaintiff had been drinking at the time
of the accident. This drinking was held to constitute an abnormal use or misuse, which was deemed a complete defense
under the Restatement approach to strict liability defenses. 95
A comparison of the results in Kirkland with those in Staymates is instructive. The refusal to apply comparative principles
in Kirkland produced an anti-plaintiff result because the plaintiff would have profited by having her supposed misuse
compared to defendant's liability rather than work as an absolute defense. On the other hand, the refusal to compare
in Staymates benefitted the plaintiff because the accusation of simple carelessness is no defense under the restatement.
The plaintiff was therefore entitled to a full recovery rather than one reduced by a percentage of fault attributable to
his own carelessness. 96

2. Statutorily l\landatcd Non-Comparison

In some jurisdictions, courts have had no opportunity to consider the proper mesh of strict liability and comparative
negligence. Five states-Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia-do not have strict liability
in products liability actions. 97 Six states have no comparative principles in any context-Alabama, Maryland, North

Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.~ In *40 addition, Indiana 22 and Kentucky JOO have strict liability
statutes which specifically reject use of comparative defenses in strict liability actions.

C. J111·isdictio11s That Do Compai·e
Most American jurisdictions do, at least to some degree, compare plaintiff misconduct with defendant strict liability. ill
Colorado,

102

Connecticut, 103 Idaho, I0-1 and Michigan 105 have specific product liability statutes that call for a

comparative approach. Arizona, 106 Iowa, _l_(fl Minnesota, 1OS Nebraska, 109 Washington, llQ and Utah ill have more
general statutes that nonetheless clearly call for application of comparative principles to strict products liability actions.
Many other states have either no comparative statute at all or a comparative negligence statute that does not by its terms
apply to strict liability actions. Using a variety of approaches, the courts of these jurisdictions have chosen to apply
comparative negligence rules to strict liability. We shall now discuss those cases using a categorization suggested by the
Texas Supreme Court. 112

I. Clear Statute Approach
Several courts have encountered no difficulty in applying their states' comparative negligence statutes to strict liability
theory because the statutes failed to contain any limiting reference to "negligence.' An example is Mississippi's
comparative negligence statute, one of the nation's first pure comparative negligence statutes, which the Fifth Circuit

*41 applied to strict liability in Ed1rnrds v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ill
Similarly, in Fiske v. MacGregor. Division of Brz111s1vick, ill the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the earlier
prediction by the First Circuit that Rhode Island's comparative fault law would not be applied to strict liability claims. 115
The court said: ' W e can only come to the conclusion that the language 'all actions hereafter brought for personal
injuries' includes actions brought on the theories of strict liability and breach of implied warranty .... 'ill The opinion
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apparently applied comparative negligence to all types of plaintiff misconduct because the misconduct involved inFiskea suit against the manufacturer of a football helmet for a design defect-was at most simple negligence. ill

2. Wisconsin Approach

The first case to apply to strict liability a comparative negligence statute that explicitly applied only to 'negligence' was
Wisconsin's Dippel v. Scicmo. ill The plaintiff in Dippel was injured when the front leg assembly of a pool table collapsed
as he and two other men were moving it in a tavern. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer and the sales distributor of
the table on strict liability and other theories. ill The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted section 402A strict liability,
but not the Restatement approach to defenses. 120 Instead, by holding strict *42 liability tantamount to negligence per
se, the court applied the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute. 121 The Wisconsin statute clearly indicated that it
applied to 'negligence.' The court decided that only by equating strict liability with some form of negligence could it

properly apply the statute. 122

3. New Jersey Approach

In a very thoughtful opinion in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 123 the New Jersey Supreme Court took
yet another approach to reconciling comparative negligence statutes with strict liability. The plaintiff in Suter injured
his hand by catching it in the cylinders of an industrial rolling machine. 124 Both the plaintiffs and defendant's experts
agreed the machine was defectively designed because it lacked a rotary guard. 125 The defendant's expert opined that
the accident occurred because plaintiff placed himself in danger by reaching inside the cylinder without first cutting off
the power. 126
The court was also faced with a comparative negligence statute that literally applied only to negligence actions.

127

The

court specifically *43 rejected the Oklahoma Supreme Court's approach in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp. 128 by
holding that a literal reading of the statute was inconsistent with its spirit. 129 The judges wished to apply the comparative
negligence statute to strict liability, but did not wish to equate strict liability with negligence per se, despite the fact
that New Jersey's legislature had consciously adopted Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute 'and may well have
believed' it would be interpreted as the Wisconsing law been interpreted in Dippel v. Sciano.

130

Instead, theNew Jersey court undertook to extend its comparative negligence statute to strict liability by reading the
term ''negligence' in [the statute] as being subsumed within the concept of tortious fault,' ill and holding contributory
negligence to be a form of contributory fault. Equating negligence with fault, the court said:
Including as we do the act's use of the word 'negligence' within the concept of fault, we construe
the Comparative Negligence Act to require that the plaintiffs negligence must not be 'greater than
the negligence [or fault due to strict liability] of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages sustained shall be diminished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.' l.'2

In construing section 402A and prior New Jersey case law, the court decided that assumption of risk constituted a form
of plaintiff fault requiring comparison, rather than constituting a complete bar to recovery. D 3 On the other hand,
unforeseeable misuse by plaintiff or evidence that plaintiffs abnormal use rather than any defect caused the injury were
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held to be complete defenses not to be compared, because they negated the presence of critical elements of plaintiffs
cause of *44 action--existence of a defect and causation, respectively.

i_q

Interestingly, the court also held that failure to discover and guard against a defect by plaintiff acts as no defense in a
strict liability case.13 5 Other types of plaintiff carelessness apparently remain as defenses to be compared. Application
of comparative negligence to strict liability, however, was held not to alter New Jersey's prior rule issued in Bexiga 1·.

Havir Manufacturing Corp. 136 that the plaintiffs carelessness was no defense when it consisted of the very conduct that
the defendant's defective product should have prevented. 137 The defendant manufacturer should not be pennitted to
escape from the breach of its duty to an employee while carrying out his assigned task under these circumstances when
observance of that duty would have prevented the very accident which occurred.' 138
Thus, although the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared eager to equate contributory negligence with contributory fault
so that it could compare plaintiff's misconduct in strict liability cases, it applied some important exceptions (failure to
discover and guard against; conduct the defective product should have prevented) for policy reasons. 139

4. Texas Approach
Some courts, unwilling to take liberties in statutory construction in order to apply their states' comparative negligence
statutes to strict liability but still desiring to marry the two doctrines, have judicially invented their own comparative
scheme for the strict liability claim. For example, following earlier cases from New Hampshire 140 and Kansas, ill the
Texas Supreme Court in Duncan I'. Cessna Aircraft *45 Co. 142 showed substantial innovation.
After reaffirming an earlier decision holding the Texas comparative negligence statute inapplicable to the no-fault strict
liability claim, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that '[i]udicial adoption of a comparative apportionment system,
independent of statutory comparative negligence, is a feasible and desirable means of eliminating confusion and achieving
efficient loss allocation in strict liability cases.' 143 The Texas scheme represented a comparative causation system,
featuring pure comparison even though the state's comparative negligence statute followed a modified approach. 144

5. California Approach
Thus far we have seen five approaches to the conflation of comparative negligence and strict liability taken by courts
in states with comparative negligence statutes. Some courts interpret their comparative negligence statutes literally as
applying to negligence claims but not to strict liability. 145 Other courts interpret comparative negligence statutes that
easily can be construed as covering strict liability because the language of the acts do not use the term 'negligence.' 146
A third group of courts, confronted with comparative negligence statutes that are literally limited to 'negligence,' but
still wishing to compare in strict liability cases, extend the comparative negligence statute by labeling strict liability as
negligence per se. 147 Another group of courts apply comparative negligence statutes to strict liability in a similar fashion

I
j

-by equating the 'negligence' in their states' laws with 'fault' such as that of marketing a defective product. 148 Finally,
some courts determine that their states' comparative negligence statutes do not apply to strict liability, and devise their
O\Vn common law comparative system which may or may not track their states' comparative negligence statutes. ill
A final group of courts, in a sense the luckiest in this matter, face the strict liability-comparative negligence confluence
without being *46 constrained by a state comparative negligence statute. The leading case is Daly 11. General Motors

Corp. 150 from California. In Daly, a plaintiff was killed when the door on his car was thrown open and he was
ejected from the car in a collision. The California Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply the common law
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comparative negligence doctrine it had enunciated in Li 1•. Yellmr Cab Co. 151 to a strict liability claim. The court applied
its comparative negligence system-a pure system-apparently to all types of plaintiffs misconduct including simple
negligence. 152

D. I11teri111 Co11c/11sio11s
Several conclusions may be drawn at this point. First, many courts have felt constrained to act in accord with the
legislative intent underlying their states' comparative negligence statutes, although frequently little exists from which
to derive guidance. Very few courts isolated any concrete legislative intent one way or the other on the comparative
negligence-strict liability dilemma.
Second, policy considerations have played a varying role in the decisions of the courts. Some courts, such as the
California Supreme Court,

153

which was unencumbered by a state comparative negligence statute, and the Texas

Supreme Court, I S-1 which determined that the Texas statute did not apply to strict liability, devoted their attentions to
the policies underlying strict liability anc comparative negligence. 155 Most other courts spent very little time analyzing
policy, concentrating instead on a usually fruitless search for legislative intent.
*47 Third,just as courts have taken varied approaches regarding the construction of comparative negligence statutes in
order to apply them to strict liability, so have they taken a wide variety of approaches in actual application, often without
extensive though. The majority of courts that apply comparative principles to strict liability have chosen to compare

all forms of plaintiff misconduct, including simple carelessness, unforeseeable misuse, and assumption of risk.

156

Other

courts deem it appropriate to compare only plaintiff misconduct that rises to the level of voluntary assumption of risk. 157
Others compare all plaintiff misconduct except the failure to discover or guard against a defect. 158

III. RECONCILING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
As noted earlier, neither strict adherence to the Restatement view of defenses to section 401A nor a reckless infusion of
comparative negligence principles is the proper approach to channeling the confluence of principles. The Restatement
formulation was written with no thought of taking advantage of the basic equitable principles of comparative negligence.
Courts, perhaps in a backlash against perceived excesses of evolving products liability law, have often carelessly applied
comparative negligence principles even when those principles undercut established policy justification for strict liability.
We believe that the products liability 'revolution,' has not 'gone too far.'

159

Hundreds of thousands of citizens are still

killed or seriously *48 injured every year by products. 1611 Even under strict liability, the most sympathetic plaintiff is
not guaranteed a jury verdict against a corporate defendant. It is not yet time to blend two pro-plaintiff doctrines to
create an anti-plaintiff result.
Before examining whether and to what extent comparative negligence principles should be integrated into the various
defenses available in strict products liability actions, two preliminary points should be noted.
First, courts and commentators have often questioned the advisability, or even the possibility, of applying comparative
negligence principles in strict liability actions. lfil These objections, though of concern, should not completely handcuff
the courts in fine-tuning the defenses available in strict liability actions to take advantage of the flexible and equitable
comparative negligence principles which had not yet been developed when section 402A and its comments were drafted.
Rather, as Dean Twerski has noted, advocating a limited application of comparative principles to strict liability actions,
' to be sure, we must blind ourselves somewhat to pristine tort analysis, but the compromise in principle is not extreme
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and should not bar us from what we believe to be a legitimate reduction in plaintiffs verdict.' 162 Professor Sobelsohn
concluded:
[W]hether plaintiffs conduct should reduce her recovery in a strict liability action ultimately rests not on
supposed 'conceptual' difficulties, but on questions of public policy. Resolving these questions requires
discussion of the major substantive justifications for strict liability.

In sum, the policies underlying strict liability do not support-and, in fact, cut against-applying
comparative fault to strict *49 liability actions. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the final argument for
extending comparative fault to this class of cases rests on the principle of justice. 163
Consistent with the analysis suggested above, we will examine each potential defense individually with an emphasis on
underlying policy considerations.

Taking an intermediate position between full comparison and no comparison of the plaintiffs conduct in strict liability
cases raises a second point: the need to analyze the mechanics of the comparison process when the comparison
achieves a fair and equitable result consistent with the policy considerations underlying strict products liability. Courts
and commentators have suggested differing approaches to the comparison problem. For example, some courts have
164 ot hers have compare d causation.
. d stnct
. 1·iab·1·
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redefine the problem out of existence' 166 by defining selling an abnormally dangerous product as one type of'fault,' and
then comparing it to the plaintiffs negligent fault. ill *50 Commentators 168 and at least one court 16() have suggested
a 'fault line' approach to comparison in strict products liability cases. One commentator advocates a ·fault quotient'
approach. 170
Suffice it to say that the method of comparison has and will continue to generate debate among commentators and
lead to a wide divergence of approaches by courts as they struggle to develop a workable approach, often encumbered
by statutory restraints. This fact alone counsels in favor of a judicious rather than wholesale infusion of comparative
principles into strict liability litigation. Nevertheless, comparative principles have gained widespread acceptance since
Daly v. General Motors Corp. was decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1978, ill and a substantial majority of

jurisdictions now apply some form of comparison. 172 Given this seemingly inexorable trend, the important question,
addressed below, is not how the plaintiffs conduct and the defendant's defective product are to be compared, but under
what circumstances should they be compared so as not to eviscerate the strong public policy consideration supporting
strict liability in tort for defective products.

\

l

A. Treatme11t of Co11trih11tory Negligence
Previously we have examined in some detail the policy considerations that have led the jurisdictions of this nation to an
almost universal adoption of strict liability as a cause of action in products cases. DJ. Those policies are pro-plaintiff and
pro-recovery in that their adoption evidences a desire by courts and legislatures to expand recovery by persons injured
by products in our modern society. ill These policies reflect *51 a desire by courts and legislatures to: (1) ease the
plaintiff's burden of proof in products cases: (2) shift the risk of injuries caused by products to their makers and sellers,
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who are best able to spread that risk generally; and (3) encourage suppliers of products to make them safer by imposing
liability for injuries resulting from unsafe products. Comparing a plaintiffs simple carelessness in a strict liability setting,
as so many courts have done, subverts these valuable policies. 175 Rather, these policies require that the plaintiff's simple
contributory negligence neither bar nor reduce the plaintiffs recovery in a strict liability case.

1. Effect of Comparing a Plaintifrs Negligence on Strict Liability Policies
a) Emi11g B111"de11 of Proof

Theoretically, the policy of easing the plaintiffs burden of proof, by focusing the inquiry on the defective status of
the product rather than on the defendant's careless conduct, is unaffected by applying comparative negligence to strict
liability. ill However, the theory does not translate into practice.
If the plaintiff proceeds against the defendant solely on strict liability theory, the plaintiff is neither attempting to prove
nor proving any fault in a blameworthy sense by the defendant. The defendant's defense of the plaintiffs carelessness, on
the other hand, does constitute an attempt to show blameworthy fault by the plaintiff. When comparing the plaintiffs

'fault' with the defendant's 'no-fault,' the jury will naturally attach to plaintiffs conduct a higher percentage of fault. ill
This may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on whether the jury is asked to compare fault or to compare
causation, or given no *52 guidance at all 178 -but the result will be the same. 'Viewed retrospectively, the user's
'active' causal contribution in bringing about the injury will loom disproportionately large in relation to the 'passive'
contribution of the manufacturer. That is especially true where the manufacture of the defective product is remote in
time or location from the plaintiffs injury.' 179
This problem of fault allocation is often magnified because the effect of a court's focus on the plaintiffs conduct in the
context of the adversarial setting of a lawsuit 'is to dilute the defect of the article by elevating the conduct of the wounded
consumer to an issue of equal significance.' ISO Similarly, Dean Twerski, in arguing against a reduction in the plaintiffs
recovery, has noted:
It might be argued that this disparity in fault should enter into the consideration of what percentage of fault
is to be attributed to the defendant and what percentage to plaintiff. Yet, this is easier said than done.

A lawsuit proceeds with plaintiff and defendant in a one-on-one adversarial setting. If the plaintiff seeks
to broaden the scope of the inquiry to demonstrate that the defendant's activity affects others in a negative
manner, the defendant may legitimately claim that the evidence is inadmissible. Even if the evidence is
admissible for a limited purpose, the plaintiff is not free to paint defendant's product as faulty outside the
context of the individual case. It thus remains for the court, in formulating its legal doctrine, to take into
account the limitations which exclude such considerations from the litigation process. If a design defect
bears the potential of great public harm and the certainty of individual harm, then it behooves the court
in structuring its doctrine of comparative negligence to consider this factor. The court cannot expect that
all this testimony will come out in the trial process since the trial is, by definition, limited to the direct
adversarial setting. ill

The problem of inequitable fault allocation is particularly acute when the defendant is an intermediary, like a wholesaler
or retailer, who had no part in the design or manufacturing defect which caused the injury. When plaintiffs carelessness
is compared to this type of defendant's virtually complete lack of fault, it is inevitable that plaintiff will suffer a great
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reduction or receive no recovery at all. This effectively guts a major portion of the doctrine of strict liability-that all
*53 sellers along the chain of distribution of a defective product are to be responsible for it.

b) Spret1di11g the Risk

Application of comparative negligence or comparative fault principles when a plaintiff is merely careless also subverts
the 'risk spreading' or 'enterprise liability' policies that led to the adoption of strict liability. In fact, the policy of 'risk
spreading' is completely destroyed in those states utilizing a 'modified' rather than 'pure' comparative negligence system;
in these states, a plaintiff is completely barred from recovery if the plaintiff is: (a) more than slightly at fault; 181 (b) 50'%
at fault; 183 or (c) 51% at fault, 184 depending upon the particular state's law. In such a case, the 49% or 50% of the fault
attributable to the defendant falls solely on the plaintiffs shoulders and the burden is not spread. 185
When a plaintiffs carelessness is compared in the above noted situation, the 'risk spreading' policies explicated in
comment c to section 402A 116. are eviscerated. ill The defendant merchant is allowed to shirk its special responsibility
to persons injured by its products, and the public's expectation that sellers will stand behind their goods goes *54
unfulfilled. 188 Moreover, the burden of the accident is not placed upon those who are partially responsible and best
able to spread the risk via insurance. ill
Even in states with a pure comparative negligence system, whether judicially or legislatively adopted, the risk-spreading
policies underlying strict products liability are undermined by comparing simple plaintiff carelessness with defendant
conduct. The strictly liable defendant's conduct is of such a nature that it cannot be accurately compared with simple
plaintiff carelessness.

A plaintiffs inadvertence normally endangers only himself, whereas the merchant who decides to market a product that
is defective endangers the reckless, the inadvertent, and even the completely careful and innocent.
has indicated:

190

As Dean Twerski

Equitable considerations preclude a plaintiff from total recovery when the plaintiffs conduct is similar
in scope and in nature to that of the defendant. However, in a product liability case based on defective
design, the defendant is not facing the plaintiff one-on-one. The defendant distributes to the world at large
a product which is unreasonably dangerous and one can statistically calculate that it will bring harm to
a percentage of users. Thus, for example, if a drill press is designed without a safety guard, there is little
question that somewhere in the manufacturing community there will be a plaintiff who is destined to have
his hand severed, due either to his negligence or to inadvertence. One noted author has likened this to an
intentional tort. In essence, once a product with a design defect is marketed, we know with substantial
certainty that there will be a victim-we just do not know his name. Thus, it seems to me that, whether the
theory is strict liability or negligence, we should be reluctant to reduce plaintiffs recovery .... [A]s a matter
of simple fairness, the comparison between defendant's act and plaintiffs act leads to the conclusion that
the defendant's act is certain to cause damage to any plaintiff who interacts with the product in the same
manner as has this plaintiff. ill

J

Twerski also provided a rationale for refusing to compare plaintiffs carelessness in a strict products liability case in a
jurisdiction *55 where such carelessness would be compared in a general negligence case:
There is, however, an important distinction between the product liability picture and general negligence
litigation. Consider for a moment a standard automobile accident in which the defendant is involved in

1;
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negligent activity (i.e., speeding) and plaintiff is involved in contributorily negligent activity (e.g .. negligent
lookout). An accident takes place and both participants are the proximate cause of the harm. Although each
could reasonably foresee the possibility of the other's act, the clefe11da11t did not prol'ide the matrix for the
plaintifj's action. In products liability cases the opposite is true. How a consumer will interact with a product
is a function of both design and marketing. If plaintiff is involved in negligent activity while either using
or misusing the product, it may be that we ought to demand that the product be designed and marketed
so that the particular offensive use will either be precluded or mitigated by some design parameter of the
product. If this is the desideratum of the law, then it becomes very questionable whether plaintiffs should
have their verdicts reduced when the very aspect ll'hich made the product dangerous and defective ill the first
instance has resulted in the very harm ll'hich one could expect },'om the defective desigll. 192

*56 Although it has been argued that in the few pure comparative negligence jurisdictions that exist, a negligent plaintiff

should bear the burden of his own careless misdeed, 193 it is easy to think of situations where even this should not be the
case. The Restarement advises that when a plaintiffs carelessness is simply a failure to discover or guard against a defect
which creates the danger, the plaintiffs negligence should not constitute a defense. 194 Several courts have recognized
the wisdom of this position, and exempt failure to discover or guard against defects from their merger of comparative
negligence and strict liability.

195

Many courts, however, have not created such an exemption and continue to compare

even a plaintiffs minor inadvertence. 196
The doctrine of crashworthiness provides another example of when a plaintiff should not be forced to bear the burden
of his carelessness. Manufacturers of automobiles know that driver carelessness and resulting accidents are inevitable.
When manufacturers fail to make a car that is crashworthy, and that defect leads to severe injury to a plaintiff who
otherwise would have walked away from an accident of his own making, is it fair to reduce recovery? Daly v. General
Motors Corp. 197 is a prime example of this scenario. As noted earlier, Daly involved an *57 accident in which the

decedent was thrown from the car and killed, allegedly due in part to a defectively designed door latch. 198 Although the
case contained substantial evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of carelessness and perhaps even foreseeable misuse, the
misconduct could be easily foreseen by the manufacturer. A well designed door latch would serve to protect the many
innocent and careful consumers as well as the few reckless drivers.
Similarly, dangerous machines on an assembly line should have guards on them to prevent injury to workers who over
the course of weeks, months, and years are bound, sooner or later, to suffer a moment's inattention. The very defect in a
machine may be the failure to protect a plaintiff from his or her inevitable inattention. 199 Consider the case of someone
who is speeding by ten miles per hour when her defective tire blows out. Had she been going the speed limit she could
have controlled the car and avoided the accident. In each of these cases the plaintiff was negligent, but should receive
full recovery, unhindered by the application of comparative negligence. Using similar examples, Twerski concluded: 'By
recognizing the contributory negligence defense in any fom1 (either as a complete bar or as comparative negligence), we
are reducing the defendant's liability exposure to users who are clearly within the orbit of defendant's responsibility.' 200

c) b,ce11tfre to JI.fake P,·otlucts Safe,.

The third major policy underlying strict liability-giving defendants the incentive to make their products safer-is
also clearly undermined by applying comparative negligence in a strict liability case, a result conceded even by most
supporters of applying comparative negligence to strict liability. Some argue that because the defendant is still partly
liable, an incentive to be safe remains.

~lll

[I

Although this may be true, that incentive is greatly reduced. Manufacturers
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can mathematically calculate their liability window. The window substantially closes by comparing plaintiffs simple
negligence, and manufacturers will react predictably:
Although a manufacturer may not know in any single instance whether an injured user will contribute to
his own injury, a manufacturer *58 that distributes a large number of products can statistically estimate
the number of injuries its products will inflict in a given period of time. From those calculations. the
manufacturer can approximate the total liability exposure that those injuries will create, and if the potential
liability is great enough, a rational manufacturer will incur increased production costs to make its product
safer. To the extent that strict products liability judgments are reduced by users' contributions to their
own injuries, the adoption of comparative principles probably will diminish manufacturers' total potential
liability. Manufacturers, therefore, will have less economic incentive to make their products safer. 202

Indeed, by comparing mere plaintiff carelessness in a strict products liability case 'we may be reducing the defendant's
financial exposure to the point where maintaining the design defect becomes economically prudent,' 203 especially in
cases where a product with an obvious design defect bears a low probability of producing harm in large numbers. 204
Though manufacturers no doubt owe a duty even to careless consumers, reduction of the safety incentive will lead to
increased injuries *59 for many innocent consumers as well. 205 As noted earlier, the allegedly defective car door latch
in Daly could have injured a completely careful plaintiff as well.

2. Effect of Refusing to Compare on Policies L'nderl}ing ComparatiYe Negligence

Refusing to hold a plaintiffs simple carelessness to be a defense in a tort action does not undermine the rationale for
comparative negligence. The purpose of comparative negligence is to ameliorate the harshness of the all-or-nothing
recovery that occurred with strict contributory negligence. 206 Comparative negligence is a pro-plaintiff doctrine which
should not be manipulated to disadvantage products liability plaintiffs. The key issue is the extent to which riskspreading, safety-inducing strict liability policies should be subverted to deter careless conduct by plaintiffs and others
similarly situated. 207 The proper approach must be that which minimizes serious injuries and death.
Additionally, we must decide whose conduct--consumers' or merchants'--can be more easily molded through
manipulation oflegal principles. This subject will be considered in more detail in our discussion ofassumption ofrisk. For
now, we note that a major theory supporting comparison in strict liability cases is that comparison reduces the incidence
of injuries caused by defective products. Comparison provides product users an incentive to protect themselves; product
users know that their own negligence will reduce recovery in the event of an injury. However, as one commentator
explained:
Whether one takes this argument seriously depends on one's view of the causes of human behavior in the
face of the risk of personal injury-whether one thinks it realistic to expect that a product user, faced with
the prospect of losing a limb or his life through carelessness, will carefully weigh the additional risk of losing
part of a money judgment should an accident occur. Note that this risk rests on multiple contingencies: that
an accident will occur; that the victim will suffer injuries serious enough to result in financial loss requiring
compensation; that the product will prove to have been defective; that the product's manufacturer will be
both solvent and subject to service of process; that the manufacturer's attorney will *60 learn of the victim's
carelessness; and that, some years down the road, a jury will consider that carelessness sufficiently serious
to warrant substantial reduction of plaintiffs recovery. Add to this the probability that the victim has firstparty insurance for her most pressing medical needs and that she knows next to nothing about tort law, and
perhaps there is room for skepticism that adoption of comparative fault will induce consumers to handle
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products with care lest their recovery be reduced. If criminal law scholars recognize the simple behavioral
principle that punishment, to be effective, must be both certain and reasonably swift, then it is time for tort
scholars to acknowledge that principle as well. 208
In short, it is unlikely that comparing the plaintiffs fault will deter the plaintiff from carelessness. If the threat of the

. .
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On the other hand, economic incentives can have a great impact on the manufacturers of products whose conduct is
more deliberately chosen and therefore more malleable through manipulation of legal principles.
Defendants are typically business firms, often large, that can and do make the appropriate cost calculations.
They can 'design out' product error and protect the plaintiff against the hazards of systematic neglect.
Plaintiffs are isolated individuals who may not even know the applicable rules governing their own conduct.
It is idle to expect them to respond to the indirect pressure created by the manipulation of the liability
rules. 210

As Justice Mosk noted in his dissent in Daly v. General Motors Corp.:

It seems self-evident that procedures which evaluate the injured consumer's conduct in each instance, and
thus eliminate or reduce the award against the producer or distributor of a defective product, are not
designed as an effective incentive to maximum responsibility to *61 consumers. The converse is more
accurate: the motivation to avid polluting the stream of commerce with defective products increases in direct
relation to the size of potential damage awards. 211

Not only are manufacturers in the best position to make the deliberate choices necessary to improve safety, 212
,l'

manufacturers also have superior economic resources available to devote to that purpose. ,;,,_2 Indeed, 'm odcrn strict
products liability expresses the legal system's choice to strengthen incentives for manufacturers, a choice based in part on
the manufacturers' generally superior ability to control the risks of products.' 21 -l In sum, to compare a plaintiffs mere
carelessness in the strict liability setting injures the policies underlying strict liability, whereas refusing to compare does
not injure the policies underlying the pro-plaintiff comparative negligence doctrine and does reduce overall damages
stemming from use of defective products in our society. 215
To illustrate these results, consider, for example, the case of Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Cropper. 216 In Cropper, the
plaintiff was driving a water wagon manufactured by Caterpillar. The water wagon, a large off-road vehicle used to
spray water for dust control, consisted of a 12,000 gallon water tank connected to the cab and engine compartment by a

ifl

gooseneck type connection. 217 The engine was situated to the right front of the operator's compartment, and had a large
muffler and air cleaner which extended from the engine compartment. 118 The plaintiff was injured when, while watering
a large open field at a mine, he ran *62 over a large folded metal backhoe track (similar to a tank or bulldozer track)
while executing a right hand turn. The cab, upon hitting the track, was driven up and over it, and the impact of the cab as
it came down forced the operator's chair to bottom out, causing a compression fracture of the plaintiffs lower back. :!l Y
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The plaintff sued on theories of strict liability and negligence, contending that the cab was defectively designed due to
visibility restrictions caused by the hood. Muffler. and air cleaner. 220 He testified that the restrictions were such that
even though he was aware of the track and was looking for it as he turned, he was unable to see to his right sufficiently to
avoid the collision. J 2 I The plaintiffs expert witness testified that the cab \Vas designed with severe visual obstructions,
particularly in the right quadrant forward from the driver's position where he estimated that visibility was restricted for
nearly 46 feet outward from the driver's position. 222 Though Caterpillar adduced conflicting expert and other testimony,
the jury found against Caterpillar on all liability issues and refused to find the plaintiff contributorily negligent. n 3 The
appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury's failure to find the plaintiff contributorily
negligent was against the great weight of the evidence. 224

,,-

Since Duncan i·. Cessna Aircraft Co.,-~::, Texas courts have compared all plaintiff conduct in products cases except mere
failure to discover or guard against the defect. In Croppa, the plaintiff was an experienced operator who was aware of
the visibility problems of the water wagon. Accordingly, the effect of the new trial, assuming liability and equal damages
are once again established, would be to reduce the recovery of the injured plaintiff.
Clearly, this result is inconsistent with the public policy underpinnings of strict tort liability. The jury, after hearing all
the evidence, including Caterpillar's expert witness, found the product defective. The existence of the defect was known
both to Caterpillar and plaintiffs employer. As noted by the court, '[The plaintiffs] training in connection with the
[water wagon] included instructions that, when turning the vehicle, a left-hand turn should be used.' 226 Apparently,
no evidence was presented that a design affording more driver visibility was impossible to achieve nor that the cost of
correcting the defect on the existing machine (for example, by the attachment of a mirror) would *63 be prohibitive.
In this instance, a product, which has now been judicially determined to be defective, was marketed. As noted by Dean
Twerski, 'once a product with a design defect is marketed, we know with substantial certainty that there will be a victim
-we just do not know his name.' 227

We now know the name of a victim of Caterpillar's defective product and the extent of his injuries. Due to the fairly
apparent nature of the defect, Mr. Cropper may perhaps be the only person ever injured because of the limited visibility
afforded operators of defendant's product. Nevertheless, comparing plaintiffs conduct in this case reduces any incentive
Caterpillar may have to improve the design of its water wagon or to make improvements on water wagons already in
use. In addition, a portion of the loss is borne by the plaintiff because of simple inattentiveness during performance of
an undoubtedly hot, noisy, and tedious task, rather than by the manufacturer who placed the product in the stream of
commerce, profited from its sale, and had the ability, through a safer design or modification, to prevent recurrence of
such an accident.
Consider also in the context of this case, the analysis by the court of the plaintiffs contributory conduct:
Even conceding the visibility restrictions alleged by Cropper, a failure to find contributory negligence
is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. It was undisputed that Cropper was an
experienced operator, fully aware of the visibility problems associated with his equipment. He saw the
track, the size and nature of which presented an open and obvious danger, when he entered the field. By
his own admissions he knew the track was to his right and that he was near it when he began his turn. In
spite of this knowledge, he made no attempt to look around the obstructions, failed to proceed far enough
so that by looking back he could see if he was past the track, and took no safety precaution whatsoever.
He did not utilize alternatives which were available and which could have prevented the accident, such as
executing a stop-to-stop maneuver, using a left turn rather than a right turn, or slowing down so that he
could see the track in front of him in time to stop or evade it. Indeed, he accelerated as he went into the right
turn when, according to him, he knew he could not see the track. Ordinarily, conduct in proceeding ahead
under visibility restrictions while cognizant of an imminent obstruction, and without taking advantage of

--------·-------·---------------
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alternative safety measures, does not conform to the standard of reasonable conduct. One may not proceed
blindly and in disregard of dangers that might reasonably be anticipated to exist. 228
Note here that all of the precautions the plaintiff could have taken *64 were necessitated by the defective nature of the
defendant's product. In Cropper, as in all products liability cases, the defendant provides the 'matrix for the plaintiffs
action.' 229 In this context, 'it becomes very questionable whether plaintiffs should have their verdicts reduced ll'hen the
very aspect which made the product dangerous and defectil'e in the first instance has resulted in the very harm which one

,,o

could expect from the defectil'e design.' "2--

3. 'Contributory Negligence' Defined
Concluding that a plaintiffs contributory negligence should not be compared in strict products liability actions does not
end the inquiry. The definition of 'contributory negligence' has itself caused confusion, stemming from the language of
comment n of Section 402A of the Restatement ( Second) of Torts. The comment provides that contributory negligence is
no defense when it 'consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence.' 231 This language, standing alone, seems to suggest that a separate class of plaintiff carelessness exists, which
amounts to more than a mere failure to discover or guard against a defect, but does not constitute knowing assumption
of the risk. Some courts, which continue to recognize the Restatement 'failure to discover or guard against' standard,
nevertheless have applied comparative principles to such 'gray area' conduct. For example, in West v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 232 the Floiida court noted: 'The fact that plaintiff acts or fails to act as a reasonable prudent person, and such
conduct proximately contributes to his injury, constitutes a valid defense. In other words, lack of ordinary due care could
,,,
,,4
constitute a defense to strict tort liability.'~ The Texas Supreme Court in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. =-L also has
recognized as subject to comparison contributorily negligent conduct that falls between 'assumption of risk' and 'failure
.
d
.
,,1s
to d1scover or guar agamst. =-'-

In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Simpson v. General *65 Motors Corp., 236 though recognizing comparative
principles in strict liability actions, applied those principles only to conduct that would have barred recovery altogether
under the original Restatement formulation. Under the Illinois court's approach in Simpson, contributory negligence,
however characterized, would not be a defense and would not reduce recovery in a strict products liability action. The
Illinois approach is consistent with that taken by many courts before the advent of comparative negligence, where courts
refused to limit the contributory negligence defense to the type of conduct outlined in comment n. 137
In addition, many recent cases also apparently interpret the Restatement formulation to include all forms of contributory
negligence, however characterized. For example, in Speck v. Unit Handling Division. A Division of Litton Systems, 238 the
Supreme Court oflowa noted:' Many courts which have allowed a plaintiffs conduct to reduce recovery in strict liability
actions have applied that comparative negligence concept only to the defenses of misuse of product and assumption of
risk, not to negligence in its ordinary sense.' 239 And as the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted: 'The vast majority of other
state courts which have adopted the strict products liability doctrine do not permit the defense of ordinary contributory
negligence to bar recovery.' 240

In addition to judicial interpretation, the language of comment n itself and related Restatement provisions supports the
interpretation that no forms of ordinary contributory negligence should be a defense to a strict products liability action.
The basic purpose of comment n, entitled 'Contributory Negligence,' is to indicate that, as in cases of strict liability
based upon conducting abnormally dangerous activities, assumption of risk is, while contributory negligence is not, a
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defense. 2-l 1 *66 The 'failure to discover the defect in the product or to guard against *67 the possibility of its existence'
is simply used to help distinguish contributory negligence from assumption of risk.
Gi\'ing contributory negligence its ordinary meaning and refusing to compare the conduct which fits within this ordinary
meaning is a preferable approach for several reasons. First, distinguishing 'failure to discover or guard against' negligence
from other forms of contributory negligence is a difficult task. For example, Justice Ryan, in his dissenting opinion in
Simpson, asserted:
Under Duncan and West, any conduct of plaintiff contributing to his injury that does not measure up to the
reasonable-man standard, other than failure to discover, may be considered as comparative fault. In Duncan
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., it was charged that the airplane in which the plaintiffs decedent had been receiving
instruction was operated at less than a safe flying speed. In Wee! 1·. Caterpillar Tractor Co., a woman, while
looking into her purse, walked into the path of a grader which was traveling in reverse without an operative
warning signal. These two cases demonstrate areas of negligence by the plaintiff not encompassed within
the types of contributory negligence referred to in comment n of section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. 242
Contrary to Justice Ryan's characterization, the facts of these cases involved contributory negligence within the
interpretation of comment n as adopted by many courts. Even under Justice Ryan's more restrictive interpretation, the
facts of West appear to be a classic example of 'failure to discover or guard against' contributory negligence.

More important than the characterization problem, however, is that comparing contributory negligence of any type
undermines the purposes of strict products liability. For example, in Duncan, the plaintiffs alleged that design and
manufacturing defects in the legs of the cockpit seats caused the legs to break during the crash, causing the deaths of
plaintiffs' decedents. 243 Thus, Duncan is a crash worthiness or foreseeable misuse case, which should not be subject to
comparison for reasons developed later in this paper. West involves a classic example of a case in which the defect in
the product (lack of an operative backing warning signal) is its failure to protect the plaintiff against just the sort of
inattentiveness that caused the injury. 244 For reasons already noted, such conduct should not be considered to reduce
.

.
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the plamtiffs recovery.-"---=The deleterious effect of comparing the plaintiffs ordinary contributory *68 negligence in strict products liability cases
was eloqently observed by Justice Mosk in his dissent in Daly v. General Motors Corp.:
Transferring the liability, or part of the liability, from the party responsible for putting the article in
the stream of commerce to the consumer is precisely what the majority propose to do. They do this by
employing a euphemism: the victim's recovery is to be 'proportionately reduced.' The result, however
delicately described, is to dilute the defect of the article by elevating the conduct of the wounded consumer
to an issue of equal significance. We can be as certain as tomorrow's daylight that every defendant charged
with marketing a defective product will hereafter assert that the injured plaintiff did something, anything,
that conceivably could be deemed contributorily negligent: he drove the vehicle with a defective steering
mechanism 56 miles an hour instead of 54; or he should have discovered a latent defect hidden in the
machinery; or perhaps he should not have succumbed to the salesman's persuasion and purchased the
defective object in the first place. I need no crystal ball to foresee that the pleading of affirmative defenses
alleging contributory negligence-or the currently approved substitute terminology-will now become
boilerplate.

21
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The defective product is comparable to a time bomb ready to explode; it maims its victims indiscriminately,
the righteous and the evil, the careful and the careless. Thus when a faulty design or otherwise defective
product is involved, the litigation should not be diverted to consideration of the negligence of the plaintiff.
The liability issues are simple: was the product or its design faulty, did the defendant inject the defective
product into the stream of commerce, and did the defect cause the injury? The conduct of the ultimate
consumer-victim who used the product in the contemplated or foreseeable manner is wholly irrelevant to
those issues.

246

B. Treatme11t of IJ1i.mse

The role of product "misuse' in strict products liability analysis has always generated substantial confusion and
uncertainty, consequences which have been exacerbated by the infusion of comparative negligence principles. Initially,
because misuse has 'many faces,' 247 the law must carefully define and distinguish the types of conduct characterized
as 'misuse.' As developed below, this definitional process reveals that in most 'misuse' cases, the proper result is not
comparison, but rather either total recovery or no recovery, leaving only a rare and specifically designated class of cases
in which apportionment of the loss is indicated.
*69 As previously noted, 'reasonable foreseeability' 248 is the common thread of the myriad definitions of misuse.

Before courts began applying comparative principles to strict liability, it was fairly well settled, in accordance with the
Restatement view, 249 that unforeseeable misuse ofa product barred recovery, 250 while foreseeable misuse constituted

no defense at all. 251 Recently, courts have applied comparative negligence to misuse with little cognizance of the
distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable misuse, 252 and without carefully defining the character *70 of the
conduct constituting 'unforeseeable' misuse.

1. Foreseeable l\lisuse

Although it is argued that comparative negligence provides a 'predicate of fairness.' 253 in misuse cases, foreseeable
misuse should be no defense at all. The plaintiff should have full recovery with no comparison of his acts with the
defendant's in order to reduce or bar recovery.
The misuse must be reasonably foreseeable, not merely conceivable. 254 A product that does not guard against
foreseeable misuse is defective for that very reason; that failure is the very essence of the defect and should not reduce
recovery. 255 As noted by the court in El/sll'orth v. Sherne Lingerie, inc.: 256
We conclude, as have most courts which have considered the issue, that 'reasonable foreseeability' is the
appropriate test, and thus a seller is required to provide a product that is not unreasonably dangerous when
used for a purpose and in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. If a product is unreasonably dangerous
for such use it is "defective' within the meaning of§ 402 A of the Restatement, and if that defect is a cause
of damage the seller will be responsible. 257
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*71 In essence, foreseeable misuse is equivalent to mere contributory negligence. 25 s Though some courts attempt
to distinguish between abnormal use and careless use for a proper purpose, 259 for all practical purposes they are
indistinguishable. Exceeding the speed limit by ten miles per hour in a car may with equal ease be described as
contributory negligence or foreseeable misuse. The reasons for not comparing a plaintiffs foreseeable misuse are the
same as those for not comparing a plaintiffs carelessness, as discussed in the previous section. 260
The worst aspects of comparing foreseeable misuse appear in the 'crashworthiness' cases. In older cases, such as
El'ans v. General Motors Corp., 261 the defendants escaped from liability for the exacerbation of injuries caused by
a 'second collision,' i.e., when the plaintiff came in contact with some portion of the vehicle following a crash. An
overwhelming majority of courts have now embraced the 'crash worthiness' concept, holding that defendants may be
liable for manufacturing, designing, and marketing automobiles that are defective by reason of their failure to protect
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The application of comparative negligence to strict liability cases substantially eviscerates the crashworthiness doctrine.
The California case of Daly v. General Motors Corp. 263 illustrates the point. Decedent, a thirty-six-year-old attorney,
was driving his Opel at a speed of between *72 fifty and seventy miles per hour when the car collided with a metal
divider fence. After this initial impact between the left side of the car and the divider fence, the car spun counterclockwise
and the driver's door flew open-causing Daly's ejection and ultimate death. 264 The plaintiffs introduced substantial
evidence that the car door opened when a defectively designed latch button on the exterior handle of the driver's door
was forcibly depressed upon contact with the fence.

265

The California court held that the defendant's conduct in marketing a car with a defective door latch should be compared
with the decedent's misconduct, which may have included speeding and driving while intoxicated. 266 Comparing the
defendant's and decedent's conduct immediately reduces the recovery, and hence the auto manufacturers' incentives to
design doors more safely. In fact, under the 'modified' comparative negligence systems that reign in most states, recovery
might be barred altogether, even further reducing the incentive to design safer doors. The next victim of the defective
door latch might well be a careful driver involved in an accident not of her own making; hence, comparing such misuse
undermines the purposes of strict liability.

2. Unforeseeable Misuse
Cases involving so-called 'unforeseeable misuse' present the most difficult challenge in fornmlating a unified strict
products liability theory. These cases are in reality one of three types: (1) cases in which the product is not 'defective'
or 'unreasonably dangerous;' (2) cases in which the product is defective but is not the cause of the injury; and (3) cases
in which the product is defective and is a cause of the injury, but the plaintiffs conduct relating to the defect is also a
contributing cause of the injury. These three possibilities will be analyzed in turn.

a) Lack of Defect

In Greenman v. Yuba Pol\'er Products, Inc., 267 the California court held that a strict products liability plaintiff must prove
he was using the product in a foreseeable manner when it caused the plaintiffs injury. 268 The Restatement concurs in this
formulation of burdens. 269 Generally speaking, therefore, 'unforeseeable misuse' is not so much an affirmative defense;
rather, foreseeable use is an element of the *73 plaintiffs case-in-chief. 2:o If an injury occurred because the product
was used in an unforeseeable manner, this may prove that the product was not defective in the first place. 271 Only if Vv"e
find the product was defective need we concern ourselves with the issue of plaintiffs misconduct. 272 As recognized by
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the court in Ell.s1rnrth v. Sherne Li11gerie, Inc.: ' I f the product is not unreasonably dangerous ,vhen used for a purpose
and in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable, it simply is not defective, and the seller will not be liable.' :;7.1
Thus, if a consumer is injured while attempting to pick up a power lav.:nmower and use it as a hedge trimmer, his injury
does not stem from any defect in the mower. Rather, the injury comes directly from the misuse, w'hich is not reasonably
foreseeable. '2?-1 If there is no defect, *74 the court should deny recovery because the plaintiffs case lacks a critical
element.
Note that in one of the few pro-plaintiff misapplications of comparative negligence concepts to strict liability, some
courts have undertaken to compare the plaintiffs fault against the defendant's, even where unforeseeable misuse indicates
the product was not defective. :: 75 This approach is erroneous because no recovery should be permitted if the plaintiff
fails to prove this critical element of the case.

b) Lack of Causatio11

Proof of the plaintiffs misuse may also negate the causation element of the plaintiffs prima facie case:
*75 Misuse of a product may also bar recovery where the misuse is the sole proximate cause of damage,
or where it is the intervening or superseding cause. For example, a high speed electric drill may be defective
because a manufacturing defect causes it to short circuit and produce a shock during normal usage. A
plaintiff who attaches a brush to that drill and in attempting to clean his teeth suffers injury to his mouth
from the high speed of the brush will lose because his misuse is the sole cause of his misfortune, and the

defect in the drill is not in any way related to the harm. 276

In sum, the court in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machinery Co. 277 outlined the proper approach to unforeseeable
misuse when it stated:

[A]n unforeseeable misuse of a product may not give rise to strict liability .... [f]he use which the plaintiff
makes of a product may be relevant on the plaintiffs case in the context either of showing that plaintiffs
use of the product was outside or beyond its intended or foreseeable scope (thereby not being probative
of whether the product was fit, suitable and safe), or that the abnormal use, rather than the defect. caused

. .
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c) Defectfre Prod11ct/Co11c111·1·i11g Cause

The lack of defect or causation analysis outlined above should be sufficient to resolve the vast majority of'unforeseeable'
misuse cases. There remains, however, a small class of 'hard' cases, exhibiting the following characteristics: ( 1) the product
is proved to be defective; (2) the defect is a contributing cause of the injury; and (3) the plaintiffs unforeseeable misuse
relates to the defect and magnifies it, so that the plaintiffs conduct is arguably a concurring and contributing cause of
the injury. In such cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove after the fact whether the defect alone would have
caused the injury. In this class, for example, are cases in which the plaintiff totally fails to maintain the product, or
modifies or alters it. Cases such as these, 'where an unreasonably dangerous defect of the product and its unforeseeable
misuse are concurring causes of the damaging event,' 279 are illustrl1ted *76 by the classic case, General Motors Corp.

v. Hopkins. 280

WESTLAW
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In Hopkins, the plaintiff was injured when the 1970 Chevrolet pick-up truck in which he was riding failed to negotiate
a sharp curve in the road and overturned. 281 The plaintiff contended that the driver lost control of the speed of the
truck when the secondary butterfly valves of the defectively designed carburetor jammed open, causing the vehicle to
accelerate to an extremely high rate of speed. 2s2 A similar event had occurred several weeks prior to the accident. 2s 3
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff had removed the original carburetor and replaced it with a racing carburetor. The plaintiff
then reinstalled the original quadrajet carburetor after about one week of unsatisfactory performance by the racing
carburetor, but he improperly reinstalled the original carburetor in eleven separate respects. 284 The Supreme Court of
Texas found that one of the changes made by Hopkins 285 was a cause concurring with the original product defect to
cause the accident.

286

In resolving the issue, the court held:

[I]f the product is found to have· been unreasonably dangerous when the defendant placed it in the stream
of commerce, and if that defect is found to have been a producing cause of the damaging event, and if the
plaintiff has misused the product in the sense as defined by the trial court in its charge in the present case,
and if that misuse is a proximate cause of the damaging event, the trier of fact must then determine the
respective percentages (totalling 100%) by which these two concurring causes contributed to bring about
the event. ... The defense in a products liability case, where both defect and misuse contribute to cause the
damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's recovery to that portion of his damages equal to the percentage of
the cause contributed by the product defect. 287

The comparative causation approach suggested by the Hopkins court, though somewhat criticized, 288 has been accepted
by several *77 courts. 289 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act 290 addresses the problem similarly in its contribution
provisions, which replace the Unifonn Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act's pro rata distribution scheme, 291 with a
system that provides for contributions on the basis of the relative 'fault' of each of the parties to the action, including
the claimant and third-party defendants. 292 The proportionate fault of the parties is determined under section 2(b) of
the Comparative Fault Act, which provides that: 'In detem1ining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider
both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the
damages dlaimed.' 293 Elaborating upon this provision, the comment to section 2 provides:
In comparing the fault of the several parties for the purpose of obtaining percentages there are a number of
implications arising from the concept of fault. The conduct of the claimant or of ay defendant may be more
or less at fault, depending upon all the circumstances including such matters as (I) whether the conduct was
mere inadvertence or engaged in with an awareness of the danger *78 involved, (2) the magnitude of the
risk created by the conduct, including the number of persons endangered and the potential seriousness of
the injury, (3) the significance of what the actor was seeking to attain by his conduct, (4) the actor's superior
or inferior capacities, and (5) the particular circumstances, such as the existence of an emergency requiring
a hasty decision.

A rule of law that a particular defendant owes a higher degree of care (as in the case of a common carrier
of passengers) or a lesser degree of care (as in the case of an automobile host in a state having a valid
automobile-guest statute) or that no negligence is required (as in the case of conducting blasting operations
in an urban area) is important in determining whether he is liable at all. If the liability has been established,
however, the rule itself does not play a part in determining the relative proportion of fault of this party in
comparison with the others. But the policy behind the rule may be quite important. An error in driving

·--------·---
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on the part of a bus driver with a load of passengers may properly produce an evaluation of greater fault
than the same error on the part of a housewife gratuitously giving her neighbor a ride to the shopping
center; and an automobile manufacturer putting out a car with a cracked brake cylinder may, even in the
absence of proof of negligence in failing to discover the crack, properly be held to a greater measure of
fault than another manufacturer producing a mechanical pencil with a defective clasp that due care would
have discovered.

In determining the relative fault of the parties, the fact-finder will also give consideration to the relative
closeness of the causal relationship of the negligent conduct of the defendants and the harm to the plaintiff.
Degrees of fault and proximity of causation are inextricably mixed, as a study of last clear chance indicates,
and that common law doctrine has been absorbed in this Act. This position has been follmved under statutes
making no specific provision for it. 294

The approaches of the Unifom1 Comparative Fault Act and the Hopkins court represent perhaps workable solutions
to the difficult 'defective product/concurring cause' fact pattern. However, several important caveats and observations
should be noted.
First, this approach, which essentially compares the conduct of all parties in a 'pure' setting should be used only to resolve
situations discussed in this section-that is, those situations in which the plaintiffs conduct relates to and exacerbates the
defect in the product, or when the plaintiff has a 'role to fulfill in maintaining the product safety,' and his fault consists
in violating that obligation.' 295 It should not apply in cases of ordinary contributory negligence, foreseeable misuse,
or cases involving lack of defect or causation for reasons previously *79 noted. The plaintiffs recovery in these cases
should be all or nothing.
Second, the circumstances outined above in the comment to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act indicate that, in
a products liability case in which fault is to be compared, a far greater percentage of fault must be allocated to the
defendant. Most importantly, the trier of fact must consider 'the magnitude of the risk created by the conduct, including
the number of persons endangered and the potential seriousness of the injury.' 296 Further, a greater degree of fault
even in the absence of negligence should be allocated to 'an automobile manufacturer putting out a car with a cracked
brake cylinder.' 297 In Hopkins, for example, General Motor's defectively designed carburetor endangered thousands of
people, whereas Hopkins's conduct endangered mainly himself and his passenger. This 'disparity in fault' 298 has been
previously discussed 299 and is an important reason for refusing to compare most plaintiff conduct in strict liability
cases. If comparison is undertaken, however, lower plaintiff percentages should be the norm (for example, zero to ten
percent), rather than the higher percentages characteristic of ordinary 'one-on-one' comparative negligence cases.
As noted by Dean Twerski:

300

In evaluating the ultimate fairness of barring or reducing the plaintifrs recovery by the percentage of
plaintifrs fault, the disparity between the kinds of risks created by plaintiff and defendant should be
explored. Products liability claims, especially design defect and failure-to-warn cases are not one-on-one
situations. ln the classic encounter between a negligent defendant and a contributorily negligent plaintiff,
the defendant exposes the plaintiff to a risk and the plaintiff, by his negligent conduct, exposes himself to a
risk. Equitable considerations preclude a plaintiff from total recovery when the plaintiff's conduct is similar
in scope and in nature to that of the defendant. However, in a product liability case based on defective
design, the defendant is not facing the plaintiff one-on-one. The defendant distributes to the world at large
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a product which is unreasonably dangerous and one can statistically calculate that it will bring ha1111 to a
11) l

percentage of users. ---

Thus, the starting point in any comparison in a products liability case is whether the defendant has distributed an
unreasonably dangerous product 'to the world at large,' which by definition is capable of injuring *80 a totally blameless
user or bystander, and which is a contributing cause of the injury. Indeed, in Hopkins, the defective carburetor almost
caused an accident before the plaintiff engaged in any of the conduct for which it is argued that his recovery should be
reduced. In addition, General Motors was aware of the defective design for as long as three and a half years before the
accident when its engineers considered a design change an 'urgent safety matter.' 302 The evidence established that the
cost of an alternative design would be approximately one cent ($.01) per car and that the alternative design was in fact
incorporated into later models of the carburetor. It is in this context that any 'concurring cause' by an individual plaintiff
must be considered in reducing recovery.

Third, cases of the 'defective product/concurring cause' type requiring comparison should be extremely rare, and fairly
easily recognizable. Most cases will be resolved without comparison by finding no defect, or by finding that the defect
or the plaintiffs conduct was the sole cause of the injury. 303 Only when the defendant's contentions that the misuse
amounted to a lack of defect or lack of causation are unsuccessful will the defendant attempt to interpose an affirmative
defense that the plaintiffs conduct was a concurring cause of the loss. Establishing this defense will not be easy. As noted
by the court in Hopkins:
It is essential that the supplier prove, as an element of this defense, that the consumer plaintiff should
have reasonably anticipated as consequences of the misuse that the malfunction or injury, or some similar
malfunction or injury, would occur. The harm must be reasonably foreseeable to the user if he is to be
penalized. Suppose, for example, a young automobile buff such as R. M. Hopkins, Jr. makes an alteration
in his carburetor which, though unforeseeable to the manufacturer, could be reasonably expected by one
with Hopkins' knowledge to risk some difficulties in the operation of his vehicle: for example, slow starts
or flooding or sluggish acceleration. But suppose that this alteration does far more: the alteration makes it
more likely that a defect of design or manufacture, which constitutes a danger in the nonnal and expected
operation of the carburetor, will be activated and cause the vehicle to speed out of control. If the *81
malfunction and damaging event are not reasonably foreseeable to the user, his misuse should not limit
·
,04
his
recovery. ---

l

Fourth, drawing the line between ordinary contributory negligence (which is not compared) and unforeseeable misuse
which affects product integrity and is a concurring cause of the injury (which may be compared) may be a difficult but
not insurmountable task, especially because cases in this category are likely to arise infrequently and turn upon their
peculiar facts. Dean Twerski, considering the issue of unforeseeable misuse, noted:
When the courts come to realize that contributory fault in products cases is a complex matter which must be
decided on clear policy grounds they will gradually become more comfortable in utilizing their comparative
fault statutes in a discriminating fashion. It will not be every case that is subject to apportionment, only those
in irhich the role of plai11tif/s conduct 1rith regard to maintaining product integrity is sign(ficant or those in
,rhich the plaintiflhas pushed the product heyond the limits of its capacities. These situations will not be easily
categorized. The common law must do its job. Individual fact patterns will carry the day and ultimately
define the parameters of the comparative fault doctrine. 305

___ --·---·-----------·---
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In sum, there exists a limited role for comparative principles in misuse cases. Most cases, however, should continue to
be resolved in the traditional manner under which the plaintiff recovers either all (foreseeable misuse) or nothing (lack
of defect or lack of causation).

C. Treatment of Ass11111ptio11 of Risk

Comment n to section 402A of the Restatement ( Second) of Torts provides in part that:
[T]he form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under
this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of
the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery. 306
*82 Most pre-comparative negligence cases adopted this view, with the end result that assumption of risk provided an
absolute defense in a strict liability case.

To hold that assumption of risk is a complete defense is to absolve the defendant of any libility arising from the defect in
the product. It also places the entire burden of the accident on the plaintiff, for which the defendant was, to a much greater
degree, responsible. Although the plaintiff assumed the risk, if the product was defective and the defect contributed to the
accident, it is inconsistent with sound notions of risk distribution to allow the defendant to escape without liability. 307
Such a position also renders strict liability a less favorable theory than negligence for some plaintiffs. 308 A plaintiff
who had arguably assumed the risk would be better off claiming that the defendant was guilty merely of negligence.
For although the plaintiff would face all the problems of burden of proof previously discussed, 309 at least the plaintiffs
assumption of risk would only be compared with the defendant's negligence in most jurisdictions today. If the doctrine
of strict liability-the supposedly more pro-plaintiff doctrine of the two-were pursued, the plaintiff's misconduct could
constitute a complete bar to recovery. 310 In addition, treating assumption of risk as an absolute bar also makes it
profitable for a defendant to market obviously defective products, posing danger apparent to any plaintiff, and thus
leaving the predicate for a successful assumption of risk defense.
One advantage of the widespread modern infusion of comparative negligence principles into strict liability actions is that
courts now compare plaintiff conduct such as assumption of risk, which formerly constituted a complete bar to recovery.
In most jurisdictions, comparison results only in a proportionate reduction in the plaintiff's recovery. ill Although
this approach is an improvement, it does not go far enough. That is, in the vast majority of assumption of risk cases,
the public policy considerations supporting strict liability support neither a total nor partial reduction in the plaintiff's
recovery. Rather, assumption of *83 risk should be no defense at all. As the following material illustrates, the most
common justifications offered in support of the assumption of risk defense-bargaining for risk, accident prevention,
and efliciency--do not withstand scrutiny. 31 ~ Further, the defense is particularly inappropriate in the most common
modern products liability setting-suits against manufacturers by employees who are injured by defective workplace
materials and equipment. ill

n
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l. Bargaining for Risk Theory

One economics-based approach to assumption of risk theory takes the view that liability rules should be designed
to maximize satisfaction in society. 314 This approach concludes that assumption of risk maximizes satisfaction by
allowing the rational consumer to decide which features of a product (such as attractiveness, utility, cost, safety) are
most important to him or her and to trade in accordance with that preference. 315 It is argued that consumers who value
safety less willingly pay less in exchange for assuming the increased risk of injury. Professor, now Judge, Posner purports
116
. o f ns
. k snnp
. 1y re fl ects t l.
. 1economic
· system.-·
t hat assumpt10n
11s rat10na
-

This rationale for the assumption of risk defense exhibits several major flaws. First, this reasoning obviously does not
apply in the significant percentage of products liability cases in which the plaintiff is a user or a by-stander, rather than a
purchaser. ill This 'bargaining for risk' theory ignores the multitude of users (employees, family members, friends) and
by-standers (pedestrians walking near lawnmowers, victims of two-vehicle collisions, residents in buildings with defective
boilers) who should be protected by the doctrine of strict liability. Furthermore, this reasoning does not apply to the
many cases in which the defect is not discovered until after the purchase.
It is fanciful to assume that consumers can rationally bargain over the safety of most products they buy. Consumers may
be able to see *84 that Saw A is twenty-five dollars and Saw Bis twenty dollars, but rarely will they know that the price
difference reflects the fact that Saw B is more likely to cause an injury because of its cheaper construction or defective
design. Consumers clearly cannot calculate the exact percentage increase in risk. As previously discussed, one of the main
policy bases for strict liability is that, because of the increasing complexity of products, '[t]he consumer no longer has
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product ... .' 318 In most cases, the consumer learns
after the purchase that he has received an unsafe product when it is too late to bargain to receive some of his money
back. 319 Moreover, it is unlikely he would desire the money in place of the increased safety. Consumers are generally
risk averse. 320 Advertisers do not have marketing campaigns for products on the theme: 'We're cheaper because we're
not as safe.' To the contrary, safety features are a selling point on many products. 3~1
Professor, now Judge, Posner claims that this bargaining-for-risk rationale also applies in the employment context,
reasoning that a brakeman on a train equipped with substandard safety appliances who knows that the train is unsafe
•n

presumably is being paid more to take the risk, and therefore may be characterized as a risk-preferrer. ~-- This argument
inaccurately assumes either that: (a) the brakeman knows of the defective equipment and the magnitude of the danger
before he takes the job and had other job offers from which to choose; (b) the brakeman, after learning of the defects
and calculating their magnitude, is able to negotiate a wage increase; or (c) the brakeman can easily quit and find a
. b ,,,
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*85 2. Accident Prevention Theory

Another argument supporting the assumption of risk defense is that the defense will prevent accidents by giving product
consumers and users an incentive for safer behavior. 324 This Article has already demonstrated that reducing or barring

!
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a plaintiffs recovery for mere carelessness will not produce safer plaintiff behavior. 325 The same conclusion is generally
true for the assumption of risk defense, although there is a 'voluntariness' component in the defense that would seem to
create an opportunity to encourage safer conduct by influencing plaintiff dhoice.
No plaintiff wants to lose a finger in a saw or to be seriously injured in a motorcycle accident. Potential plaintiffs continue
to use saws without guards and motorcycles that are shimmying because they believe the chance of injury to be slight. 'It
can't happen to me' is a trite but almost universal reaction in human beings. In consumers' minds other factors, including
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the desire not to be deprived of the use ofan item they have purchased with good money, outweigh the perceived dangers.
Asking consumers to factor into their purchasing decisions calculations of the assumption of risk will have no effect.
The so-called 'seatbelt cases' arc illustrative. If an automobile occupant knows that the risk of an accident is particularly
high, he is much more likely to 'buckle up.' 326 This is because most people recognize clearly that wearing a seat belt
will reduce the injuries caused by an accident. 327 In fact, the risk of serious injury is quite low-only one fatal accident
occurs in every 3.5 111illio11 trips. 328 As a result, most people do not wear seatbelts when they have a choice because
the chance of injury is so slight that it docs not outweigh such considerations as convenience, comfort, and urgency.
The actions of assembly line workers provide another example. As one product design expert *86 noted: ' A person
will generally tend to follow those procedures which involve minimal physical and mental effort, discomfort, or time.
Any task which contravenes this basic principle is certain to be ignored or modified by the person who is supposed to
accomplish the task.' .'2 9 Product engineering must take into account this simple matter of human nature.
Adjustment of the doctrine of assumption of risk will not affect consumer or user behavior. However, this is not to
say that human behavior cannot be affected. Laws on seatbelt usage can change practices and save lives. 330 Incentive
bonuses and motivational programs may improve safety consciousness among workers. The doctrine of assumption of
risk is simply too remote to have an impact. It should not be surprising that neither experts on traffic safety 331 nor
experts on industrial safety -' 32 ever advise drivers or assembly line workers of the doctrine of assumption of risk in order
to alter their practices. To so advise drivers or workers would have no meaningful impact. As one commentator noted:
The theory is that risk avoidance is enhanced if workers know that they must bear the economic brunt
of workplace injury. This proposition is not founded in workplace reality. On-the-job behavior is not
determined by thoughts of after-injury common-law adjudications. Psychologically, a worker does not face
the daily demands of a job undergirded by the comfort of knowing that a jury may compensate him or her
years later for a disabling injury. For most, the risk avoidance instinct is predicated on the avoidance of
pain rather than cost. That accidents still frequently occur, despite an almost universal aversion to pain,
shows that the risk avoidance argument for denying recovery has little logical basis. 333

Although consumers and users are generally faced with only a small possibility of being injured by a particular product,
the product's *87 manufacturer knows with virtual certainty that the product will cause a calculable number of injuries.
The manufacturer makes a conscious choice to market the products that it knows will cause these injuries, a choice
comparable to the supposedly conscious, voluntary decision by the consumer that underlies the assumption of risk
defense. 334
A rather striking illustration of this conscious choice by the manufacturer appears in the decision by Ford Motor
Company to market the Pinto without improving the crashworthiness of its fuel tank. Evidence suggests that Ford
estimated that the design of the Pinto could lead to 180 bum deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, and 2,100 burned
vehicles. 335 Yet, the Ford executives decided to sell the cars as designed based on the calculations of expected liability
exposure as compared to the number of cars that would be sold and the eleven dollar cost per vehicle of remedying the
problem. The Pinto had been a very profitable car for Ford, at least until law suits were filed in great numbers. 336
The verdicts against Ford have, no doubt, had an impact on the practices of other manufacturers. Product safety
engineers, in motivating product designers to build safer products, stress the likelihood of facing expensive products
liability suits if safety practices are not improved. -1 37 Thus, products liability exposure is a major factor behind
improvements in product safety.
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Whereas manipulation of the products liability rules-such as the assumption of risk doctrine-will have no discernible
impact on consumer behavior it can and does have a, indeed the, major impact on the behavior of manufacturers.
Although human factors may account for most accidents on assembly lines, experts on the prevention of accidents and
injuries focus on the machines themselves, 338 not the humans.
*88 The most ardent supporters of the belief that worker-failure accident causes are predominant are,
nevertheless, firmly convinced that mechanical guarding and correction of mechanical and physical hazards
are fundamental and first requirements of a complete safety program. They believe, and act on the belief,
that safety begins with safe tools, safe machines, safe processes, and safe environment. ... In the same
breadth it can be truthfully said that although worker failure causes the most accidents, mechanical guarding

and engineering revision are nevertheless important factors in preventing the most accidents. 339
In short, the human being cannot be redesigned. 340 But with the fear of products liability exposure, the products those
humans use can be redesigned to improve safety. ill

Evidence on highway tragedies similarly shows that new safety features for cars and highways have done more to save
lives than all the driver's education courses and seatbelt advertisements put together. 342 Again, the cars and highways
can be redesigned more effectively than can the humans who drive them. 343
*89 Not only is the assumption of risk doctrine incapable of increasing safety, it is not aimed at that goal. The use of
the doctrine is not currently limited to situations where barring the consumer's recovery strengthens incentives for long-

term safety. Only one jurisdiction has attempted this type of formulation, 344 and the results are mixed at best. 345 Nor
does the current assumption of risk doctrine, at least in *90 many jurisdictions, consider the plaintiffs level of care.
In summary, the manufacturer has the greater realistic capacity to prevent accidents and injuries stemming from the
use of products. The law should be structured to provide manufacturers the incentive to utilize that capacity. 346 The
assumption of risk doctrine accomplishes the *91 contrary result by protecting the party with the ability to reduce
accidents and punishing the party with little realistic ability to do so.

3. Efficiency Theory
Some defend assumption of risk arguing that if the doctrine is not recognized, the manufacturer of a relatively safe
product pays not only for its own defects but also for plaintiffs misconduct. The manufacturer's products, therefore,
are priced unfairly high so that cheaper, less safe goods of competitors will now be purchased. Economic efficiency is
thus undennined. 347
Actually, the assumption of risk defense works in precisely the opposite manner. The more defective a product, the
more obvious those defects will be. The more obvious the defects are, the more likely the product's manufacturer can
successfully invoke the assumption of risk defense. Thus, manufacturers of the most dangerous products are protected
*92 to the greatest degree by the assumption of risk defense.
The notion that manufacturers are saddled with unjustified costs is misfocused. 348 Even elimination of the assumption
of risk defense will not require manufacturers to account for all the costs their defective products inflict. For example,
consider the injury to the worker on the assembly line. By applying the assumption of risk defense. the manufacturer bears
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none of the costs generated by the product's defect. If we do not allow the assumption of risk defense, the manufacturer
pays the direct costs arising from the defect. However, the manufacturer will not (in most cases) be liable to the injured
worker's employer for the incidental costs of the accident, such as the disruption in production that followed the injury,
clean-up costs, costs of training a replacement employee and the like. These costs have been estimated to be four times
the direct costs of the accident. 349
Along the same economic lines, it is argued that allowing the assumption of risk defense creates efficiency by putting
the burden on the consumer to prevent accidents when the consumer can do so more cheaply than can the product's
manufacturer. 350 There are at least two problems with this line of argument. First, the assumption of risk defense does
not take into account who can prevent the accident more *93 cheaply. Cost is not one of its considerations. Second,
as demonstrated above, changing the liability rules will not affect the consumers' conduct and therefore will not reduce
the number of accidents efficiently. It is pointless to decide that in a given case the consumers could prevent the accident
more cheaply while knowing that the consumers will not do so no matter how the liability rules are manipulated. 351

4. Assumption of Risk in the Employer-Employee Setting
As developed above, the assumption of risk defense does not allow *94 consumers to bargain for risk, does not promote
product safety, and does not promote economic efficiency. A brief examination of the historical background of the
defense uncovers additional reasons to reject the defense in the products liability setting.
The doctrine of assumption of risk developed primarily in the employment context during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries to insulate employers from liability for work-related accidents. The purpose of the doctrine was to subsidize
the rapidly expanding industrial sector by giving employers a potent defense to negligence actions brought by injured
employees. In 1943, the Supreme Court noted:
Assumption of risk is a judicially created rule which was developed in response to the general impulse of
common law courts at the beginning of this period to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing
the 'human overhead' which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing of industrialized
business. The general purpose behind this development in the common law seems to have been to give
.
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The time when industry could profit by minimizing 'human overhead' has long since passed. The philosophical
underpinnings of the doctrine have, according to Dean Prosser, suffered 'violent denunciation at the hands of every
writer who has dealt with the subject.' 353 Dean Prosser noted:

The cornerstone of the common law edifice was the economic theory that there was complete mobility of
labor, that the supply of work was unlimited, and that the worker was an entirely free agent, under no
compulsion to enter into the employment. ... The economic compulsion which left him no choice except
starvation, or equally dangerous employment elsewhere, was entirely disregarded. 3; 4
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Harper and James likewise stated:

It will be apparent at once that the whole spirit of the defense and of the reasoning it employs bears the strong
imprint oflaissez faire and its concomitant philosophy of individualism which has passed its prime .... Small
wonder then that assumption of risk has lost ground as that climate of opinion has undergone modification
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-especially in some relationships like that of master and servant .... It is likely to lose more ground as
notions of social insurance gain strength and techniques for affecting broad distribution of enterprise *95
liability are developed. 355

Of course, commentators have not been the only critics of the doctrine. The reason for widespread enactment of worker's
compensation laws in the early twentieth century was to negate the untoward consequences of the 'unholy trinity' of
defenses (contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine) available to the employer to defeat
recovery by injured employees. 356 Indeed, Dean Prosser has noted that the assumption of risk defense was a major
factor in denying recovery in 'the great majority of industrial accidents.' 357 At the federal level, the Federal Employer's
Liability Act (FELA), enacted in 1908, 358 was amended in 1939 359 to abolish the assumption of risk defense.
State and federal statutory abrogation of the assumption of risk defense has not eliminated it entirely. Courts continue to
judicially recognize the assumption of risk defense in nonemployment cases, 360 and, most importantly, through the grace
of comment n of section 402A of the Restatement ( Second) of Torts, in strict products liability actions. It is important
to note the relationship between assumption of risk, compensation law, and strict products liability:
The longevity of the doctrine in this country has been effected both by its application in non-employment
settings during the past century and by its emergence in more recent employees' strict products liability suits
against the manufacturers of defective workplace materials and equipment. This latter category deserves
particular attention today. Employers are generally insulated from employees' tort actions by workers'
compensation laws, and workers' compensation payments are generally conceded to be minimal at best;
hence, injured workers often look to manufacturers for redress of work-related injuries and diseases. The
resulting strict products liability lawsuits necessitate judicial re-examination of the use of assumption of
*96 risk in the employment context. ill

In reexamining the use of assumption of risk in its most important modern setting-products liability cases arising out of
employment related injuries-a basic question arises: should a product manufacturer be able to assert against an injured
employee in a strict liability case a defense long denied the employer under workers' compensation and other statutes
for public policy reasons, when the policies supporting both strict liability and compensation statutes-eased plaintiff
recovery, risk-spreading, and increased incentives for safety-are virtually the same? The answer, as developed below,
must be no.

5. Defining the l\lanufacturer's Duty

At the outset it should be noted that the focus in assumption of risk cases must first be upon the defendant's duty not the
plaintitTs conduct. Dean Twerski has argued that the basic question for each product and each situation is:
[I]s it the desire of the law to impose a duty upon defendants to preclude plaintijfsfrom choice-making? That
question, admittedly a difficult one, is crucial to a sophisticated understanding of assumption of risk. Only
after squarely facing this major policy question can assumption of risk as a doctrine of the law designed to
evaluate p/aintif}'s behavior come into play.

!
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... In each instance we shall have to examine the offending product and determine whether we wish the
manufacturer to protect the plaintiff from decision-making. That determination can only be made on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the kind of policy considerations which are best expressed within the
framework of tort duty law. Only after having decided that choice-making is a viable policy option can we
turn to the !plaintiffs activity and examine his voluntariness and appreciation of the risk. In sum, the first
order policy judgments that must be made in evaluating defendant's conduct and the more limited questions
that typically arise under the assumption of risk defense require independent treatment. 362

In the context of products liability suits against manufacturers of defective workplace materials and equipment, courts
and commentators have increasingly recognized the inappropriateness of the assumption of risk defense. Some have
focused on the voluntariness aspect of the plaintiffs conduct. 363 For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted *97
that' an employee who is at his proper post of employment using machinery furnished by the employer is not ordinarily
guilty of contributory negligence because he has no choice other than to work or quit, the latter an unrealistic possibility
in the current economy.' 364 To contend that assumption of risk in this context is voluntary is to ignore the extraordinary
power our economic system grants employers over employees. 365 It is very difficult for most employees to move from
job to job. 366 An employee who is dismissed for refusing to work on an unsafe machine faces social stigma and mental
anguish, 367 as well as lost earnings, the expense of searching for new employment, and perhaps being forced to accept
a less desirable, lower-paying job at a distant place. 368 Other commentators have suggested that the abrogation of the
doctrine *98 represents the imposition of new duty rule-to protect the plaintiff from himself-in the employment
product liability setting. 36 ()
On whatever theory, modern courts increasingly have rejected assumption of risk as a defense in employment products
liability cases. For example, in Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., .no a factory employee was injured while using
a punch press which was activated by stepping on a foot pedal that caused a ram to descond and punch a hole in a
metal disc. ill The court imposed strict liability on the manufacturer for failing to provide a safety device to prevent the
operator's hands from being in the zone of danger when the ram was activated. 372 In deciding whether the plaintiffs
carelessness or assumption of the risk should bar recovery, the court said:
The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand under the ram while at the same time depressing
the foot pedal-was the very eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against. It would be
anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of that duty results in no
liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect against. 373
In Bexig{I, the court rejected the defendant's argument that it was the custom of the trade that purchasers, not
manufacturers, provide safety devices on such equipment, stating:

n

Where a manufacturer places into the channels of trade a finished product which can be put to use and
which should be provided with safety devices because without such it creates an unreasonable risk of harm,
and where such safety devices can feasibly be installed by the manufacturer, the fact that he expects that
someone else will install such devices should not immunize him. The public interest in assuring that safety
devices are installed demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave such a critical phase
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of his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser. The only way to be certain
that such devices will be installed *99 on all machines-\\"hich clearly the public interest requires-is to
place the duty on the manufacturer where it is feasible for him to do so. 374
A later New Jersey case, Surer v. San Angelo Foundry & 1Hach. Co., 37 ~ involved a worker injured while working on a sheet
metal rolling machine that lacked an adequate guard around the lever that activated the rollers. 376 On the assumption
of risk issue the court noted:

Before Bexiga was decided we had held that voluntarily encountering a known danger might constitute
contributory negligence .... In our view an employee engaged at his assigned task on a plant machine, as in
Bexiga, has no meaningful choice. Irrespective of the rationale that the employee may have unreasonably
and voluntarily encountered a known risk, we hold as a matter of policy that such an employee is not guilty
of contributory negligence ....

The imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to make the machine safe to operate whether by installing a
guard or ... by making it inoperable without a guard, means that the law does not accept the employee's
ability to take care of himself as an adequate safeguard of interests which society seeks to protect. The policy
justification for Bexiga is sound. We see no reason to depart from Bexiga's elimination of contributory
negligence where an employee is injured due to a defect (whether design or otherwise) in an industrial
accident while using a machine for its intended or foreseeable purposes. The defendant manufacturer should
not be permitted to escape from the breach of its duty to an employee while carrying out his assigned task
under these circumstances when observance of that duty would have prevented the very accident which
occurred. 377
In sum, Suter stands for the principle that, as a matter of public policy, workers injured while doing their assigned work
cannot be found to have assumed the risk. 378

As the preceding discussion indicates, the public policy considerations justifying products liability support total abolition
of the assumption of risk defense in its most common products liability setting-suits against manufacturers of defective
workplace materials and equipment. Comparative negligence principles, which would partially reduce the injured
employee's recovery, or the Restatement approach of totally barring recovery, are completely inconsistent with those
policies, especially in light of other state and federal laws designed to promote work-place safety and compensation for
injured employees.

*100 6. The Role of Comparative Principles

If assumption of risk is not to be recognized in its most common setting, the question then becomes: are there any
products liability cases in which the defense might provide an appropriate basis for comparison and reduction of an
injured plaintiffs recovery? As Dean Twerski has asserted, the availability of the defense should turn on identifying those
situations in ,Yhich the law should impose a duty on defendants to preclude plaintiffs from choice making.
Twerski stated:

379
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In analyzing the hard-choice type of case [courts] have frequently concluded that plaintiff is really not
making the choice; that defendant is unfairly putting the choice to the plaintiff. Especially in the products
area the courts have recognized that there is a high degree of foreseeability on the part of defendants that
plaintiffs will have to use their products in a variety of situations in which the options available to plaintiffs
for alternative actions will be limited. If the product is defective, the burden of this foreseeable use of the
product is placed on the defendant. 380
In determining when a plaintiffs 'choice' is 'fair.' courts must proceed on a case-by-case basis and refrain from invoking
the doctrine for the purpose of attaining unattainable goals, such as accident prevention, creation of efficiency, or
retribution. 381 Application of the fairness standard should reveal a limited class of extraordinary cases in which
the plaintiffs conduct should be compared to reduce the recovery from the manufacturer of a defective product. 382
Generally, as in our suggested *101 treatment of 'defective product/concurring cause' misuse, 383 when a plaintiffs
assumption of risk is to be compared, a 'pure' form of comparison should be used, and a higher percentage of fault
should be allocated to the defendant than in an ordinary 'one-on-one' negligence case.

IV. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 384 the seminal case applying comparative negligence principles to strict
tort liability actions, Justice Mosk noted:
This will be remembered as the dark day when this court, which heroically took the lead in originating the
doctrine of products liability and steadfastly resisted efforts to inject concepts of negligence into the newly
designed tort inexplicably turned 180 degrees and beat a hasty retreat almost back to square one. The pure
concept of products liability so pridefully fashioned and nurtured by this court for the past decade and a
half is reduced to a shambles .

. . . I am convinced that since the negligence of the defendant is irrelevant in products liability cases,
the negligence-call it contributory or comparative-of the plaintiff is also irrelevant. The majority, by
considering the comparative negligence of a plaintiff in an action in which defendant's negligence is not an
issue, apply an untenable double standard. Their error is grievously unsettling to the law of torts. More
significantly, this decision seriously erodes the pattern of the law which up to now reOected a healthy concern
for consumers victimized by defective products placed on the market in this mechanized age through the
dynamics of mass production, national *102 and international distribution, and psychologically subtle
· ·~R5
mark etmg.
Subsequent experience with Daly and its progeny have proved that Justice Mosk's concerns were well founded. Wholly
apart from the intractable problem of comparing fault and no-fault concepts, the unninching merger of strict products
liability and comparative negligence-two 'pro-plaintiff doctrines-has resulted in reduced protection for the thousands
of persons injured each year by defective products.
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Despite the adverse effects of blanket application of comparative principles, there may be circumstances in which
comparison is advisable in the interest of fairness, and justice-for example, limited cases of assumption of risk and
certain cases in which the plaintiffs contributory conduct adversely affected product integrity. Identifying these cases,
however, requires individual analysis of the peculiar facts of each case, focusing on the effect of comparison on the
public policy under-pinnings of strict liability. In analyzing cases, courts also should be particularly careful to recognize
that it is far easier for manufacturers than consumers to promote product safety. That is, whereas manipulation of
products liability rules has no discernible impact on consumer behavior, products liability is perhaps the single most
important factor influencing manufacturers' product design decisions. Though this analytical process may, at the outset,
be difficult as courts struggle to draw the line in borderline cases, it is far superior to wholesale application of the 'great
compromiser'--comparative negligence. For, as Dean Twerski noted, comparative negligence 'permits the court the
luxury of evading fundamental policy questions, and once it is introduced it has a life of its own which blinds courts to
the policy questions which they might otherwise be required to face.' 386

Footnotes
Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. B.S. 1971, J.D. 1975, University of Illinois.
Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1972, University of Kansas; J.D. 1975, Washburn
University.
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One can argue that the alleged 'litigation explosion' and the supposed 'insurance crisis' have spurred an even greater revolution
in tort reform legislation. Some commentators have spoken of the 'extraordinary state law development.' See, e.g., Priest, The
Cur rem Insurance Crisis mzcl Modern Tort Law. 96 YALE L.J. 1521. 1523-24 ( 1987). Indeed, 44 state legislatures considered
some 1,400 tort reform bills in 1986 alone; forty-one of those states passed some sort of reform legislation. Proffer & Trolin,
Coping 1rith a Crisis, STATE LEGISLATURES, Sept. 1986, at 18. HoweYer, 'only 12 states passed what most reform
advocates have billed as meaningful' changes. Nutter, Yuir o(Ref{mn. Bus. Ins .. Dec. 29. l 986. at l 9. See generally Strasser,
Both Sides Brace for Tort Battle, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at l,col. 3.
At the federal level there has been comparable outcry and debate, but reform advocates have failed in several attempts to
pass a uniform federal products liability law. See Cronan, Proposed Federal Product Liability Act, 29 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
498 (1985); Dickinson, Tort Reform Again A1rnits Final Action by Senate Panel, LEGAL TIMES, June 23, 1986, at I, col. 3;
Unsafe Products: The Great Debate Over Blame and Punishment, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 30, 1984, at 96.
The doctrine of strict products liability may be traced to Greenman v. Yvba Power Prod .. Inc .. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962)
(en bane), a decision that predated the infusion of comparative negligence into state tort law. Subsequently the drafters of
Restatement ( Second) of Torts predicated§ 402A upon contributory negligence principles.
The recent surge in development of the doctrine of comparative negligence may be traced to Liv. Yellow Cab Co .. 532 P.2d
1226 (Cal. l 975) (en bane). Virtually every court adopting comparative negligence has done so in the context of a negligence
case. and has only later considered whether to apply the doctrine to strict liability. Similarly, it is apparent that most legislatures
adopting comparative negligence have done so giving little thought to its implications for strict liability claims.
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See infra notes !01-52 and accompanying text.
See infi·a notes 90-IOO and accompanying text.

RESTATEMENT (SECO;'\/Dl OF TORTS §402A ( 1965).
011 Plaintiffs Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267 [hereinafter Epstein I];
Epstein, Plaintiff's Conduct in Products Liahility Actions: Comparative Negligence, Auto111£1tic Division and Multiple Parties,
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 87 ( 1979) [hereinafter Epstein II]; Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability o.f Comparatil'e Negligence,
43 MO. L. REV. 431 (1978) [hereinafter Fischer I]; Fischer. Products Liability-Applicability of Comparatil'e Negligence to
Misuse and Assumption v.f the Risk. 43 MO. L. REV. 643 ( 1978) [hereinafter Fischer II]; Gershonowitz, Comparatil'e Ca11s£1tio11
as an A!ternatil'e to. Not a Part of. Comparative Fault in Strict Products Liability. 30 ST. LOUIS U .L.J. 483 (1986): Holliger &

See Epstein, Products Liahility: Defenses Based

__________________________ ~- -----------·-------,
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Dill, Comparatire Fault, Strict Liahility mu{ Crasl11rorthi11ess Cases, 41 MO. B.J. 217 ( 1985 ): Jensvold, A A!odcm Approach to
Loss Allocation Among Tor(/c•a.mrs in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1974); Kennedy, As.,·u111ptio11 o(the
Risk. Co/Jl/hl/'<1tirc Fa11/1. and Strief Liahilitr Alier Rozell. 47 LA. L. REV. 791 ( 1987); Leff & Pinto, rnmparatire Negligence
in Strict Products Liability: The Courts Render tl,e Final Judgement, 89 DICK. L. REV. 915 (1985): Levine, Buyer's Conduct
as Affecting tl,e Extent of Manufacturer's Liability i11 Warranty. 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968) [hereinafter Levine I]: Levine,
Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: Tl,e Collision of Fault a11d No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337 ( 1977)

[hereinafter Levine II]; Little, Rationali::ation of the Lmr of Products Liability, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1984); Noel, Defectil'e
Products: Abnormal Use, Contriblllory Negligmce, and Assumption of Risk, 25 V AND. L. REV. 93 (1972): Razook, Merging
Comparatil'e Fmdt and Strict Products Liability: Tl,e Case for Judicial Innovation, 20 AM. BUS. L.J. 511 (1983); Rosenlund
& Killion, 011ce a Wicked S1:l'ter: The Continui11g Role of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in California, 20U.S.F.

L. REV. 225 ( 1986): Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: ls There Real~v a Difference in Lall' or Economics?, 8 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 259 (1978); Sales, A.1·sw11rtiv11 o[ rhe Risk a11d .\fi.rnsc in Strict Tort Uabilitr-Preludc to Co111raratil'e
ft111/t. 11 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 7'29 (1980): Scarzafava & Scarzafava, Co111p<1rati1•c Ca11smio11 in Product Liahilitv Actio11sNo need to hlferfect Cu11trihutorv Nedir;1·11cc. 45 TEX. B.J. 27 ( 1982); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence,

42 TENN. L. REV. 171 ( 1974 ); Sobelsohn, Com{Jarini: Fault. 60 I ND. L.J. 413 (1985); Steen son, The Fault H'itlt Comparative
Fault: The Problem of Individual Comparison in a Modified Comparatil•e Fault Jurisdiction, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1
(1986); Thode, Same Thoughts 011 t!te L~\'(' o[ Comparisons in Product Liahilitl' Cases. 1981 UT AH L. REV. 3; Twerski, The
Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, IO IND. L. REV. 797 ( 1977) [hereinafter Twerski I]; Twerski,
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977)
[hereinafter Twerski II]; Twerski, The J\fany Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation,
29 MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978) [hereinafter Twerski III]; Wade, 011 the Na/lire of Strict Tort Liability for Producrs, 44 MISS.
L.J. 825 (1973) [hereinafter Wade I]; Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiffs Fault-The Un/form Comparative Fault Act, 29
MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978) [hereinafter Wade II]; Woods, Product Liability: ls Comparative Fault Winning The Day?, 36
ARK. L. REV. 360 (1982) [hereinafter Woods I]; Woods, Comparative Fault and Product Liability in Indiana, 17 IND. L.J. 999
(1984) [hereinafter Woods II]; Woods, The Tre/1{/ Toll'ard Comearatirc Fault. 20 TRIAL 16 (NOV. 1984) [hereinafter Woods
III]; Note, Loosing the Shackles of 'No Fault' in Strict Liability: A Better Approach to Comparative Fault, 33 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 339 (1984-85); Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Where Do We Stand? rVhere Do We
Go?, 19 VII L. L. REV. 695 (1983-84).
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Twerski II, supra note 6, at 346.
See infra notes 11-60 and accompanying text.

2

See infra notes 61-158 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 159-386 and accompanying text.
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377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (en bane) (plaintiff injured while using a combination power tool).
Id at 900.

ll

id at 901 (citations omitted).

14

150 P.2d 436,440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor. J., concurring).

I5

Id. at 4-10-41: see also Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlirn! Co .. 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1975). The court in Embs held that 'since
the risk of harm from defective products exists for mere bystanders and passersby as well as for the purchaser or user, there
is no substantial reason for protecting one class and not the other.' Id. at 705.
161 A.~d 69 (N..1. 1960).

11

Id. at 75-8-1. 94-97.
Id at 77.
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Id at 80-81.
Id. at 83-84.

Id at 85.

Id. at 87.
Id. at 96.
See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel ( Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 804 n.80 (1966).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical ham1 thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
27

For a listing of states accepting strict liability in tort for defective products, see I Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) iM'.4005-4016
(1987-1988). This listing indicates that 45 states have adopted Restatement (5;e,ond) o[ Torts § 402A or some variation of
strict liability. Only Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia do not recognize some form of strict
liability in tort in products cases. See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3-16 to -29 (1987).

28

Wade I, supra note 6, at 826. Professor Wade further notes:
True, res ipsa loquitur often comes to the aid of the injured party. But it is normally regarded as a form of circumstantial
evidence, and this means that there must be a logical inference of negligence which is sufficiently strong to let the case go to
the jury. This is often not present, and strict liability eliminates the need of the proof.
Id. See also the cases ofMurrav v. Fairbanks Morse. 610 F.2d 149,161 (3d Cir. 1979). and Stavmates v. ITT Holub Industries.
527 A. '.'d 140. 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 198 7). both of which discuss the rise of strict liability as a response to plaintiff difficulty
in proving manufacturer negligence.

29

4 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE
LEGAL STUDY 89-90 (1977) (footnote omitted).
Justice Traynor made the same point in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436. 441 (Cal.
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), when he noted that '(a]n injured person ... is not ordinarily in a position to ... identify the
cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is.'
However, one commentator has argued that the plaintiffs burden is only slightly less under strict liability:
[T]he plaintiff still must establish the defect in the product, prove either that the defect was the result of the defendant
manufacturer's design and/or production process, or alternatively, that the defect was present in the product at the time it left
the manufacturer's control, and that the cause of his injury was the product's defect. ...
. . . Proving product design defect(s) is, for all practial purposes, the equivalent of proving the manufacturer's negligence in
the design of the product.
Sachs, supra note 6, at 263.
lknningsen v. Bloomfield Motors. Inc .. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), provides a good example of this problem. In Henningsen,
the trial court had dismissed the Henningsens' negligence counts because an accident had so badly damaged the front of the
plaintiffs' automobile 'that it was impossible to determine if any of the parts of the steering wheel mechanism or workmanship
or assembly were defective or improper prior to the accident.' Id. at 75.

ll

Though there is widespread agreement on this point among both courts and commentators, at least one expert has suggested
that an alteration of rules of evidence, namely by a shifting of the burden of production and persuasion, might substantially
strengthen the plaintiffs position. Powers, The Persisre11ce o[Fault in Pmducrs Lial>ilitl', 61 TEX. L. REV. 777. 81 I ( 1983 ).
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Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel ( Strict Liahili11· to the Consumer). 69 YALE L.J. 1099, l 124 ( 1960) (concluding: 'What
is needed is a blanket rule which makes any supplier in the chain liable directly to the ultimate user, and so short-circuits the
whole unwieldly process.').

See Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968 {Dd. 1980). The court stated: '[T]he doctrine of strict tort liability was based on
the perceived need for greater protection of the consuming public from manufacturers beyond that provided by the contract
warranty theory. This was accomplished through the mechanism of 'risk shifting' .... ' Id. at 972.
Prosser, supra note 32, at 1123; Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine. Function and Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
Conder v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc .. 405 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). The plaintiff, who was seriously injured when a
forklift truck overturned, brought a product liability action against both the lessor and manufacturer of the forklift truck.
Id at 541. See also Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d l 299, 1300 {Or. l 977) (plaintiff brought product liability action to
recover for personal injuries caused while greasing the gears of a twenty-four year old crane); Dippel v. Sciano. 155 N. W.2d
55, 56 (Wis. 1967) (tavern patron brought action for injuries caused when leg assembly of pool table collapsed and table fell
on patron's foot).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment c (1965). The comment states: '(T]he public has the right to and
does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will
stand behind their goods.' Id.
37

Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc .. 207 A.2d 305. 307 (N.J. 1965) (product liability case against manufacturer and distributor
of defective carpeting). The court in Santor stated: '[S]trict liability in tort is not conditioned upon advertising to promote
sales.' Id. at 312.
Lechuga. Inc. v. Montgomerv, 467 P.2d 256. 257 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff brought action against truck lessor for injuries
sustained while using truck). In his concurrence, Judge Jacobson recognized, '(T]he consumer does not have the ability to
investigate for himself the soundness of the product.' lei. at 262 (Jacobson, J ., concurring).
Esco la v. Coca Cola Bottling Co .. I 50 P .2d 436. 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Kassab v. Central Soya,
246 A.'1d 848. 849. 854 n.6 (Pa. 1968) (cattle breeders brought action against feed supplement manufacturer and seller for
damages to cattle due to inclusion of synthetic hormone in feed); Hill v. Joseph T. Rverson & Son. Inc. 268 S.E.2d 296, 297.
303 (W. Va. 1980) (plaintiff filed product liability action against seller of steel pipe that split and injured plaintiff's left eye).
Sachs, supra note 6, at 261-62.

41

Lechuga. Inc. v. Montgomerv. 467 P.2d at 261; see also RESTATEMENT (SECONDl OF TORTS~ 402A comment c (1965);
Scarzafava & Scarzafava, supra note 6, at 29.
Sachs, supra note 6, at 261-62.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co .. 150 P.2d 436,440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor wrote, The cost of
an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one. for the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.' /cl. at 441.
RESTATEl'vlENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 40:!A comment c (1965).
'[T]he thesis is that a Joss resulting from the use of defendant's defective goods 'is a casualty produced by the hazards of
defendant's enterprise, so that the risk of loss is properly a risk of that enterprise." Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d
624,627 (Or. 1%5) (quoting James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L.
REV. 923, 926 (1957)).

46

Escola v. Coc:1 Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ('[T]he risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.'); accord Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
S,pg_rting Goods, 555 P.2d 4~, 44 (Alaska 1976) ('[M]anufacturers should bear the costs of injury resulting from their marketing
of defective products rather than the injured party who is essentially powerless to protect himself.').
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47

This view is not without criticism. One authority argues that some manufacturers are neither able to absorb the added costs of
insurance nor raise the cost of their products to evenly distribute the loss. Sachs, supra note 6, at 272. 'Although it may be an
appealing notion morally, the idea that shifting a large loss from the individual accident victim to a group of individuals (each
of whom bears only a small fraction of the total accident cost) increases economic welfare has no basis in economic theory.' Id.
Others have argued that to benefit those injured by defective products in this manner, when so many other victims of tragedies
within our society go uncompensated under tort rules, is unfair. Powers, supra note 31, at 813.

48

Dawejko v . .Jorgensen Sted Co .. 434 A.2d 106. 109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981 ); Recent Case, 86 HARV. L. REV. 923, 926 ( 1973).
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in adopting the principle of strict tort liability for defective products, recently stated:
When a defective article enters the stream of commerce and an innocent person is hurt, it is better that the loss fall on the
manufacturer, distributor or seller than on the innocent victim. This is true even if the entities in the chain of production and
distribution exercise due care in the defective product's manufacture and delivery. They are simply in the best position to either
insure against the loss or spread the loss among all the consumers of the product.
There are many products liability cases in which the plaintiff must essentially show negligence in order to prove that a product
is defective. And there are cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can provide the missing link to an otherwise solid
negligence case. Under these circumstances, the strict liability action is unnecessary to ensure that the deserving plaintiff is
made whole. There are cases, however, in which the negligence action proves inadequate. For instance, when a person is injured
by a defect that causes the wheel of a car to come apart, it may be practically impossible to establish that the manufacturer's
negligence caused the failure. Let us assume that 5,000,000 wheels for automobiles were manufactured and one was defective.
The manufacturing, inspection, and testing procedures may have exceeded engineering standards. Due care was exercised and
yet there was one defective wheel. Thus, there may have been an entire absence of negligence in the total manufacturing and
sale of the product, yet a totally innocent person was injured when the defective wheel came apart. On these facts, that person
justly ought to have a claim. But he can recover only if strict liability has been adopted and the fault requirement discarded.
Manufacturers and distributors can easily and efficiently apportion the injured person's loss among themselves and ultimately
among their customers, and that is better than affording no relief to the person injuried.
Ode v. Caterpillar Tractor Co .. 716 P.2d 334. 342 (Wvo. 1986) (citations omitted).

49

Note, Assumption o[ Risk and Strict Products Liabilitv. 95 HARV. L. REV. 872. 883 (1982).

5o

Wade II, supra note 6, at 373 (citing Butterfiled v. Forrester. 103 Eniz. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809) (contributory negligence);
Winterbottom v. Wright. 152 Eniz. Rep. 402 (Ex. 184") (privity required for products liability)).

21

The impact of contributory negligence is often so harsh that juries apply comparative principles although instructed to apply
contributory negligence. See Wittman, The Price of Negligence Under Differing Liability Rules, 29 J.L. & ECON. 151, 162
( 1986).

52

See Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226. 1230-3 l (Cal. 1975) (en bane).

53

Austin v. Ravbestos-Tvfanhattan. Inc .. 471 A.2cl 280. 286 (Me. l 984) (comparative negligence statute applicable to strict
product liability claim deriving from exposure to asbestos).

54

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 433 (4th ed. 1971).

55

532 P. '.'d 1..,26 (Cal. I975) (en bane) (action arising from intersectional collision where both parties were negligent).

56

Id at 1242.

57

Daly v. General Motors Corp .. 575 P.2d 1162. 1167 (Cal. 1978).

58

Other states adopting pure comparative negligence systems include: Alaska. Kaatz v. Alaska. 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975);
Arizona. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12-2505 (Supp. 1987); Florida, Hoflinan v . .Jones. 280 So. ~d 431 (Fla. 1973); Kentucky,
Hilen v. Hays. 673 S.W.2d 713 (Kv. l984J; Louisiana, LA. ClV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (Wt!sl Supp. 1987): Michigan, Placek
v. Sterling I-kights. 275 N.W.2cl 511 {Mich. 1979); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN.§ 11-7-15 (1972); Missouri, Gustafson
v. Benda, 6Cil S.\V.2d II (Mo. 1983), and MO. 8,EV. STAT.§ 5':o7.765 (Supp. 1987) (rule of pure comparative negligence
established for products liability actions): New Mexico, Scott v. Rizzo. 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981 l: New York, N.Y. CIV.
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PRAC. L & P. § 1411 {McKinney 1976); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-20-4 (1985); and Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN.§ 4.22.005 (1988).
States adopting a 'less than' rule include: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN.§§ 27-1764 to -1765 (1979); Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT.§ 13-21-111 (1987); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN.§ 51-11-7 (1982 & Supp. 1988); Idaho, IDAHO CODE§ 6-801 (Supp.
1988); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a ( l 983); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14. § 156 (1980); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 9-10-07 (1987); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-27-38 (1987 & Supp. 1988); West Virginia, Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT.§ 1-1-109 (1988).
States adopting a 'not greater than' rule include: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. ST AT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1988);
Delaware, DEL CODE ANN. ti!. LO.§ 8132 (Supp. 1986); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.§ 663-31 (1985); Illinois, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Supp. 1987); Indiana, IND. CODE§§ 34-4-33-3 to -33-4 (1986); Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 668.3 (West 1987); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85 (Supp. 1986); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.§
604.01 (West 1988); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN.§ 27-1-702 (1987); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT.§ 41.141 (1987); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 507:7-d (Supp. 1987); New Jersey, NJ. REV. STAT.§ 2A:15-5.l (1987); Ohio, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN.§ 2315.19 (Baldwin 1984); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 23. §§ 13-14(1981); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.470(1987); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 7102 (Purdon 1982); Texas, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN.§ 33.001 (1986); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12. S 1036 (Supp. 1987); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 895.045
(West 1983).
Other fonns of modified comparative negligence include a 'slight v. gross' system under which recovery is allowed when the
plaintiffs negligence is 'slight' when compared to that of the defendant. States using this approach include: Nebraska. NEB.
REV. STAT.§ 25-21,185 ( 1985); and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 20-9-2 (1987). Finally, Tennessee, in
Bejach v. Colbv. 214 S.W. 869 (Tenn. 1919), adopted a rule allowing recovery if the plaintiffs negligence is only remotely
connected with the accident. The remaining jurisdictions: Alabama, District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia, have not adopted comparative negligence principles. See generally Vainisi, Merging Comparative
Fault With Strict Liability Actions in North Dakota: In Search of a New Day, 61 N.D.L. REV. 7 and appendix at 27-29
(1985) (table showing forms of comparative negligence by state); Comment, Change {rom 'Pure' Com11arative Negligence tn
'ModiOe,r Com11arative Negligence-Will it Alleviate the Insurance Crisis·:'. 32 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 753, appendix at 773-76
(1988) (appendix listing pure vs. comparative negligence systems by state).
Dalv Y. General Motors Corp .. 575 P.2d 1162. 1167 (Cal. 1978).
Preiser, Defenses in Strict Tort Liability Actions, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 485,488 (1982).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A( I) (1965). Most courts use the negligence concept of 'foreseeability' to
gauge proximate causation even in strict liability cases. Powers, supra note 31, at 805-06. Some have attempted to avoid this
mixing of doctrines by using terms such as 'producing cause.' For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins. 548 S. W.2d
344 (Tex. l 977), the Texas Supreme Court noted that the trial court defined 'producing cause' as "an efficient, exciting or
contributory cause, which, in a natural and continuous sequence, caused in whole or in part the occurrence or injuries ... but
for said cause the occurrence or injuries would not have occurred." Id al 351 n.3.
RESTATEMENT !SECO:'TD) OF TORTS§ 402A comment g (1965). The burden of proof that the product was in a defective
condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be
produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective. the burden is not sustained.' Id.
This burden is not always easily sustained. See. e.g., Gates\. Ford Motor Co .. 494 F.2d 458. 459-60 ( 10th Cir. 1974) (defendant
escaped liability where no evidence showed that allegedly defective tractor, altered since its purchase from defendant, was
defective when manufactured); Zambrana v. Standard Oil Co .. I 02 Cal. Rptr. 699. 703-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (plaintifrs
case failed because defendant was shown to be neither 'designer' nor 'manufacturer' of the allegedly defective brass valve
stems or extensions).

92

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment n (1965).

66

Id. comment h.

67

Id. comment n.
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Ettin v. Ava Truck Le::isin!!. 251 A.2d 278, 283 (N.J. 1969) ('[A] plaintiff who uses a leased truck which is impliedly warranted
to be in serviceable condition, owes no duty to the lessor to inspect or guard in advance against the possibility of a defect .... );
Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks. 416 S.W.2d 779. 786 (Tex. 1967) ('It would be incongruous to hold that one could
not recover upon the representation that a product was safe because he had failed to meet the test of the reasonably prudent
man in discovering that the representation was not true.').
Annotation, Products Liabilitl': Contriblllorv Nerzligence or Ass11mptio11 o( Risk as Defense Unda Doctrine o(Srrict Liabilitv
in Tort. 46 A.L.R.3d 240. 251-53 ( 1972).
70

See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus .. 454 N.E.2d 197. 203-04 (Ill. 1983); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co .. 406 A.2d 140.
148-49 (N.J. 1979); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors Corp .. 642 P.2d 624,628 (Or. 1981); Star Furniture Co. v.
Pulaski Furniture Co .. 297 S.E.2d 854. 861-63 (W. Va. !982).
Other jurisdictions applying comparative negligence to strict liability claims apparently do or would compare with the
defendant's conduct the plaintiffs failure to discover or guard against a defect. See Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010. 1016
( I0th Cir. 1983 ); Sun Valley Airlines v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho 1976 ); Dalv v. General Motors
Corp .. 144 Cal. Rptr. 380. 386 (Cal. 1978); Kennedv v. Citv of Sawyer. 618 P.2d 788, 796 (Kan. 1980); Karl v. Brvant Air
Conditionin!l Co .. 331 N.W.2d 456. 459-62 (Mich. 1982); Thibault v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 849 (N.H. 1978).

1l

See, e.g., Elder v. Crawlev Book Mach. Co., 44 l F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 1971 l ('inadvertence, momentary inattention or
diversion of attention ... would not amount to assumption of the risk.').

72

Sales, supra note 6, at 740-41.

73

RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS 402A comment n (emphasis added).

74

Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1974).

75

See Culp v. Rexnord & Booth-Rouse Equip. Co .. 553 P.2d 844 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co .. 547 P.2d
132 (Or. l 976); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co .. 223 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1966).

76

See Sweenev v. Max A. R. Matthews & Co .. 264 N.E.2d 170 (Ill. 1970); Kennedv v. Providence Hockev Club. 376 A.2d 329
(R.I. 1977); Hender,on v. Ford Motor Co .. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).

77

'Misuse' has been defined in various ways in different courts. See, e.g., Eshbach v. W. T. Grant's & Co .. 48 l F.2d 940. 943 (3d
Cir. 1973) (a use that is neither intended nor reasonably foreseeable by the seller); Kerns v. En!!:elke. 369 N.E.2d 1284. 1290 (Ill.
App. Ct. I 977) ('a particular use [that is not] foreseeable, or objectively reasonable to expect'); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie.
Inc .. 495 A.2d 348. 355 (Md. 1985) ("reasonable foreseeability' is the appropriate test, and thus a seller is required to provide a
product that is not unreasonably dangerous when used for a purpose and in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable'); Findlav
v. Copeland Lumber Co .. 509 P.2d 28. 31 {Or. 1973) ('a use or handling so unusual that the average consumer could not
reasonably expect the product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it-a use which the seller, therefore, need not
anticipate and provide for.').
The Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Menard. 559 F.2d 1282. 1285 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (construing Louisiana law), defined misuse
for three types of products cases:
In inadequate warning cases misuse means that the seller had no duty to warn against unforeseeable uses of its products, while
in design cases misuse means that the manufacturer had no duty to design a product so as to prevent injuries arising from
unforeseeable uses of that product. ... In defective manufacture cases, however, misuse means that the injury was not caused
by some inherent defect in the product but by the consumer's abnom1al use of it.
See also J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW§ 32. 79 (1983 & Supp. 1984) (misuse is a use for a purpose neither intended
nor foreseeable by the defendant): L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 15.01 (1984) (misuse is
the abnormal or unintended use of the product if such use was not reasonably foreseeable); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 102 (5th ed. 1984) (misuse is defined as a use different in kind from what was intended, and
unforeseeable misuse in the sense of a use that could not reasonably have been anticipated by the manufacturer); P.
SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER§ 9.06 (1981) (misuse is 'an unintended
and unforeseeable use of a product, by a user, consumer, or third party, that is not in accord with the purpose for which the
product was intended').
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See, e.g., Westerman v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 577 F.2d 873. 880 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting the Texas Supreme Court on misuse
as a defense); Pochcs v. J. J. Newberry Co .. 549 F.2d 1166. 1168 (8th Cir. 1977) (construing South Dakota law); Kav v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1977) (construing California law).
Note, Comparative Negligence Collides With Strict Liability: Will Tort Law Ever Be the Same?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 76,
93 (1979).

See, Schwartz v. American Honda Co., 710 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1983) (interpreting Illinois law as follows: 'misuse is not
an affirmative defense; rather, absence of misuse is part of a plaintiffs proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition or of
proximate cause'); McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros .. Inc .. 672 F.2d 652. 661 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (construing Missouri law);
Amburgery v. Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co .. 606 P.2d 21, 22 (Ariz. 1980); Illinois State Trust Co. v. Walker Mfo. Co., 392
N.E.2d 70. 73 (Ill App. Ct. 1979) (misuse is not an affirmative defense); Henkel v. R. & S. Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185. 191
(Iowa 1982) (misuse goes to plaintiffs proof that the product was defective and caused the injury); Hughes v. Magic Chef,
Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542. 546 (Iowa 1980); Rogers v. Toro Mfo. Co .. 522 S.W.2d 632. 637-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).

fil

See J. DOOLEY,supranote 77, § 32.79; L. FRUMER& M. FRIEDMAN,s11pranote 77, § 15.01; Noel, supra note 6, at 96-100.

82

See Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010. 1015 (10th Cir. 1983) (construing Utah law); Wood v. Stihl. Inc., 705 F.2d
1101, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing Washington law); Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150. 1156-57 (6th Cir. 1982)
(construing Ohio law); Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (construing Texas law); Walker v.
Trico Mfa. Co., 487 F.2d 595. 598 (7th Cir. 1973} (construing Illinois law); Hammond v. McDonough Power Equip., 436 So.
2d 842. 843 (Ala. 1983); Nelson v. Cakrpillar Tractor Co .. 694 P.2d 867, 869 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Uptain v. Huntington Lab,
Inc., 685 P.2d 218. 220-21 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Matthews v. F.M.C. Corp .. 462 A.2d 376. 377-78 (Conn. 1983); Gangi v.
Sears. Roebuck & Co .. 360 A.2d 907, 909 (Conn. l 976); McBride v. Ford Motl)r Co., 673 P.2d 55, 63 (Idaho 1983); l'vlarchese
v. Warner Communications. 670 P.2d l 13. 118 (N.M. 1983); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp .. 521 P.2d 1353. 1366 (Okla.
1974); Allen v. Heil Co .. 589 P.2d l 120. 1122 (Or. 1979); Nomrnn v. Fisher Marine, 672 S.W.2d 414. 420-21 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1984); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344,348 (Tex. 1977); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301,
1302-03 (Utah l 981 ); Smith v. Sturm. Rug:er & Co .. 695 P.2d 600. 604 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Jackson v. Standard Oil Co.,
505 P.2d 139, 148-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
See, e.g., Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds. Inc .. 637 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1980l.
548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).

Id. at 349.
Twerski III. supra note 6, at 417 ('[W]hen misuse is used in this manner it is not really a matter of defense. If a user utilizes a
product in a totally unforeseeable fashion, then the product simply may not be defective.').

s

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A comment h (1965).
Ellsworth v. Sherne Li1werie. Inc .. 495 A.2d 348. 355 (Md. 1985).
The ground-breaking 'crash-worthiness' case was Larsen v. General Motors Corr .. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). which now
represents the overwhelming majority view.
90

527 A.2d 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).

Id. at 143.
Id. at 145.
521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).

Id at 1367. The court apparently did not contemplate judicially fomulating a comparative negligence system to supplement
the statutory system.
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lei.
Stavmates. 527 A.2d at l45. In addition to Pennsylvania and Oklahoma, courts in several other states have refused to meld
strict liability and comparative negligence despite their opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 2 l8 S.E.2d
580, 582 (Ga. 1973); Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co .. 446 N.E.2d 1033. l040 (Mass. 1983); Young's Mach. Co. v.
Long. 692 P.2d 24. 25 (Nev. 1984); Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1987); Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 161
n.7 (S.D. 1979).
Two other courts formerly took this approach but recently saw it invalidated by legislation. Melia v. Ford l\fotor Co., 534
F.2d 795. 802 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the 'application of Nebraska comparative negligence statute would, under the
language of the statute, be extremely confusing and inappropriate in a strict liability case.'); Seav v. Chrvskr Corp., 609 P.2d
1382. 1384 (Wash. I 980) (en bane) (finding comparative negligence to be a 'legislative doctrine,' the court chose to allow the
legislature to decide whether to extend it to strict liability actions).
97

Michigan and Massachusetts have implied warranty doctrines that are functionally equivalent to strict liability and create the
same comparison conundrums.

98

See supra note 60.

99

IND. CODE ANN.§§ 34-4-20A-l to -4 (Burns 1986).

100

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 411.320 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.1986).

lQl

Greenlee & Rochelle, Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability-The Marriage Revisited, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV.
455, 456 (1987) ( '[s]ome thirty-four states now apply, to a greater or lesser degree, comparative fault principles in strict
products liability cases').

102

COLO. REV. STAT.§ 13-21-406 ( l 987).

103

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-5720 (West Supp. 1988).

104

IDAHO CODE§ [6-1404] 6-1304 (Supp. 1988) (Chapters 93 and 225 ofS.L. 1980 each purported to enact a new chapter 13 in
title 6. Accordingly, chapter 93 is codified as title 6, chapter 13, while chapter 225 is codified as title 6, chapter 14. Bracketed
section designations inserted by the compiler indicate the change in numbering from the law as enacted).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2949(1) (West 1986).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12-2509.B (Supp. 1987).

107

IOWA CODE ANN.§ 668.1 to .IO (West Supp. 1987).
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 604.01 (West 1988).
NEB. REV. STAT.§ 25-21.185 (1985).

1lQ

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 4.22.005 to .925 (Supp. 1988).

l ll

UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 78-27-38, -38 (1987).

l 12

See Duncan v. C.:ssna Aircraft Co .. 665 S.W.2d 414, 425-27 (Tex. 1984).

ill

512 F.2d 276. 290 (5th Cir. l 975); see also Nichols v. Western Auto Supply Co., 477 So. 2d 26 l ( Miss. l 985). The Mississippi
statute reads:
In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where such injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property,
the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person having control over the property may have been guilty
of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person injured, or the owner of the property, or the person having control over the property.
~USS. CODE ANN.§ 11-7-15 (1972).

--·-----------------·-----------
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114

ill

464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983).
Id at 727 n.8. 'We must point out that the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Roy v. Star Chopper Co., did not anticipate
our holding today wherein it assumed that Rhode Island law requires that a jury should not be instructed on comparative
negligence when only an implied-warranty claim is brought.' Id. (citation omitted) .

.ill

Id. at 727.

ill

Other states that arguably fit into this category include Arkansas. Maine, New Hampshire, and New York. See H. WOODS,
COMPARATIVE FAULT 434-35 (1978); see also Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan. Inc .. 471 A.2d 280 (Mc. 1984) (where
both the plaintiff and defendant are at fault, as defined by Maine's negligence statute, their faults are compared in assessing
liability); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co .. 451 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 507:7-d (West 1986)
(superseding an earlier decision in Thibault v. Sears. Roebuck & Co .. 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1983)).

ill

155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967).

Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 63.
121

Id at 64-65. The Wisconsin comparative negligence statute in effect at the time of Dippel read:
Contributory negligence _shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
11eglige11ce resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the

person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.
WIS. STAT.§ 895.045 (amended 1971) (emphasis added), cited in Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d at 64 n.10. The current
comparative negligence statute retains its application to 'negligence,' but now requires that the plaintiffs contributory
negligence not be greater than the negligence of the defendant. See WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 895.045 (West 1983).
122

Equating strict liability to negligence was also criticized in the concurring opinion of Judge Hallows. 155 N.W.2d at 65-66
(Hallows, J. concurring). Most subsequent commentators have agreed. See generally Fischer I. supra note 6, at 439-42.
This approach, however, was adopted, at least in substantial part, by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Busch v. Busch
Construction, 26J N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), only to be overturned later by statutory changes which ended negligence per se
in Minnesota. lvHNN. STAT. ANN. S604.01 (West 1988).

123

406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979).

Id.at 141.
125

Id at 143.

Id.
The New Jersey comparative negligence statute in effect at the time of Suter provided:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person ... to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought ....
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:15-5.1 (amended 1982) (emphasis added), cited in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406
A.2d at 1"1-5. The comparative negligence statute was amended in 1982 to address the situation of multiple defendents by
requiring that the plaintiffs negligence not exceed 'the combined negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought.'
See N..I. STAT. ANN.§ 2A: 15-5.1 (West Supp. 1987>.
521 P.2d 135.\ IJ65 (Okla. 197"1-I ('traditional negligence concepts should not, and do not, apply').
129

406 A.2d al 145. 'We have frequently adverted to the interpretative guideline that statutes are to be read sensibly, the purpose
and reason for the legislature controlling, rather than construed literally.' Id.

______________________________________________
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130

Id.

ill

Id. In a footnote, the court added, 'We recognize that Wisconsin's strict liability doctrine has been interpreted in terms of
negligence per se, but the more persuasive legislative signposts indicate that the act was intended to cover fault in a broader
sense rather than in the technical narrow negligence concept.' Id. at 145-46 n.2.

132

Id. at 146 (brackets in original) (citing N.J. ST AT. ANN.§ '.l A: 15-5.1 (current version at N.J. ST AT. ANN. 2A: 15-5.1 (West

s

Supp. 1987))).
133

Id. at 144.
Id.

ill

Id.

136

290 A.2d 281. 285 (N.J. 1972).

137

Sllll'r. 406 A.2d at 148.

138

Id.
Cases in Kansas, Montana, and Oregon took a similar approach in 'stretching' comparative negligence statutes. SC'e Prince v.
Leesona Corp .. 720 F.2d 1166 (I 0th Cir. 1983) (construing Kansas law); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co .. 66 l P.2d 17 (Mont.
1983); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors. 642 P.2d 624 (Or. 1982); see also Sun Val!t:v Airlines v. Avco-Lvcoming
Corp .. 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (later rendered irrelevant by IDAHO CODE§ 6-1404 (Supp. 1988). Idaho's specific
products liability statute calling for 'comparative responsibility').

14 0

Thibault v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 850 (N.H. 1978> ('We judicially recognize the comparative concept in strict
liability cases parallel to the legislature's recognition of it in the area of negligence'). As noted earlier, after Thibault was
decided, the New Hampshire legislature passed a statute specifically applying comparative principles to strict products liability.

-141

Stueve v. American Honda Motors. 457 F. Supp. 740, 751-756 (D. Kan. 1978) (predicting that the Kansas Supreme Court
would decline to extend the Kansas comparative negligence statute to strict liability but would devise its own system of pure
comparative negligence). The prediction in Stueve was incorrect, as noted earlier. See Kennedy v. City of Sawver, 618 P.2d
788, 796-98 (Kan. 1980) (the Kansas comparative fault statute calls for 'misconduct to be expressed on the basis of degrees
of comparative fault or causation').

142

665 S.W.2J 414 (Tex. 1984).

!4 3

Id at 417_

144

Id at 427-28. Other states taking a similar approach include Hawaii, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Vermont. See, e.g., Smith
v. Goodvear Tire & Rubber Co .. 600 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Vt. 1985); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing. 654 P.2d 343 (Haw.
1982); Bell v. kt Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); Dav\·. General Motors Corp .. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).

145

See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.

14 6

See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.

147

See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.

148

See supra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.

149

See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.

150

575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).

151

532 P.2d 1226 /Cal. 1975).

47
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152

153

Dair, 575 P.2d at 1165-73. Other courts in states with judicially-created comparative negligence systems have also applied their
systems to strict liability. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (a pure system;
comparing all plaintiff misconduct); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80. 90 (Fla. 1976) (a pure system; comparing
all plaintiff misconduct except failure to discover and guard against defects); Coney v. J .L.G. Indus .. 454 N .E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983)
(the Illinois Supreme Court later emphasized that only conduct formerly constituting a complete bar to recovery. i.e., misuse
and assumption of risk. would be compared); Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co .. 698 P.2d 887. 900 (N. M. Ct. App. 1985) (a
plaintiffs recovery may be reduced on the basis of the plaintiffs breach of the duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of
his property); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (a 49'1., system; comparing all but
failure to discover and guard against). Also worth noting is the Fifth Circuit's creation of a comparative negligence scheme
for maritime law in Lewis v. Timco .. Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. l 983 ); see also Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr. &
D.:sign Co .. 565 F.2d l 129 (9th Cir. 1977).

Dalv v. G.:neral Motors Corp .. 575 P.2d l 162. 1165-66 (Cal. 1978).
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co .. 665 S.W.2d 414, 422-28 (Tex. 1984).
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See, e.g., Stueve\'. American Honda Motors Co., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 740, 750-54 (D. Kan. 1978).
Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co .. 600 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Vt. l 985); see Dalv v. General Motors Corp .. 575 P.2d 1162
(Cal. 1978); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343 (Haw. !982); Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., 698 P.2d 887
(N.M. Ct. App. 1985); Fiske v. MacGn:gor. Div. of I3ruJl~\VJfk,~:l6J A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).

157

See Dura Corp. v. Harned. 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d l 7 (Mont. 1983 ).
See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co .. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); Austin v.
Raybestos-Manhattan. lnc .. 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984);
Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
The movement for tort reform at the federal and state levels has been fueled by the twin fears of a litigation 'explosion' and an
insurance 'crisis.' Substantial evidence exists that the so-called litigation explosion has been little more than a loud pop. See
Daniels, Ladders and Bushes: The Problem of Caseloads and Studying Court Activities Over Time, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 751; Galanter, The Dav After the Litigation Explosion. 46 lvID. L. REV. 3 (1986); Habush, The Tort System Under Fire: Don't
Fix What Ain't Broken, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 119 (1987); Strasser, Have 'Anecdotes,' Not Facts, Fueled Tort Crisis?, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 15, col. I; Much-Cited Nwnbers 011 Verdicts Are Misleading, Legal Times, Feb. 17, 1986, at 6, col. I.
Similarly the insurance 'crisis' seems, in large part, to be either an invention of the insurance industry or a self-inflicted wound
suffered by that industry. See Bellotti, Van de Kamp, Thornburg, Mattox, Brown & Lafollette, An Ana(l'sis of the Causes of
the Current Crisis of Unavailability and U1wjfordability of Liability Insurance (Report Prepared for the National Association of
Attorneys General) (May 1986); Claybrook, Consumers and Tort Law, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 127 (1987); The Manufactured
Crisis, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1986, at 544; Liability Insurance Crisis Fades, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 22, 1986,
at 29, col. I.
Each year there are an estimated 29,000 deaths and 33 million injuries associated with the use of products under the jurisdiction
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT 15
(1985). Emergency room treatment of these injuries alone costs $10 billion annually. Id. One hundred thousand children are
treated each year in hospital emergency rooms for toy-related accidents. NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS
48 (1986).
These numbers to not include automobile accidents, which kill 45,600 each year and injure another 1.7 million, at a cost of
$46.8 billion. Id. at 4. Approximately 14'Vi, of auto accidents involve defects in the vehicles involved. Id. at 48.

See Levine II, supra note 6, at 356; Dalv v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162. 1178 (Cal. 1978) (Jefferson. J.. concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Twerski I. supra note 6, at 806.

163

Sobelsohn, supra note 6. at 436. 440 (footnotes omitted$.
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164

See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees. 582 P.2d 27L 278 (Kan. 1978) (strict liability 'is a concept based upon
negligence per se'); Dippd v. Sciano, 155 N.W.'.?.d 55. 64-65 (Wis. 1967) (strict liability is 'akin to negligence per se' ); see also

Wade I, supra note 6, at 850.
165

See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse. 610 F.2d 149. 159-61 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying law of Virgin Islands) ('the comparison

itself must focus on the role each played in bringing about the particular injury'); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d
414,427 (Tex. 1984) ('trier of fact is to compare the harm caused by the defective product with the harm caused by the
negligence of [the other parties]'); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins. 548 S. W.2d 344 (Tex. l 977); see also Twerski I, supra
note 6, at 826-29; Twerski III, supra note 6, at 405.
Sobelsohn, supra note 6, at 428.
167

The Uniform Comparative Fault Act§ I, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1988), provides:
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or ham1 to property, any contributory
fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury
attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law
the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear
chance.
(b) 'Fault' includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor
or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption
of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable,
and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault
as the basis for liability and to contributory fault.
See also Wade II, supra note 6, at 373.

™

Pearson, Appvrtiomnent of' Losses Unda Comparative Fault LaH"s-An Analvsis of' r/ze Al!anatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343.
348-349 (1980) ('the absense of fault at one end [of the fault line] having a value of zero and deliberate wrong doing at the
other having a value often').

!69

Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors. 642 P.2d 624. 635 n.19 (Or. 1982). Under the Pearson approach adopted in
Sandford:
[T]he trial judge must instruct the jury to compare plaintiffs conduct with that of a reasonable person, assigning plaintiff
a number on a scale of Oto 10. The jury must then compare defendant's product with a product that would not have been
defective, assigning the defective product a number on a scale of O to 10 .... [T]he jury then adds the two numbers and, by
dividing each party's fault number into the total, determines each party's percentage of fault.

Sobelsohn, supra note 6, at 431-32 (footnotes omitted).
170

Sobelsohn, supra note 6, at 418-21, 430-35.

171

575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).

172

For an extensive listing of the cases, see Leff & Pinto, supra note 6, at 920-22 n.34.

I 73

See supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.

174

East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval. In..:. 476 U.S. 858 (1986) ('Products liability grew out of a public policy
judgment that people need more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by the law of warranty.').

175

See Correia v. Firestone Tiri! Rubber Co .. 446 N .E.1d l 033, 1040 (Mass. 1983 l (careless plaintiffs are barred from recovery
as a balance to seller's strict liability); Smith v. Smith. 278 N.W.2d 155, 161 n.7 (S.D. 1979) (comparing fault would 'negate
the underlying basis of strict liability.').

176

See Dalv v. General M9tors Corp .. 57 5 P.2d 1162. 1168 ( Cal. [ l)78 l (the policy behind strict manufacturer's liability 'will not

be frustrated by the adoption of comparative principles'); Conev v . .J.L.G. Indus .. 454 N .E.1d 197, 201 (Ill. 1983 J ('application
of comparative fault principles would not frustrate this court's fundamental reasons for adopting strict products liability');

----------------------·------
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Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co .. 297 S.E.2d 854, 862 (\V. Va. 1982) ('[a]pplication of comparative negligence will
not remove the advantages which strict liability provides to injured customers').

ill

Fischer I, supra note 6, at 434. Fischer stated: 'The difficulty is that in many strict liability cases the defendant is not at fault.
In such cases there is no negligence to compare with plaintiffs negligence. In cases where the defendant is not negligent, a
plaintiff who is even slightly contributorily negligent will be completely barred from recovery.'
Id.

Id.
Note, Mulherin v. Ingersoll: Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability Cases, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 461,
471 (footnote omitted); see also Daly v. General Motors Corp .. 575 P.2d 1162, 1178 {Cal. 1978) (Jefferson, J., dissenting) ('it
is illogical and illusory to compare elements or factors that are not reasonably subject to comparison').
Dalv, 575 P.2d at 1183 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

ill

Twerski I, supra note 6, at 800-01 (footnotes omitted).
See states listed supra note 60.

183

See states listed supra note 59.

184

See states listed supra note 60.

185

Dalv v. General l\fotors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162. 1183 (Cal. 1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting). Mosk wrote: 'Transferring the liability,
or part of the liability [California is a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction], from the party responsible for putting the
article in the stream of commerce to the consumer is precisely what the majority propose to do.' Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment c (1965), provides:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for
use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who
may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is
forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden
of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as
a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to
the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
Razook, supra note 6, at 515-17. '[T]he merger between modified comparative fault and strict products liability principles
fails to place the financial burden in all products liability cases on the parties according to their individual responsiblility for
the injuries sustained.' Id. at 516; see also Simpson v. General Motors Corp .. 483 N.E.2d l. 3 (111. 1985) (comparative fault
principles can be fairly applied to products liability cases).
See Noel, supra note 6, at 109-10. The author indicated that if liability is in any way based on express misrepresentation, the
contributory negligence defense is 'anomalous.'
Id. at 108. '[W]hen strict liability is based primarily on concepts of administration of risk, contributory negligence seems
inappropriate as a bar to recovery.' !cl

Lewis v. Timco. Inc., 697 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.), rev'd in part, affd in part, 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. l 983) (en bane). In the earlier
decision the court wrote, 'As contrasted with the risks to which Joy Manufacturing exposed many, Lewis' simple negligence ...
wanes into insignificance. And the inadvertence of Lewis ... endangered no one but himself.' Lewis, 697 F.2d at l 256.
Twerski I, supra note 6. at 800 (footnotes omitted).
Twerski II, supra note 6, at 342-43.
Professor Gershonowitz rejects Twerski's argument that the manufacturer has a higher degree of culpability because it largely
determines the way in which consumers will interact with the product. Gershonowitz argues that the flaw in Twerski's
reasoning lies in Twerski's characterization of the plaintiff as a non-actor whose response the manufacturer determines.
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Gershonwitz, supra note 6, at 489-90. Therefore, Gershonowitz suggests that a car occupant who does not wear his seatbelt
should have his recovery reduced. Id. at 487.
There are many problems with Gershonowitz's argument. First, his suggestion that we can protect producers by inflicting
economic harm on users is unrealistic. As we will develop in more detail later in this Article, see infra notes 208-09, 324-46
and accompanying text, if graphic television ad compaigns and spirited speeches by 'Officer Friendly' do not induce people
to use their seatbelts, the vague chance of a reduced recovery certainly will not do so.
Second, to reduce recovery will reduce manufacturer incentive to build safer cars. This is another point we develop, see infra
notes 201-05 and accompanying text. Gershonowitz argues that 'manufacturers are powerless to prevent injuries caused by
plaintiffs who are unwilling to protect themselves, such as drunk drivers and passengers who do not wear their seatbelts or
lock their doors.' Id. at 486. Gershonowitz is patently wrong. Improved auto safety standards saved 9,000 lives between 1975
and 1978 alone. Injury Control, 59 J. AM. INS. 25 (1983-1984). Twerski's approach encourages more safety improvements to
save more lives. Gershonowitz's approach will result in more lives being lost unnecessarily.
Gershonowitz goes on to argue that Twerski's reasoning leads courts to miss important distinctions. He hypothesizes two
separate lawsuits against a gun manufacturer, each claiming that the weapon is defectively designed because it lacks a
childproof safety feature. In each case, a two-year-old child finds the gun and accidentally shoots the parent who left it within
the child's reach. The defendant in both cases claims that the plaintiffs negligence in supervising the child should bar or reduce
recovery. Plaintiff X left the gun under his pillow for easy access in case of a burglary. Plaintiff Y left his gun on the kitchen
table. Gershonowitz, supra note 6, at 494.
Gershonowitz suggests that the plaintiffs bear different amounts of responsibility for the accident, which may be true, and
that as a result plaintiffs should recover differing amounts, which we dispute. Either the gun has an unreasonably dangerous
defect, or it does not. This is a jury determination. If it does not, neither plaintiff should recover anything. If it does, any reader
of newspapers knows that the victim in such cases is much more likely to have been the child himself, a sister or brother, or a
playmate. To reduce the manufacturer's incentive to include such a safety feature endangers these children much more than it
does a careless adult. Gershonowitz's desire to punish the adult for his carelessness leads to a regime which ensures that more,
rather than fewer, children and innocent adults will be injured in the future. See generally Trubo, Children & Guns: A Tragedy
Waiting to Happen, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, July 1982, at 86.
Dalv v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162. 1169 (Cal. 1978) (plaintiffs conduct should not 'escape unexamined'); Duncan
v. Cessna Aircraft Co .• 665 S.W.2d 414. 428 (Tex. 1984) (where a 'combination of factors causes plaintiffs injuries juries
should apportion responsibility').
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment n (1965).
See Conev v. .I .LG. Indus .. 454 N. E.2d l 97 (Ill. 1983 ); Suter v. San Angelo F oundrv & Mach. Co .. 406 A.2d 140 (N .J. 1979);
Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors Corp .. 642 P.2d 624 (Or. l 982); Star Furniture v. Pulaski Furniture Co .. 297
S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).

196

See Beacham v. Lee-Norse. 714 F.2d 1010 (I 0th Cir. l 983) (applying Utah law); Sun Vallev Airlines v. Avco-Lvcoming Corp ..
411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Kennedv v. Citv of Sawver. 618 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1980); Karl v. Brvant
Air Conditioning Co .. 331 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1982); Thibault v. Sears. Roebuck & Co .. 395 A.2cl 843 (N .H. 1978); Fiske v.
MacGregor, Div. of Brunswick. 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983).

197

575 P.2d l 162 (Cal. 197R) .

.!.2]_

ld. at I 164.

199

See, e.g., Suter v. San Angdo Foundrv & Mach. Co .. 40(i A.2d 140. 143 (1979) (rotary guard which was available when
machine was produced would have protected plaintiff who inadvertently brushed the gear lever, starting rollers which injured
his hand). '[T]he law does not accept the employee's ability to take care of himself as an adequate safeguard of interests which
society seeks to protect.' ld. at 148.

200

Twerski II, supra note 6, at 342. Twerski adds other examples in another article. See Twerski III, supru note 6, at 413-14.

201

Dalv v. General Motors Corp .. 575 P.2cl 1162. l l69 (Cal. 1978).

202

Note, 1982 UTAH L. REV 461, 473-74 (footnote omitted). The author noted:

W25TLAW

-----------------·-------·-----

RECONCILING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT ... , 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 19

Most accidental injuries are intentional in the sense that the injurer could have reduced the probability of the accident by
taking additional precautions. The element of intention is unmistakable when the tortfeasor is an enterprise which can predict
from past experience that it will inflict a certain number of accidental injuries every year.
Id at474 n.83 (quoting R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 66 (1972)). Professor Sobelsohn has explained
the role of comparison in reducing the incentive to manufacture safe products as follows:
No doubt manufacturers will still incur some liability under comparative fault, just as they incurred liability for negligence
before the adoption of strict liability. But comparative fault will clearly reduce that liability, and thus-to the extent of the
reduction-reduce the manufacturer's incentive to produce a safe product. Of course, no one in any given case can predict
whether a particular consumer will be negligent, but the incentives of strict liability do not operate on a case-by-case basis;
they operate on the aggregate of cases resulting from the manufacture of a defective product. For example, suppose a product
results in accidents costing about $1 million. To redesign the product would cost about $900,000. Imposing the full costs
of the accidents on the manufacturer will cause the manufacturer, as a matter of economics, to redesign the product, thus
netting the manufacturer and society a savings of $100,000. But the manufacturer can predict that, over the long run, a certain
percentage of consumers will negligently contribute to their own injuries while using the product. With comparative fault in
effect, this consumer negligence will reduce the manufacturer's liability, perhaps to Jess than $900,000. lt will now be cheaper
for the manufacturer to pay tort claims than to redesign the product, and society will have Jost the savings that a redesigned
product would have generated.
Sobelsohn, supra note 6, at 438 (footnotes omitted).
Twerski I, supra note 6, at 802.

Id. at801-02.
Twerski II, supra note 6, at 342.
See supra notes 51-60. See generally Wade II, supra note 6 (general discussion of the history of comparative negligence).

Fischer I, supra note 6, at 444. Many argue that it is not fair to permit the plaintiff not to bear the entire burden of his own fault.
This criticism rings hollow in a country where most jurisdictions reject pure comparative negligence and cause the plaintiff to
bear the consequences of his own fault and of the defendant's fault whenever the plaintiffs own fault rises to 50 or 51%.
Sobelsohn, supra note 6. at 440 (footnotes omitted).
One court has aptly noted:
The worker has an incentive-the avoidance of injury to himself-to work as safely as permitted by the demands of his
employment, the nature of the equipment furnished to him, and the frailties of mankind. To impose an additional economic
sanction on a negligent plaintiff ignores the definition of negligence. Without in the least suggesting that manufacturers are
totally devoid of humanitarian considerations for workers' safety, we do suggest that workers' safety (and therefore worker
productivity through uninterrupted production) will be fostered and encouraged by our holding that a plaintiffs recovery
may not be diminished by his own negligence if the liability of the defendants arises from their failure to provide adequate
safety devices.
Tulkku v. l\tackworth Rees. 301 N.W.2d 46. 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (footnote omitted).
Epstein II. supra note 6, at 103.
211

575 P.2d 1162, 1186 (Cal. 1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting).

212

Correia v. Fin:stone Tin: & Ruhher Co .. 446 N.E.2d 1033. 1040 (Mass. 1983).

213

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co .. l 50 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
Note, supra note 49, at 883 (citing Kdlv v. Gt!nt!ral Motors Corp .• 487 F. Supp. I041, I046 (D. Mont. 1980)).

215

The courts which seem transfixed with determining with mathematical precision how the plaintiff's carelessness or other fault
compares with the defendant's fault Jose sight of the basic notion underlying strict Jiability-'It is not based on fault. It is a
doctrine developed to meet the exigencies of modern life.' De Felice v. Ford Moter Co_., 255 A.2d 636. 638 ~onn. l 9691.
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As Judge Politz recently stated: 'Strict liability, as I perceive it, allows plaintiff in certain situations to escape his own negligence,
a reality factored into the construct of the policy.' Lewis v. Timco. Inc .. 716 F.2d 1425, 1435 (5th Cir. 1983) (Politz, J.,

dissenting). Courts which insist on comparing mere plaintiff carelessness are thoughtlessly destroying this carefully designed
policy construct. Frequently, the plaintiffs involved in this policy battle have been seriously injured, perhaps permanently.
That some of their fault is spread over society hardly creates grounds for major objection. The policies underlying comparative
negligence provide no strong reason to alter this reality.

lli

720 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Ct. App. I 986).

217

Id. at 825.

218

Id.

219

Id.

no

Id. at 826.

221

Id.

222

Id.

223

Id.

224

Id.

225

665S.W.2d414(Tex. 1984).

226

720 S.W.2d at 825.

227

Twerski I, supra note 6, at 800.

228

720 S.W.2d at 826-27 (footnotes omitted).

229

Twerski II, supra note 6, at 343. 'If plaintiff is involved in negligent activity while either using or misusing the product. it
may be that we ought to demand that the product be designed and marketed so that the peculiar offensive use will either be
precluded or mitigated by some design parameter of the product.' Id.

Id. (emphasis in original).
231

s

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A comment n (1965); see supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text. For
the full text of comment n of the Restatement, see supra text accompanying note 65.
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).

233

Id at 90.

234

665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 198-1).

Id. at 428, 432.
483 N.E.2d I (Ill. 1985).
237

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
366 N.W.2d 543 (fowa 1985).

fd. at 547 (emphasis added).
Bell v. Jct Wheel Blast. Div. nf Ervin Ind u~ .. 462 So. 2d 166. 171 (La. 1985) (emphasis added).

--------------------
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See RESTATEl'vIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment n (1965); id. § 524 (discussing the contributory negligence
in strict liability actions based upon the conduct of abnormally dangerous activities). Specifically, comment n provides that
'[s]ince the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied
to strict liability cases (see§ 524) applies.' Id.§ 402A comment n. Section 524, also entitled 'Contributory Negligence,' provides:
(I) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to the strict liability of one
who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity.
(2) The plaintiffs contributory negligence in knowingly and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk of harm from the
activity is a defense to the strict liability.
Id. § 524. Comment a to that Section provides:
Since the strict liability of one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is not founded on his negligence, the ordinary
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to an action based on strict liability. The reason is the policy of the
law that places the full responsibility for preventing the harm resulting from abnormally dangerous activities upon the person
who has subjected others to the abnormal risk.
Thus in the ordinary case the contributory negligence will not bar recovery on the basis of strict liability. This is true when
the plaintiff merely fails to exercise reasonable care to discover the existence or presence of the activity or to take precautions
against the harm that may result from it. Thus one who is inattentive while driving along the highway, and therefore fails to
discover a sign that would warn him of blasting operations ahead endangering his passage is not barred from recovery by
his contributory negligence.
Id. § 524 comment a. Comment b continues:
On the other hand, the plaintiff is barred by his voluntary assumption of the risk. as stated in§ 523: and on the same basis, he
is barred by his contributory negligence when he intentionally and unreasonably subjects himself to a risk of harn1 from the
abnormally dangerous activity, of which he knows. This kind of contributory negligence, which consists of voluntarily and
unreasonably encountering a known risk, frequently is called either contributory negligence or assumption of risk, or both.
Id. § 524 comment b.
Section 463 provides the general Restatement definition of ordinary contributory negligence: 'Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiffs harm.'
Id. § 463. The standard of conduct to which the plaintiff must conform for his own protection is, of course, familiar: 'that of
a reasonable man under like circumstances.' Id. § 464(1). Finally, Section 466 provides that contributory negligence consists
of either:
(a) an intentional and unreasonable exposure of himself to danger created by the defendant's negligence, of which danger the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know, or
(b) conduct which, in respects other than those stated in Clause (a), falls short of the standard to which the reasonable man
should conform in order to protect himself from ham1.
Id. § 466. Analysis of the provisions and comments quoted above indicates no intent to recognize two types of defenses short
of voluntary assumption of risk. Rather, the distinction is between plaintiff conduct taken with knowledge or reason to know
of the danger, and other plaintiff conduct falling short of the reasonable person standard. 'Knowledge' generally refers to
a conscious belief in the truth, or an awareness, of a fact or condition. A person has 'reason to know' of a fact if he 'has
information from which a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact
in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists.· Id. § 12(1). Only
rarely will a products liability plaintiffs conduct in relation to the defect qualify to give the defendant a defense under these
exacting standards. In cases in which such knowledge is shown. assumption of risk may provide a basis for a comparison and
partial reduction in plaintiffs recovery, but only in the limited classes of cases outlined later in this Article.

Simpson v. General Motors Corp .. 483 N .E.2d l, 6 ( Ill. 1985) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co .. 632 S.W.2J 375, 378 (Tex. Ct. App. 198:!), rer's. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. l 984J
Sec West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 336 So. :!cl 80, 82-83 (Fla. 1976).

245

Sec supra note 192 and accompanying text.

575 P.2d l 162, 11113-84 (Cal. 1978! (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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247

Twerski III, supra note 6 passim.

248

See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. As noted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 'foreseeability' as used in tort
law generally, is in fact a matter of hindsight:
(l) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor
should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from
the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 435 (1965) (emphasis added). On this issue, Dean Prosser noted:
[T]here are courts which have thrown over the language of foreseeability, and have said outright that this becomes a matter
of hindsight, which is to say of relating the consequences back into the picture of the original negligence after they have in
fact occurred.
The Restatement of Torts has offered much the same approach by saying that the defendant is not to be liable for
consequences which, looking backward after the event with full knowledge of all that has occurred, would appear to be 'highly
extraordinary.' The language may be unfortunate; to one gifted with omniscience as to all existing circumstances, no result
could appear remarkable, or indeed anything but inevitable, as a matter of hindsight. Certainly no element of mystery is
necessary, or of ignorance as to what has happened. Perhaps the Restatement has come close to expressing the underlying
idea of a limitation of liability short of the remarkable. the preposterous, the highly unlikely, in the language of the street the
cock-eyed and far-fetched, even when we look at the event, as we must, after it has occurred.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 268 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).

249

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS~ 402A, comment h (1965). Comment h states that where a manufacturer 'has
reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use,' he will be liable for a failure to protect the consumer from
dangers of that use. Id For the full text of comment h, see supra text accompanying note 66.

250

See McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co .. 391 F.2d 364. 367-70 (5th Cir. 1968) (construing Texas law); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of
America, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp .. 501 P.2d 1153. 1157 (Cal. 1972).

251

See Porter v. United Steel & Wire Co .. 436 F. Supp. 1376. 1387 (N.D. Iowa 1977); General Eke. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366.
367 (Nev. 1972); Ritter v. Narragansett Eke. Co .. 283 A.2d 255. 262-63 (R.I. 1971); l'vfagic Chef. Inc. v. Siblev. 546 S.W.2d
851. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).

252

See Edwards v. Sears. Roebuck & Co .. 512 F .2d 276, 289 (5th Cir. 1975); Sun Vallev Airlines v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 41 l
F. Supp. 598, 60::i (D. Idaho l 976).

2 53

Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods. 555 P.2cl 42. 45 (Alaska 1976).

254

Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185. 19 l (Iowa 1982); see also Sales, supra note 6, at 757. Sales wrote: 'It is the
intended and reasonably foreseeable uses for which the supplier must design, manufacture, and market the product.' Id.

255

Twerski II, supra note 6, at 348. Twerski stated, 'We must, however, be extremely careful that contributory fault does not
negate or lessen the plaintiffs recovery when the very harm which should have been protected against materializes.' Id.

256

495 A.2d 348 (Md. 1985).

257

Id at 355 (footnotes omitted). In Sherne, the plaintiff was severely injured when the protruding pocket of the nightgown she
was wearing inside out caught fire on a hot stove. Id. at 351. Though no warning regarding the flammability of the nightgown
was given to consumers, the manufacturer and retailer defendants asserted that the plaintiff had 'misused' the product by
wearing it inside out. Id. at 351,353. The court rejected the misuse claim stating:
Clearly, and concededly, Appellant was using the nightgown for a reasonably foreseeable purpose. We conclude that her
manner of use of the nightgown. though possibly careless, was reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law. It certainly may be
foreseen that wearing apparel, such as nightgowns and robes, will occasionally be worn inside out. It is also foreseeable that a
loosely fitting gown will come into contact with sources of ignition in the environment where it may be expected to be worn,
and particularly when worn in the kitchen and near a stove. Momentary inattention or carelessness on the part of the user,
while it may constitute contributory negligence, does not add up to misuse of the product under these circumstances.
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Id at 357.
According to pre-Duncan Texas law, foreseeable misuse was considered only contributory negligence and therefore no defense
at all. Averv v. l'vlaremont Corp .. 628 F.2d 441. 446 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting the Texas Supreme Court's rejection of misuse
as a defense to a strict liability action). It has been speculated that the line between foreseeable and unforeseeable misuse had
to be drawn because for all practical purposes foreseeable misuse was equivalent to contributory negligence. Wade II, supra
note 6, at 384.

See Doran v. Pullman Standard Car l\Ug. Co .. 360 N.E.2d 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
See supra notes 173-246 and accompanying text.
359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 ( 1966). A car equipped with X-frame rather than perimeter frame was held
'reasonably fit for its intended use' since intended use does not include 'participation in collisions.' Id. at 825. Evans was,
however, overruled in Huffv. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104. 109 (7th Cir. 1977). Similar cases include McC!ung v. Ford
Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (D.W. Va. 1971), affd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 ( [972), Willis v.
Chrysler Corp .. 264 F. Supp. IO 10, 1012 (S.D. Tex. l 967)(defendant had no duty to design a car that could survive the head-on
collision which caused car to split in two), and Walton v. Chrvsler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969) (seat collapsed).

See Larsen v. G.:neral Motors Corp .. 391 F.2d 495. 497 (8th Cir. 1968). The Larsen case involved a plaintiff who was impaled
on the steering shaft during an accident and is the seminal case in the area. As of 1984, Larsen had been followed in 35 states
and the District of Columbia, in cases brought on both negligence and strict liability theories. For a listing and discussion of
the negligence cases, see I Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ii t 580.36; for a corresponding listing and discussion of the strict liability
cases, see Id.~ 4098.
575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).

Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1172.
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).

Id. at 90 l.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment h (1965).
Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N .W.2d 185. 191 (Iowa 1982); see also Noel, supra note 6. at 96; Schwartz, supra note 6, at
172. As noted by the court in Ellsworth\. Sherne Lingerie. Inc .. 495 A.2d 348, 356 (Md. 1985):
[Q]uestions of misuse of the product are involved in the determination of whether the product was defective, and whether a
defect was the proximate cause of the injury. Because defectiveness and causation are elements which must be proved by the
plaintiff, we conclude that misuse is not an affirmative defense. Misuse, therefore, is a 'defense· only in the sense that proof
of misuse negates one or more essential elements of a plaintiffs case. and may thereby defeat recovery.
271

It has been noted that unforeseeable misuse or abnormal use may reflect on causation as well as upon presence of a defect. See
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co .. 261 N .E.2d 305, 312 (lll. l 970 ). In most instances, however, it will relate to the defect. See, e.g.,
Lame v. National Union Elec. Corp., 57 l F.2d 51 ( 1st Cir. 1978) (11-year-old boy's penis partially amputated as he played
with a canister vacuum cleaner): Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 89 ( E.D. La. 1982) (movie stuntman killed when
he jumped 323 feet onto an air-inflated rescue-type device rated for 200 feet only): Talquin Elec. Coop v. American Chem.
Prod .. 427 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (knowing failure to follow instructions in use of herbicide).

272

Wade I, supra note 6, at 846.

273

495 A.2d 348. 355 (Md. 19851. On this issue the court further noted:
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Whether foreseeability of use relates to the requirement of proof of 'defective condition' or to proof of being 'unreasonably
dangerous' the result is the same, for both must be proven as a part of a plaintiffs case. Comments g and h of§ 402 A support
the prevailing view that misuse relates to the existence vel non of a defect.
Id. at 355 n.7.

Regarding the limits of foreseeability in such cases, consider of rexample the case of Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co .. 626
F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying Massachusetts law). In this case, the plaintiff. an eight year old boy, suffered severe eye
injuries after breaking a discarded Miller non-returnable glass bottle against a telephone pole. In holding that neither the
bottle manufacturer nor the brewer could be held liable on either a negligence or breach of warranty theory, the court stated:
No reasonable consumer would expect anything but that a glass beer bottle, apparently well suited for its immediate intended
use, would fail to safely withstand the type of purposeful abuse involved here. In fact, one would suspect that the present
eight year old plaintiff knew well the expected result, if not the potential injury, of his conduct. What, if not the possibility of
shattering the bottle, would lead him to throw it against the pole in the first place?
Plaintiff ... attempts to expand the scope of the 'intended' use concept by resort to the familiar, and sometimes misleading,
rubric of 'foresee-ability.' But reliance on such generality is of limited assistance, for '[i]n a sense, in retrospect almost nothing
is unforeseeable.' One with the time and imagination and aided by hindsight no doubt can conjure up all sorts of arguably
'foreseeable' misuses ofa variety of otherwise reasonable safe products. We see no evidence that the Massachusetts courts have
abandoned their previously expressed view that 'a common or straightforward product, if safe for normal uses reasonably
to be anticipated at the time of manufacture, is not defective [i.e., unfit for its intended use] simply because it is foreseeable
that it may cause injury to someone using it improperly.' Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has recently cited with approval
previous decisions of this and other circuit courts which have defined the scope of the concept of 'intended use' as encompassing
the 'probable ancillary consequences of normal use,' and the consequences 'incident to the normal and expected use' of a
particular product. Certainly the present product misuse falls far outside that definition.
Even under the most expansive theories of products liability, a 'manufacturer is not an insurer and cannot be held to a
standard of duty of guarding against all possible types of accidents and injuries' in any way causally related to the design and
manufacture of its products. The world, as the Massachusetts Appeals Court has noted, is 'full of rough edges.' Review of
the relevant authority convinces us that the Massachusetts courts would not be prepared to hold a manufacturer liable for
injuries sustained by an individual coming into contact with such 'rough edges' created by his own intentional misuse of an
otherwise ·fit' product in a manner in no reasonable way related to the immediate intended uses for which the product was
designed, manufactured and marketed.
Id. at 190-92 (citations omitted; brackets in original).
275

Courts which have indicated that they intend to compare defendant's strict liability with plaintiffs 'misuse,' without
differentiating between foreseeable and unforeseeable misuse, include: Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods. 555
P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Conev v. J.L.G. Indus .. 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983); Busch v. Bus..:h Const.. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn.
1977); Thibault,. Sears. Roebuck & Co .. 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978).

276

Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie. Inc .. 495 A.2d 348. 355-56 (Md. 1985) (footnotes omitted); see also Stewart v. Von Solbril!
Hosp., 321 N.E.2d 413,432 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (break in plaintiffs leg not caused by failure of surgical pin where plaintiff
walked upon leg knowing that pin was not designed to support plaintiffs weight). For a discussion of a similar hypothetical
situation see Vargo. The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary With An Old Meaning. 29 MERCER L. REV.
447,459 (1978).

277

406A.2d 140(N.J. 1979).

278

Id. at 144 (citing Cepeda v. CL1mherland Engineering Co .• 386 A.2d 816 (N .J. 1978)).

279

General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344. 351 (Tex. 1977).

280

548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).

2 8!

!dat346.

281

Id..
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Id. at 348.
Id.
The plaintiff mispositioned the thermocoil cover. This cover then interfered with the operation of the defectively designed
lock out pin and lever mechanism. Id. at 348-49.

Id. at 349.
Id. at 352.
See, e.g., Carestia, 711e Interaction v{Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liabi/itv-Where Are H'e?, 47 INS. COUNS .
.I. 53, 67 (1980). Carestia wrote:
There are three complicating factors which make comparative causation an undesirable comparative method. First, ...
[i]urors cannot understand the concept of causation to the extent needed to effectively apportion damages based upon causal
contribution as it varies both in terms of degree (line drawing considerations) and in comparison with the other actor or actors
involved in the suit.
Second, it is an oversimplification to suggest that the combined causal contribution of plaintiff and defendant alone totals
I00% of the cause of the damages ....
Third, for comparative causation to be a valid means of loss apportionment it must bear a functional relationship to fault.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Sobelsohn, supra note 6, at 428. Sobelsohn noted, 'Without more the concept of comparing
causation neither relates to any reasonable notion of 'fault' nor yields an intelligible basis for deriving fault percentages.' Id.
289

See Pan-Alaska Fisheries. Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d I 129. 1139 (9th Cir. 1977) ('perhaps the term
'comparative causation' ... is a conceptually more precise term than 'comparative fault' since fault alone without causation
does not subject one to liability.'); Sun Vallev Airlines v. Avco-Lvcoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho 1976);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods. 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976) ('The manufacturer is still accountable for all
the harm from a defective product, except that part caused by the consumer's own conduct.').
12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1988).
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,§ l(b), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975).
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act§ l(b) defines 'fault' as including:
acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or
that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not
constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and
unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as
the basis for liability and to contributory fault.
12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1988).

Id.§ 2(b), 12 U.L.A. at 43.
Id.§ 2(b) comment, 12 U.L.A. at 44.
Wade II, supra note 6, at 387.
Uniform Comparative Fault Act§ 2(b) comment, 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1988).

Id.
Twerski I. supra note 6, at 80 I.

See supra notes 176-8 l and accompanying text.
See Ji!!ll v. kt Wheel Blast. 462 So. 2d 166, 174 (La. 1985) (Blanche, J., dissenting).
Twerski I. supra note 6, at 799-800 (footnotes omitted).
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302

General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins. 548 S.W.2d 344,347 (Tex. 1977).

30J

Dean Twerski noted that prior to the Hopkins decision:
The issue of a defective product which was subject to unforeseeable misuse has been litigated many times. The courts have
treated the question as one of intervening cause. The issue has usually been submitted to juries to determine whether the
plaintiff (or a third party) has subjected the product to 'substantial change,' 'misuse,' or 'abnormal use.' In rather extreme
cases courts have directed verdicts when they have believed that the misuse was so significant that the defendant's defect was
no longer the proximate cause of the harm.
Twerski III, supra note 6, at 431-32 (footnotes omitted).
Hopkins. 548 S.W.2d at 351-52 (footnote omitted).

Twerski III, supra note 6, at 434 (emphasis added).
As previously noted, the use of 'unreasonable' in the Restatement formulation is unfortunate. See supra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text. In most cases a fairly clear distinction between mere contributory negligence and assumption of risk may
be drawn. In a recent Fifth Circuit case the court noted: '[A]ssumption of risk involves 'first, knowledge and appreciation
of a danger, and second, a voluntary encountering of it.' In contrast, '[t]he essence of contributory negligence is simply
carelessness." Bell v. Jct Whcct Blast, 709 F.2d 6. 7 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Rodrique v. Dixilvn Corp .. 620 F.2d 537,539 (5th
Cir. 1980), and Crowe, Tl,e Anatomv o(a Tori, 22 LOY. L. REV. 903, 915 (1976)).
Additionally, assumption of risk is judged subjectively-it requires that the plaintiff personally know and appreciate the
danger presented. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 68, at 447 (4th ed. 1971). The reasonable person standard of
negligence is not applied. Thus, the requirements of subjective knowledge and appreciation, plus voluntary action, render
assumption of risk qualitatively different from mere plaintiff carelessness.
307

Schwartz, supra note 6, at 176.

30 8

Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 475 F. Supp. 740, 753 (D. Kan. 1978) (applying Kansas law).

309

See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.

310

See Daly v. General Motors Corp .. 575 P.2d 1162. 1169 (Cal. 1978).

ill

See, e.g., id at l 167: Conev v. J.L.G. Indus .. 454 N.E.2d l 97. 200 (Ill. 1983).

312

Our organization in this section and several of the arguments herein are based on the excellent note regarding assumption of
risk contained in Note, supra note 49.

313

See infra notes 352-78 and accompanying text.

314

See Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 27 (1973).

315

See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS; A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 69 (1970).

3 l6

R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1977) ·A plaintiffs willingness to waive cost-justified
precautions by the defendant does not imply that the plaintiff could have prevented the accident by cost-justified precautious
of his own.' Id

ill

One study found that about half of all products liability suits involved on-the-job injuries. 3 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 78 (1977), cited i/1
Note, supra note 49, at 879 n.29. Nothing in our reading of recent case law would contradict this estimate.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436. 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also R. SEIDEN, PRODUCT
SAFETY ENGINEERING FOR MANAGERS 21 (1984). Seiden noted that '[n]ot all users have the know-how, resources,
or safety engineering background to retrofit production machinery properly and adequately, even if they ultimately come
to recognize its hazardous content.' Id: see also l\fauch v. Manufacturers Saks & Si!n· .. 345 N.W.2d 338. 345 (N.D. 1984)

59
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(interpreting the policy behind§ 402A): Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893. 898 (Pa. 1975) ('the seller is
'effectively the guarantor of his products.").
Note, supra note 49, at 880.
Id. at 878 (citing Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263,
264 (1979) (The prevalence of risk aversion is perhaps the best known generalization regarding risky choices.')).

321

M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 259 (1980) (crash padding and seat belts sold an extra 200,000 Fords
in 1956); R. SEIDEN, supra note 318, at 290-91 (disussing product safety as the one avenue remaining to be exploited in
marketing consumer products.).

322

Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 45 (l 972).

323

See infra notes 363-68 and accompanying test.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Timco. Inc .. 716 F.2d 1425. 1433 (5th Cir. 1983) (construing maritime law to apply comparative fault in
strict liability cases to give users an economic incentive to avoid accidents).

325

See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.

326

Fahner & Hane, Seat Belts: Factors Affecting Their Use, 5 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 27 (1973).

327

Joubert, Prepared Discussion of John Adams' Paper, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND TRAFFIC SAFETY 249-53 (L. Evans
& R. Schwing eds. 1985).
Von Buseck, Evans, Schmidt & Wasielewski, Seat Belt Usage and Risk Taking in Driving Behavior, in ACCIDENT
CAUSATION 46 (1980) (citing SLOVIC, FISCHOFF & LICHTENSTEIN, ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES AND
SEATBELT USAGE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1979)); see also Clements, Compatibility in Highway Safety,
in HIGHWAY SAFETY FORUM 11 (C. Goedken ed. 1985) ('deaths per mile of travel amounted to less than one for every
1,560 passenger trips around the world'); T.W. Forbes. Introduction, in HUMAN FACTORS IN HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SYSTEM SAFETY RESEARCH 19 (T. Forbes ed. 1972) ('By far the largest share of traffic accidents is experienced by
drivers who have one accident only.').
W. HAMMER, PRODUCT SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING 94 (1980).
New York's mandatory seatbelt law reduced traffic deaths 27% in just three months. Coleman & Krycinski, A Major Victory
for Safety, !TE J., Aug. 1985, at 14.

331

See, e.g., D. SHINAR, PSYCHOLOGY ON THE ROAD: THE HUMAN FACTOR IN TRAFFIC SAFETY (1978);
HIGHWAY SAFETY FORUM (C. Goedken ed. 1985); HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND TRAFFIC SAFETY (L. Evans &
R. Schwing eds. 1985); HUMAN FACTORS IN HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SYSTEM SAFETY RESEARCH (T. Forbes ed.
1972).

332

H. HENRICH, D. PETERSEN & N. ROOS. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION: A SAFETY MANAGEMENT
APPROACH ( 1980); R. MARSHALL. PROTECTING PEOPLE AT WORK ( 1980); G. MATWES & H. MA TWES, LOSS
CONTROL: A SAFETY GUIDEBOOK FOR TRADES AND SERVICES (1973); L. SCHENKELBACH, THE SAFETY
MANAGEMENT PRIMER (1975); R. SEIDEN, supra note 318.

333

Comment, Emplon·e As.1·1m1f1/io11 o( Risk: Rat! or lllusorr Choice?. 52 TENN. L. REV. 35. 48 (1984) (footnote omitted).

334

Note, supra note 49, at 888-89 (citing Cat<!rpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck. 593 P.2d 87l. 891 (Alaska 1979) (accidents are an
inevitable cost of products)).

335

Comment, Cor[!!.mlle llomicid(': The Stark: Realities of' Artificial Beinf!.I' and Lei:al Fictio11s. 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 367
37':, ( 1981) (quoting 60 Minutes interview between Mike Wallace and one of the plaintiffs attorneys from Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co .. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. A1,.~).
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M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 321, at l O1-02, 260 (The production and sale of Ford's subcompact Pinto represents
a classic case of safety versus profits.').
33 7

R. SEIDEN, supra note 318, at 3.

338

Id. at 48. Seiden wrote:
One of the most important reasons absolutely safe or risk-free homes and workplaces are unattainable is that errorprovocative, failure-prone, and otherwise unsafe and defective products will continue to be sold and resold ....
Until it is recognized by designers, managers, and executives alike that reasonably foreseeable user error, failure, and oversight,
under reasonably foreseeable conditions of product use and abuse, deserve the same attention as product performance, styling,
and advertising effectiveness, this epidemic of accident-producing products will be unyielding, unmanageable, and expansive.
Until business and industry learn that the most profitable product is the safer, higher-quality product, both user safety and
industrial productivity will remain in jeopardy.
Id.

339

H. HEINRICH, D. PETERSON & N. ROOS, supra note 332, at 56-57 (3d ed. 1980) (emphasis in original).

34 o

Hulbert, Human Factors: The Problem with the Problem, in HIGHWAY SAFETY FORUM, supra note 328, at 46-47; see
also DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, BULLETIN NO. 67, SAFETY SUBJECTS 178
(1956). The Department of Labor Bulletin states: 'Whenever a hazard can be reduced or eliminated by methods such as better
design, mechanical safeguards, or better construction, the gain is positive. Human habits and practices in the interest of safety
are difficult to establish and maintain, but mechanical gains are permanent ... .' Id.

341

Greene, Product Liability Litigation and Safety, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1987, at 24-25, col. l. '[T]he annals of product liability
litigation contain case after case of the redesign or withdrawal of dangerous products that resulted from the finding ofliability
in the context of specific litigation.' Id.

342

According to Mackay, 'The major gains which have been made in transport safety have come about predominantly from
engineering solutions; that is, engineering of either the road environment or the vehicles involved.' Mackay, Reducing Car
Crash Injuries: Folklore, Science and Promise (1982), quoted in Adams, Smeeds Law, Seat Belts, and the Emperor's New
Clothes, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND TRAFFIC SAFETY, supra note 327, at 193, 194; see also O'Neil, Lund, Zador
& Ashton, lvfandatory Belt Use and Driver Risk Taking: An Empirical Evaluation of the Risk-Compensation Hypothesis, in
HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND TRAFFIC SAFETY, supra note 327, at 94 (105,000 lives saved in U.S. between 1975 and 1982
by introduction of new auto safety standards).

343

Hulbert, supra note 340, at 47. Hulbert wrote:
It has been my observation that of the three components of surface transportation, namely, vehicles, operators and roadways,
the only one that can't be re-designed is the human operator/pedestrian. Therefore, it makes sense to me that we shall have to
design the rest of the 'system' to be compatible with us as human operators and pedestrians.
Id.; see also D. SHINAR, supra note 331, at 130. Dr. Haddon, the first director of the National Highway Safety Bureau,
stated, The traditional safety approach of removing the nut from behind the wheel does not face the very real possibility that
it may be impossible to change human nature.' Id. (quoting Dr. Haddon).

344

In Bell v. kt Wheel Blast. Div. of Ervin Indus .. 462 So. 2d 166. 171-72 (La. 1985 ), the Louisiana Court stated:
Where the threat of a reduction in recovery will provide consumers with an incentive to use a product carefully, without
exacting an inordinate sacrifice of other interests, comparative principles should be applied for the sake of accident prevention.
The recovery of a plaintiff who has been injured by a defective product should not be reduced, however, in those types of
cases in which it does not serve realistically to promote careful product use or where it drastically reduces the manufacturer's
incentive to make a safer product.

345

Although most post-Bell cases have been correctly decided, several demonstrate the errors of judges who overestimated the
deterrent effects on consumers and users resulting from the manipulation of the rules of liability.
The Bell court correctly decided that no purpose was served in reducing the recovery of an assembly line worker who, through
a moment's inattention, caught his hand in a conveyor belt mechanism that should have had a guard. Id. at 172.
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Reduction of the plaintiffs award in this type of case would only tend to defeat the basic goals of strict products liability
doctrine by reducing economic incentive for product quality control and by forcing the injured individual to underwrite a loss
himself which could be more efficiently distributed by the manufacturer through insurance and price adjustments.
Id.
Cases which properly followed the Bell reasoning include Winston v. International Harvester Co .. 606 F. Supp. 187. 188 (E.D.
La. 1985) (plaintiffs recovery should not be reduced because of inattentive driving which caused tractor to leave road and
plaintiff to be bounced off tractor seat; driving all day leads to boredom and inattention and tractor lacked seat belt designed
to prevent this type of foreseeable injury); Lanclos v. Rockwell Int'! Corp .. 470 So. 2d 924,933 (La. Ct. App.) ('The imposition
of a duty on the manufacturer to make the machine safe to operate ... means that the law does not accept the employee's
ability to take care of himself as an adequate safeguard of interests which society seeks to protect.'), cert. denied, 477 So. 2d 87
(La. 1985); Mercer v. Fruehauf Corp .. 470 So. 2d 538, 543 ( La. Ct. App.) (where plaintiff fell off the walkboard of a tanker,
reducing recovery would 'seriously' reduce the manufacturer's incentive to remedy the design of the surface of the walk board
which the jury found to be defective), cert. denied, 4% So. 2d 350 (La. 1986).
However, in Nicholas v. Homclite Corp., A Div. of Textron, Inc., 780 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1986), the Bell approach was
misapplied. Plaintiffs decedent in Nicholas was killed when a chain saw he was operating kicked back; the jury, finding the
saw defective, held that the decedent had not assumed the risk, and found the decedent 50°/., negligent. Id. at 1151-52. The only
reported fact indicating that the decedent was careless in any way was that the saw had kicked back once before. Id. at 1153.
Because decedent was a homeowner and not an assembly line worker, the court distinguished Bell, concluding that to reduce
the plaintiffs recovery would give other consumers an incentive to be more careful. Id. at 1153-54. The court failed to explain
why reducing the recovery of a widow in one isolated case would provide consumers with any incentive to be more careful
beyond that which the threat of instant death already provided. In addition, the court erroneously concluded that to reduce the
levels of recovery against makers of defective products would not reduce their incentive to produce safer products. Id. at 1154.
A similar erroneous, shallow analysis characterized Burnett v. Gehl Co .. 605 F. Supp. 183, 185 (W.D. La. 1985), in which
the Bell ban on application of comparative fault was held not applicable where the injured plaintiff was not an industrial
employee but a home user. Another interesting case along this line is McCaskill v. Welch. 463 So. 2d 942 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 466 So. 2d 469 (La. 1985), in which the plaintiff, his brother, and Welch decided to enter the oil drilling business
though unacquainted with the business. Id. at 945. Despite his lack of experience, Welch, a welder, built an oil drilling unit
using some drawings provided by the plaintiffs brother. Predictably, the unit failed and the plaintiff was seriously injured.
Id. at 945. Although these unusual facts are unlikely to arise again, one feature of the court's application of the Bell test is
instructive. The McCaskill court reasoned that according 25% of the fault to Welch would be sufficient to ensure that Welch
learned his lesson and would not act in the same manner in the future. Id. at 947. Notably, the court assumed that plaintiff
had not learned his lesson from the serious injuries he had sustained.
One prominent commentator recently argued that recoveries in tort cases could rise beyond the level needed to maximize the
safety incentive for manufacturers. Priest, T'lie Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Lem. 96 YALE L..J. 1521, 1534-39
( 1987). Beyond that level, Priest argued, the manufacturer essentially provides an insurance function. Id. at 1538. While this
is true, Priest offered no evidence that this more-than-optimal level has been exceeded substantially in any significant number
of industries. Even if the level were surpassed, other important goals of strict products liability-the spreading of risk and its
inclusion (like workers' compensation costs) in the cost of doing business-are still being served.
Priest's major thrust-that requiring manufacturers to provide third-party insurance coverage for product uses is less
efficient than placing the insurance burden on the consumer-is weakened by his implicit assumption that a manufacturer is
automatically liable for all injuries stemming from the use of its product. Id at 1569. In fact, only l 2'Y., of accident victims assert
tort claims. D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LOYD-BOSTOCK, D. FENN, P. CORFIELD. & Y. BRITTAN,
COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 45-77, 317 ( 1984) (actual figures obtained from British
case studies, but figures are representative of the similar American phenomenon). These victims must prove that the product
that injured them contained defects or was otherwise unreasonably dangerous. To do so, victims must overcome a substantial
number of procedural hurdles and lack of expertise not facing the manufacturer. Shakaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort
Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329,337 (1987).
Priest noted that 25% of the largest manufacturers had removed products from the market because of liability concerns. Priest,
supra, at 1522 (citingN. WEBER. PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSF 15-16(Conf. Bd. 1987)). Even
accepting as accurate these self-serving figures, Priest ignored that these figures include the removal of products such as the
Corvair, the Pinto, the Dalkon Shield, the Rely tampon, the Firestone 500 tire, and asbestos-related products. Surely, the
removal of these and other dangerous products cannot be viewed as problematic.
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Priest himself noted that injury rates in recent years have successively declined in almost all injury categories. Id. at 1527
(citing Schelling, An Economist Looks at Risk and Liability, in RISK, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY: THE POLICY
CHOICES 53-55 (1986)). Yet, at the same time, insurance rates soared 'by 400'Yo, 1000%, 1500%, and more.' Id. Priest ignored
the reason for this reduction of injuries. He took no note of the fact that tort liability is the major impetus for safer product
design.
Priest asserted that the poor are the parties who suffer most from the current tort system. Priest reasoned that product costs
rise when risks are spread and yet the poor receive smaller tort judgments than the middle class plaintiffs who had good
jobs and higher income potential. Id. at 1550-51. Priest claims that these 'low-risk members' of the insurance pool will 'drop
out' either by self-insuring or by ceasing to engage in the potentially injury-related activity. Id. at 1550. Nevertheless, a poor
person is less likely to be self-insured and has fewer assets than a middle-class person to rely on in the case of a product injury.
Therefore, liberal strict liability recovery rules also benefit the poor.
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Murray v. Fairbanks Morse. 6l0 F.2d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1979) (construing V.I. law) (citing G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENT: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970)). The court stated:
The problem with this 'deep pocket' rationale is that the manufacturer may be paying for a part of the loss which is attributable
not to the product defect, but to plaintiffs conduct. If contributory negligence is ignored in determining the extent of plaintiffs
loss, then the future cost of the manufacturer's product will be artificially inflated and will not accurately represent the actual
risk posed by the defective product. Although individual plaintiffs may benefit from the immunity currently given for their
contributory negligence, the consuming public at large may be adversely affected. If the future cost of a product does not
accurately reflect the risk posed, then consumers may actually choose cheaper, less safe products because the cost of the
manufacturer's product is artificially high.

Id.
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The court in Lewis v. Timco. Inc .. 716 F.2d 1425. 1433 (5th Cir. 1983), viewed costs of negligent use as improperly borne
by the manfacturer.
The Timco court also argued that "the comparative regligence standard reduces the risks of non-negligent users indirectly
paying for [costs generated by] negligent users.' Id. But this argument ignores the very heart of strict liability-spreading the
risk. It is impossible to know in advance who will be negligent and who will not be. Everyone pays a little more for the products
they buy in order to cover the costs of both defects by the manufacturers and the carelessness of all consumers. As Judge Politz
stated, dissenting in Tim co, 'Strict liability, as I perceive it, allows a plaintiff in certain situations to escape his own negligence,
a reality factored into the construct of the policy.' Id. at 1435 (Politz, Johnson & Williams, J.J., dissenting).
The Timco majority also presented a hypothetical situation of a product that might have been involved in several costly
accidents as a result of negligent users. The court suggested that, absent a comparison of fault, the costs caused by negligent
users will be incorporated in the price of the product, stifling 'proper use of a safe product.' Id. at 1433. This argument has
several flaws. First, if the product were truly safe, it would have no defects that would cause unreasonable danger. If it had no
defects, the manufacturer would face no liability and would have no costs to incorporate into the product's price. If there have
been several accidents, however, the product is likely defective-perhaps lacking a safety guard or warning stickers. There
is no reason to assume that any particular manufacturer will face a higher percentage of careless users than its competitors.
Products with similar defects will cause similar levels of liability exposure. There is no reason why a safer product would have
to incorporate into its price a higher liability cost than a less safe product.
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H. HEINRICH, D. PETERSEN & N. ROOS, supra note 332, at 81. This figure is controversial: but even by accepting an
extremely conservative estimate that indirect costs are equal to direct costs, indirect costs would still have amounted to $17.5
billion in 1985 alone. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 5 (1986).

35()

See Sobelsohn, supra note 6, at 439.

35 I

See Note, supra note 49, at 883-87. Economists are generating a large and ever-growing body of literature in an attempt to
determine which liability rules (strict liability versus negligence; contributory versus comparative negligence) are most efficient
under various circumstances. See, e.g., Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973);
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960); De Alessi & Staaf, liability, Control & the Orga11i=t1tion of
Economic Activity, 7 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 5 ( 1987); De Meza, The Efficiency of Liability Lall', 6 INTL REV. L. & ECON.
107 (1986); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 ( 1973); Haddock & Curran, An Economic Theory
of Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1985); Horvitz & Stern, Liability Rules and the Selection ~fa Socially
Optimal Production Technology, 7 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 121 ( 1987): Posner, A Theory of Neglige11ce, I J. LEGAL STUD.

RECONCILING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT..., 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 19

29 (1972); Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 375 (1987); Shavell, Strict Liabilit1·
Versus Negli~ence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. l (1980). This body of literature generates more heat than light. No real consensus
has emerged and, more importantly, most of the current theories are based on assumptions of human behavior that have little
correlation to the manner in which people actually react on the assembly line or behind the wheel of a car.
There have been precious few attempts to empirically verify the various theories. One such attempt involved efforts to calculate
the impact on industrial accidents of the shift from the negligence-dominated employer-employee legal rules around 1900 to
the shared strict liability system of workers' compensation that was widely adopted by 1940. Chelius, Liability for Industrial
Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 293 (1976). Chelius' conclusionthat a switch to the strict liability system led to a reduction of accidents-can be viewed as supportive of some of the arguments
made in this Article. However, the existence of a high number of variables that Cheli us could not control precludes confidence
in his findings. In addition, a similar study (with similar shortcomings) reached generally opposite conclusions. Fishback,
Liability Rules and Accident Prevention in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 305, 317-24 (1987).
The Fishback article illustrates the lack of realism that pervades most of these economic discussions. On the one hand,
Fishback notes that increased liability for workers' safety led employers to adopt safety measures, such as first aid teams. Id. at
314. On the other hand, Fishback assumes, but has no direct evidence, that if workers' compensation benefits rose employees
would be less careful to avoid accidents such as 'roof falls' in mines. Id. at 313-14. In essence, Fishback seems to assume that
miners have no aversion to pain and no attachment to life. While the increased incentive to claim a non-existent back injury
esists, a miner who is putting in the roof supports that will save his life when down in the ground will not be motivated to do
a sloppy job simply because his workers' compensation benefits have gone up.
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Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943) (footnote omitted); see also Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147,
1149 (N.M. 1972); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp .. 373 P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962) (en banc)(assumption of risk used 'to protect
expanding industry').
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W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 491 (5th ed. 1984).

354

Id. at 568.
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2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1174-75 (1956).

356

See C. EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 169-89 (1910). The author outlined common law obstacles
facing injured workers and addressed the need for a state-run compensation system. See also D. BERMAN, DEATH ON
THE JOB 15-24 (1978) (provides a history of the early workers' compensation movement).
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W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 353, at 569. Estimates indicate that prior to workers compensation laws 70'Yo to
94% of industrial accidents were uncompensated. Id. at 572 n.43.
Pub. L. No. 59-219, 34 Stat. 232 (1906), re-enacted Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§
5 l-60 (1982)).
Act of Aug. 11, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-382, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §Ll.1, 56 (1982)). See Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R .. 318 U.S. 54. 64-68 ( 1943 ), for a discussion of the 1939 amendment and its effect on the assumption
of risk defense.
For examplt:, tht: assumption of risk dt:fense is recognized in situations involving licensees on land, voluntary participants in
sporting events, and passengers in cars. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 355, at 1181-82.
Comment, supra note 333, at 36-37.
Twerski, suprn note 74, at 4, 51.

See, e.g., Noel, supra note 6, at 127 ('When an employee consents to work under dangerous conditions, this consent ordinarily
is not regarded as effective in a suit against the employer because of the economic pressure involved.'); Comment, supra note
333, at 49 ('The most telling criticism of the doctrine ... relates less to its general theoretical foundations than to the illusory
nature of the doctrine's voluntariness requirement in the employment context.'); see alsoJ.lhoads v. Service Mach. Co .. 329

'N25TLA'¥'/

64

RECONCILING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT ... , 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 19

F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1971) ('The 'voluntariness' with which a worker assigned to a dangerous machine in a factory
'assumes the risk of injury' from the machine is illusory.').
364

Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast. A Div. of Ervin Indus .. 462 So. 2d 166, 173 (La. 1985) (Watson, J., concurring); see also Beacham
v . Lee-Norse. 714 F.2d 1010. 1014-15 (10th Cir. 1983) (mine employee, who caught his hand in pinch points of roof bolter

and severed four fingers, 'did not voluntarily encounter [pinch points] simply by performing his duties.'); Green v. Sterling
Extruder Corp .. 471 A.2d 15. 20 (N.J. 1984) ('A factory worker pursuing his assigned task on a plant machine has no real
choice. The practicalities of the workaday world are such that in the vast majority of cases, the employee works 'as is' or he
is without a job.').
365

F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951). Tannenbaum wrote:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people
have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by
the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is something
new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Blades, Emp/ovml.'11/ at Will vs. Individual Frel!dom: On Li111itinr: 1/ze Abusive Exercise o( £mp/over Power, 67 COL UM. L.
REV. 1404, 1405 (1967) (citing J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM I 14 (2d ed. 1956)).

See W. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 28 (1962) (classifying dismissal as 'a kind of organizational
equivalent of capital punishment'); Comment, Employment at Will: An Analysis and Critique of the Judicial Role, 68 IOWA
L. REV. 787, 792 (1983) (discussing economic and psychological burdens on employees discharged from employment);
Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1081, 1084 (1973) (noting that damage to a
worker's employment record resulting from dismissal enhances an employer's power over employees).
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Blades, supra note 366, at 1413 (quoting Hacker, Introduction: Corporate America, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER
9 (A Hacker ed. 1964)). Substantial evidence suggests that discharge from employment severely affects the mental well-being
of the person. Comment, Implied Contract Rird1ts to Job Sernritr. 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,339 (1974).
Twerski, supra note 74, at 25-31.
290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972).

ill

Id. at 282-83.

372

Id at 285.

373

Id at 286: see also Twerski II, supra note 6, at 346. Twerski wrote, '[I]t is difficult to justify reducing plaintiffs verdict when
he is injured by absence of the very mechanism which should have protected him in the first place.' Id
Additionally, momentary inadvertence should be distinguished from true, knowing assumption of risk. See, e.g., Beacham v.
Lce-N orse, 714 F.2d lO l 0. IO 15 ( I 0th Cir. 1983) (applying Utah law; where plaintiff fell into roof bolter his action was not
voluntary); McCracken v. Westi1rn:house Air Brake Co .. 430 N.E."'d 539. 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 198 l) (plaintiff, whose hand was
mangled by cooling fan when, as required by his job, he attempted to tap a fuel filter while machine was running, did not
assume the risk): Anthonv Pools v. Sheehan. 455 A.2d 434. 435. 441 (Md. 1983) (plaintiff who fell off diving board hitting
his head on concrete coping not barred from recovery).
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B.:xiga v. Havir Mfa. Corp .. 290 A.2d at 285.

375

406 A.~d 140 (N.J. 1979).

376

Id. at 142-43.

377

Id at 148 (footnotes omitted).

378

Comment, supra note 333, at 55.
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Twerski, supra note 74, at 4.
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Id. at 26.
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Seiden, a products safety engineer, suggested that 'having a hand, finger, or toe amputated seems a rather severe penalty to
make [a] customer pay for merely being human.' R. SEIDEN, supra note 318, at 93.
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For example, in Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Corp .. 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), the plaintiff purchased
a motorcycle in Canada and rode it to California. Id at 748. During the trip he noticed that it developed a serious 'shimmy'
when he drove over 50 miles per hour. The plaintiff knew the cause of the shimmy-a defective steering damper-as well as its
potentially dangerous consequences because of his previous experience with motorcycles. Id at 747-50. Furthermore, during
the 1300 miles that he rode the offending motorcycle, he stopped at no fewer than six Harley Davidson shops, but never once
tried to have the motorcycle repaired, and never called the defect to the attention of a mechanic. Id. at 750. The accident of
which the plaintiff complained was caused by the shimmying while the plaintiff was riding at about 50 miles per hour. Id. at 748.
750. Saeter voluntarily assumed the risk of his injury, and the California court appropriately denied recovery. Id al 751-52.
In Sargia v. Ski! Corp., [Sept. 1985-Aug. 1986 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ,Il0,813 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1985),
plaintiff, an experienced professional carpenter, and his employer were using a Ski! circular power saw while cutting tar shingles
on the roof of a house. Id. ,Il0,813, at 29,245. At about 10:00 in the morning, they realized that the 'bumper' for the saw's
protective blade guard had fallen off. Id The bumper was designed to stop the guard from covering up the front of the saw
in order to maintain a small aperture of exposed saw blade for contact with the object to be cut.Id. Without the bumper, the
guard obstructed the front of the blade, preventing the user from beginning the cut. Id. Although two other saws were on the
job site, Sargia and his employer continued to use to broken saw by manually retracting the blade guard before each cut. Id.
At 4:30 in the afternoon, Sargia missed the life lever he was using to raise the guard and his fingers came in contact with the
blade. Id. Sargia voluntarily assumed the risk of his injury, and accordingly his recovery was, as it should have been, reduced.
Another appropriate 'window' for the application of the assumption of risk defense in strict liability cases are those cases in
which the setting is commercial and property damage occurs rather than personal injury. For a case applying comparative
principles to assumption of the risk in this context, see National Marine Serv. v. Petroleum Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.
1984). Note, however, that a majority of courts have refused to pem1it strict liability actions for purely commercial injuries,
a position adopted by the Supreme Court for maritime cases in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Dela val, 476 U.S. 858
(1986).
See supra notes 279-305 and accompanying text.
575 P.2d 1162, 1181 (Cal. 1978) (Mosk. J., dissenting).
Id. at 1186 (citations omitted).
Twerski II, supra note 6, at 346.
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